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CHAPTER I
POLITICAL TERRORISM: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It has been 
utilized throughout history by criminals, military forces, 
political dissidents and governments. While terrorism for 
political purposes is nothing new, its applications and goals 
have changed and evolved to reflect the political, social, and 
technological climate of the post-World War II world. The 
utilization of political terrorism increased dramatically 
throughout the world during the past decade. Increasingly 
revolutionary groups have turned to terrorism as a means of 
achieving a particular goal. The primary reason for the pro­
liferation of terrorism in recent years is simple, recognition. 
By employing terrorism any small group of individuals can 
gain worldwide publicity for itself and its cause. A revo­
lutionary group is not a force to be reckoned with until 
it is recognized as such by the people and the government 
of the country against whom its actions are directed. A 
group which lacks either a strong base of support among
the population or a popular cause to mobilize the population 
must resort to spectacular acts of violence in order to gain 
recognition.
The belief that spectacular acts of violence will 
alienate the population is not always valid. One must 
remember that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom 
fighter.^ An act of extreme violence, such as the murder 
of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics by Palestinian 
terrorists, may be condemned in the Western world; however, 
such acts are justifiable in the eyes of many Arab govern­
ments which support the Palestinian cause. The "terrorists" 
are regarded as heroes and martyrs by millions of supporters 
in the Arab world. The same is true of other groups, such 
as the supporters of the IRA or SWAPO causes, and support­
ers of the Iranian revolution. The "terrorists" are freedom 
fighters and their actions are justifiable acts of libera­
tion.
In the past decade terrorists have been able to 
exert influence over nations and world leaders by confronting 
them with terrorism or the threat of terrorism. By 
perpetuating acts such as the kidnapping of former Italian 
Prime Minister Aldo Moro and the seizure of the American 
Embassy in Iran, terrorists are able to hold hostage not 
only the individuals actually under their control, but also 
the headlines throughout the world. By employing terrorism 
little'known groups, such as the South Moluccans, are able
to gain instant recognition for themselves and their cause.
Advanced technology has played an important role 
in the increase of political terrorism. Due to the increased 
sophistication of the communication equipment employed by 
the mass media it is possible to see the actions of 
terrorists as they are being played out. Bringing the 
actions of terrorists into the living room every evening on 
the television set increases the impact of their actions.
The actions are shown repeatedly for television audiences 
and photographed extensively by the print media. Extensive 
research is conducted on the terrorist group, its members, 
its grievances, and its objectives. Thus, millions of 
dollars of free publicity are given to terrorists every time 
they carry out a spectacular act of violence. Additionally, 
the instant publicity effects the governmental decision­
maker by arousing the emotions of the public as the act is 
being played out. The government leaders may find their 
options limited by public sentiment and they may be forced 
into certain courses of action by public opinion.
Advanced technology has also greatly improved the 
terrorist's arsenal. Such weapons as the Soviet SA-7 Grail, 
a man-portable surface-to-air heat-seeking missile, makes 
it possible for a lone terrorist to shoot down an airliner 
from a distance of up to two miles. In recent years PLO 
members have been apprehended twice, once in Rome and once 
in Kenya, with SA-7's and plans to shoot down El Al airliners
2during takeoffs or landings. In Rhodesia two civilian 
airliners have been shot down by members of the Patriotic 
Front utilizing SA-7's. The terrorist arsenal also contains 
the latest in plastic explosives, time-delay devices, and 
"booby-trapping" techniques.
Another reason for the increase in terrorism is the 
cost/benefit ratio of terrorism compared to other types of 
military operations. In terms of men and equipment expended, 
terrorism is much more economical than full-scale guerrilla 
warfare. By investing a very small number of personnel in 
a terrorist operation a terrorist group can receive world­
wide attention. The publicity not only gains recognition 
for its cause, but also serves to attract new recruits to 
its movement.
The word "terrorism" is currently used to define a 
variety of distinct and different actions, from the coercion 
of a criminal organization operating for profit, to the 
revolutionary organization operating to promote its ideals. 
This study is concerned with contemporary "political 
terrorism." Political terrorism is "an action designed to 
influence political behavior by extranormal means, entailing 
the use or threat of v i o l e n c e . T h e  key to this definition 
is the emphasis on political gain by the use or threat of 
violence. ^
Types of Terrorism 
For the purpose of this study two general types and
three distinct categories of political terrorism have Been 
identified. The two types refer to the method of employment 
and the targets of political terrorism, and the three cate­
gories deal with who employs the political terrorism and its 
purposes. The first type, selective terrorism, is used pri­
marily on government officials or other opponents of the 
terrorist group, such as political leaders, police officials, 
and the military. The Viet-Cong employed selective terrorism 
extensively in order to gain control of rural villages. 
Between 1959 and 1964 more than 6000 Vietnamese officials and 
landlords were killed by the Viet-Cong in acts of selective
4terrorism. Both the Italian Red Brigades and the Irish 
Republican Army have utilized selective terrorism against the 
police, military, and other government representatives. The 
Red Brigades have copied the IRA's tactic of "knee-capping" 
opponents as a type of implicit warning.
The purpose of selective terrorism is to demonstrate 
the strength of the terrorist group, disrupt government 
control of the population, suppress cooperation with the 
government, and to embarrass the government by making it 
appear inept. By employing selective terrorism the terrorist 
group attempts to divorce the people from the government by 
eliminating the government representatives and demonstrating 
the penalties for cooperating with the government. To 
underscore the unprofitability of being or becoming a 
government representative, terrorist groups often employ
particularly brutal means of execution. The Viet-Cong/ for 
example/ executed Vietnamese village headmen suspected of 
cooperating with the government by disemboweling and 
decapitating them and their families.^ The attention given 
to such acts in the press and through word of mouth is much 
greater in cases where extreme brutality is used. Thus/ 
the implied threat to others becomes all the more obvious.
Many terroris-t groups actually hope that terrorism 
will drive the government into taking severe measures to 
eliminate their movement. The terrorists believe that if 
the government can be made to take drastic measures, such 
as suspending many civil liberties in order to defeat their 
group/ the overreactions of the authorities will alienate 
the population. Once the population has been oppressed and 
alienated by the government's actions it will revolt against 
the government and create a power vacuum which the terrorist 
group will be able to fill.
The second type of terrorism, indiscriminate 
terrorism, involves the killing of anyone, civilian or 
military, regardless of their affiliation with the government. 
The violence is instigated in order to gain recognition for 
a cause, and to discredit the government by demonstrating 
the inability of the government to protect the people. 
Indiscriminate terrorism is often characterized as "mindless 
violence." However, the more mindless the violence, the 
more horrendous the act, and the more indiscriminate
the terrorism, the more publicity gained by the action.
The Viet-Cong utilized indiscriminate terrorism as did the 
FLN during the Algerian revolution. However, the most 
recent widespread use of indiscriminate terrorism is by 
the various groups that comprise the Palestine Liberation 
Organization. The fedayeen, or Palestinian commandos, have 
relied predominantly upon indiscriminate terrorism to bring 
their views to the attention of the world. Over the past
decade other terrorist groups have begun to emulate the 
tactics of the PLO. Therefore, indiscriminate terrorism 
is becoming much more widespread than selective terrorism.
In addition to increasing the impact of his actions
by utilizing indiscriminate terrorism, the terrorist also
has the advantage of ease of operation and availability of
targets. Since a government cannot protect each and every
citizen 24 hours a day there is no problem finding a%
target. This is particularly true in the democratic Western 
nations where there exist civil liberties that allow 
unrestricted travel and laws limiting indiscriminate 
searches. Additionally, indiscriminate terrorism generally 
requires less training and operational expertise than does 
selective terrorism. It is much easier to throw a grenade 
into a crowd or plant a bomb in a crowded, unsuspecting 
store than it is to assassinate well-guarded government 
officials.
Political blackmail is also more easily applied if 
it is applied indiscriminately. The seizing of hostages and
8
the issuing of political demands can either be selective, 
which involves the seizing of an embassy or other government 
institutions, or indiscriminate, in which a group of civil­
ians is seized at random. In recent years governments have 
greatly increased security at embassies and other government 
facilities that might be subject to seizure by terrorists. 
Therefore, it is easier to seize an unguarded train or bus 
than an embassy, and the effect is just as dramatic.
Categories of Terrorism
The two types of terrorism, selective and indiscrim­
inate, are employed in varying degrees in the three 
categories of terrorism.
The first category is institutional terrorism which 
is utilized by governments and has two distinct forms. First 
of all, institutional terrorism can be utilized by a 
government to control the population through fear and 
elimination of political opposition. A recent example would 
be the rule by terror of Idi Amin in Uganda. Secondly, a 
government can employ counter-terror tactics in order to 
combat and counter an insurgency movement. The French 
tactics in Algeria is an example of this tactic. The 
Israelis have also made use of counter-terror. The Israelis 
have, in the past, responded to fedayeen activities by 
employing such actions as neighborhood punishment, whereby 
homes and neighborhoods suspected of aiding and harboring 
terrorists are destroyed. Additionally, the Israelis have
carried out raids against sanctuary countries, such, a? the 
Latani operation into Lebanon in 1978.
The second category of political terrorism is 
terrorism as a stage of revolutionary warfare. There are 
four stages of revolutionary warfare;
(11 Organizational Stage. This is the initial stage in 
which the party of the revolutionary organization is 
formed, the ideological base is solidified, and 
members are recruited.
(.21 Terrorism Stage. In this phase both selective and
indiscriminate terrorism are utilized. Indiscriminate 
terrorism is used to draw attention to the cause and 
to the revolutionary movement. Selective terrorism 
is utilized to eliminate government supporters and to 
divorce the people from the government.
C31 Guerrilla Warfare Stage. Once terrorism has achieved 
the desired effect and the revolutionary organization 
is firmly entrenched in the country, the revolution 
passes into the third phase, guerrilla warfare. In 
this stage, which may involve years, the guerrillas 
employ hit-and-run tactics. Isolated military outposts 
are attacked and small groups of government soldiers 
are isolated and defeated by large groups of guerrillas. 
Government facilities and institutions are subjected 
to sabotage and raid. During this phase the emphasis 
is on winning military victories. Although the 
victories may be small the government forces are
10
demoralized and forced c-n the defensive. Each 
guerrilla victory aids in attracting new recruits and 
supporters to the movement.
C4) Conventional Warfare Stage. When the enemy has been 
weakened severely by guerrilla warfare the revolution 
moves into its final stage, conventional warfare. 
During this stage the government forces are openly 
challenged to engage in set-piece decisive battles. 
The guerrillas now have their forces organized into 
conventional army formations rather than small 
guerrilla bands. The insurgents no longer utilize 
hit-and-run tactics, but are now prepared to stand 
and fight. An example of this can be seen in the 
difference in tactics employed by the North Vietna­
mese and Viet-Cong after the withdrawal of American 
troops from South Vietnam. In 1975 after the 
withdrawal of U.S. troops the North Vietnamese 
invaded the South with a massive conventional force. 
The South Vietnamese Army was engaged in conventional
Cwarfare and defeated.
The stages of revolutionary warfare are regressive 
as well as progressive. If the insurgents are defeated in 
one stage they can regress to another and reorganize and 
again attempt the next stage at a later date. For example, 
the North Vietnamese in 1972 tried to defeat the South by a 
conventional invasion. Due to the intervention of the U.S. 
in the form of renewed bombings the North Vietnamese had to
11
regress back to guerrilla warfare. In 1975 the North, again 
moved into the conventional stage with successful results.
The third category of terrorism is provocational and 
instigational terrorism (PIT). This is a new type of warfare 
instigated primarily By the PLO. Both in institutional 
terrorism and terrorism as a stage of revolutionary warfare 
the major objective is to win military victories. Further­
more, revolutionary warfare aims to weaken the government 
sufficiently to enable a shift to conventional warfare and 
to defeat the government militarily. However, in provoca­
tional and instigational terrorism military victory is hot 
the primary aim. The primary purpose of PIT is a propaganda 
or symbolic victory rather than a military victory. The 
PLO and other such terrorist groups do not challenge the 
military forces of the target country. The PLO’s terrorist 
activity is actually aimed at civilians, not the military. 
Groups such as the PLO resort to PIT because they are 
unable to wage successful guerrilla warfare against the 
target country. Therefore, the PLO is not an insurgency 
movement; its members are not guerrilla warriors. The PLO 
is too weak militarily and lacks the internal support 
necessary to wage successful guerrilla warfare against 
Israel. Thus, the targets of the attacks are civilian or 
representatives of the government. Additionally, provoca­
tional and instigations! terrorism is not stage-oriented 
as is revolutionary warfare. The terrorism employed in
12
revolutionary warfare is only one of four stages; it is 
only a part of a larger strategy. However, PIT is a strat­
egy in and of itself. Provocational and instigational 
terrorism is designed to:
-PROVOKE the government into severe reaction which will 
turn the tide of opinion against the government. It is 
not necessary to provoke sympathy from the nations of the 
world, although that may be an objective. All that is 
necessaty is to bring both internal and external pressure 
to bear on the government.
-PROVOKE recognition of the cause of the terrorist group. 
PIT relies on spectacular acts of terrorism to force 
recognition and to gain the headlines of the world. For 
example, the little-known South Moluccan terrorist group 
was able to hold the headlines for 12 days while it 
held a Dutch train and its passengers hostage.
-PROVOKE the world to take action in behalf of the 
terrorists' cause. The PLO has used PIT to gain publicity 
for its cause and to pressure governments into yielding 
concessions, such as the shutdown of the Austrian refugee 
processing center for Russian Jewish immigrants to Israel. 
This shutdown was accomplished by seizing hostages 
aboard a Vienna-bound train.^ However, the height of the 
PLO's success was in gaining an observer status in the 
United Nations. Terrorist organizations such as the PLO 
have political aims but no legal political structure 
through vhich to negotiate and gain political influence.
13
The use of terrorism actually constitutes a "diplomacy 
of confrontation" whereby groups can force governments 
to negotiate with them.
-INSTIGATE internal insurrection and widespread dissatis­
faction with the government. No terrorist group has 
yet been able to achieve this by employing only terrorist 
tactics.
-INSTIGATE fear and disorder among the population. In the 
case of Israel, the PLO additionally hopes to discourage 
tourists from visiting Israel and thereby injuring 
Israel economically.
A significant. aspect of PIT is acts of international 
terrorism. International terrorism is a tactic instigated 
in 1968 by the PLO. (The PLO and its leading role in 
instigating international terrorism will be explained in 
detail in Chapter IV). As in guerrilla warfare there are 
no front lines of clearcut battlefields. However, unlike 
guerrilla warfare there are no boundaries or territorial 
limitations on international terrorism. Institutional 
terrorism and terrorism as a stage of revolutionary warfare 
confine themselves to the target country, or at most to 
certain surrounding countries who are utilized as sanctu­
aries for the insurgents.
International terrorism makes extensive use of 
operations in non-involved nations, that is, nations which 
are not directly involved in the conflict between the 
terrorists and the target country. Non-involved nations are
14
much more likely to yield to terrorist demands than is the 
government of the target country. In the past non-involved 
nations have found it easier to yield to terrorist demands 
than to risk hostages' lives and potential embarassment to 
the government. In addition, non-involved countries fear 
terrorist retribution if a hard-line is taken against 
operations of the terrorist group. A study by the Rand 
Corporation of 63 major kidnapping operations executed 
between 1968 and late 1974 found that there was a 79 percent 
chance that all members of a terrorist team would escape
Qdeath or punishment. Thus, operations carried out in a 
non-involved country against symbols or representatives of 
the target country, such as airliners, nationals of the 
target country, and government and business executives, have 
a much greater chance of success. Additionally, if terror­
ists are captured or surrender in a non-involved nation 
their chance of escaping punishment is extremely high. 
Outside of Israel very few PLO terrorists have been punished 
for their actions or have spent any significant time in 
prison. In many cases the captured terrorists have been 
released in exchange for hostages seized by the terrorist 
group in order to gain freedom for their jailed comrades.
The examples are numerous. In August 1972 two Palestinians 
planted a bomb in luggage placed on an El Al airliner. The 
bomb subsequently detonated in the hold of the aircraft 
while in flight. However, the plane was not destroyed due 
to the armored holds constructed on El Al planes. The
15
Palestinians were not on the plane but were later identified
and captured by Italian police in Rome. Italy wanted to
avoid conflict with the PLO and was afraid of future terror-^
ist acts if the two Palestinians were prosecuted. Therefore,
the terrorists were granted "provisional liberty" on the
grounds that the explosive charge they planted "was not
qadequate to destroy the airliner." Naturally the terrorists 
disappeared from Italy as soon as they were released.
In the case of the famous hijacking to Mogadishu, 
Somalia by a combined group of Arab and German terrorists 
in 1977,three of the terrorists were killed by German 
Commandos in a rescue operation. However, one female terror­
ist survived. She remained in Somalia until she recovered 
from her wounds and then was flown to Iraq and released.
Even the surviving three members of Black September, who 
carried out the Munich massacre of Israeli athletes, were 
freed. Only seven weeks after the massacre two members of 
Black September hijacked a Boeing 727 Lufthansa airliner and 
held it for the ransom of the three Black September members 
held in Germany. The terrorists were released and flown 
to Libya.
Another advantage of attacking a non-involved country 
is the limitation of reactions of the non-involved country 
to terrorist attacks. When there is a terrorist attack in 
Israel or against Israeli targets in another country the 
Israelis react violently against the source of the attack,
16
the bases and leaders of the terrorist group. Israel has 
repeatedly attacked terrorist bases in surrounding Arab 
countries in reaction to terrorist attacks. However, a non­
involved country does not launch an air strike or send in 
commandos to raid the terrorist bases for political reasons. 
The reaction of a non-invoIved nation is limited to rhetoric 
against the terrorist group and actions against those terror­
ists involved. However, the primary reason for the emergence 
of the use of PIT and international terrorism by the PLO and 
other groups is their inability to wage successful guerrilla 
warfare in the target country.
The PLO has resorted to international terrorism due 
to a general inability to wage successful guerrilla warfare 
inside of Israel. There have been some successful attacks by 
the PLO on Israeli territory. However, these are acts of 
provocational and instigational terror and have no effect on 
the military capability of the country. On the contrary, 
these raids kill only a small number of people and only serve 
to harden the Israeli position toward the PLO. Also, with 
each new attack Israeli security and counter-terror methods 
are strengthened and it becomes increasingly difficult to 
mount successful terrorist raids. Presently the PLO can suc­
ceed in mounting a successful terrorist operation only after 
several months of efforts and many failures. The majority 
of the fedayeen are captured or killed Before carrying out
their mission. Each year it becomes more difficult to mount
12a successful terrorist attack. Therefore, the PLO has
17
found it more advantageous to resort to acts of international 
terrorism.
Terrorist Tactics 
As previously stated, terrorists attempt to obtain 
the maximum cost/benefit ratio from their actions. Therefore, 
terrorists concentrate on high visability actions such as 
kidnapping, hijacking, indiscriminate bombings, and barricade/ 
hostage operations. These are tactics which are little used 
by insurgents in revolutionary warfare. This is because 
these types of actions have little effect on the military 
capability of the target country, particularly if the acts 
are carried out in non-involved nations.
According to the CIA, terrorists adapt their tactics 
to counter the countermeasures adopted by the police and 
m i l i t a r y . F o r  example, when the increased security aboard 
aircraft and at airports made aircraft hijacking difficult, 
terrorists switched to trains. Buses, and buildings. Organ­
izations such as the PLO have been able to survive as viable 
organizations by constantly changing their tactics in response 
to preventive measures enacted against them.
The following study centers around one specific 
revolutionary organization which has adopted terrorism as its 
primary tactic. This organization, the Palestine Liberation 
Organization, has had a profound effect upon the Middle East 
conflict. It is the purpose of this study to. examine this 
effect and the reasons behind this effect. This study is
18
not intended as a value judgment regarding the legitimacy 
or illegitimacy of .the Palestinian cause. Rather is is 
intended as a study of the methods utilized by a group 
representing the Palestinian cause. Any negative implica­
tions presented in this study are directed at the utilization 
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CHAPTER II 
HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT
The Basis of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a 
conflicting claim to a small strip of land at the eastern 
end of the Mediterranean Sea which has Been called at 
different periods of time ""Canaan,"' "Palestine," and 
"Israel." The Palestinians claim this land as their own by 
virtue of occupancy. The Jews cite a historical claim on 
the basis of the existence of an ancient Jewish state in 
this land, a religious bond with this land, and the contin­
ued existence of a Jewish community in Palestine for over 
4Q0Q years.
The two historical viewpoints, Arab and Israeli, 
differ so greatly that I have elected to handle them 
separately.
The Israeli Viewpoint
Historically both the Jews and the Arabs share 
common Semitic roots. Both groups trace their lineage back 
to "father Abraham" who immigrated to Palestine approximately 
4000 years ago.^ The settlement of Palestine by the Hebrew 
people took place approximately 1400-1300 B.C. The kingdom
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reached its peak under King David and his son Solomon.
This kingdom contained much of what is today Jordan,
Lebanon, and Syria. The Jews cite this kingdom as the
basis for the Jewish claim to the land of Israel. Following
Solomon's death the kingdom was divided into two separate
states, the kingdom of Israel in the north and the kingdom
of Judah in the south. In 722 B.C. the kingdom of Israel
was conquered by the Assyrians and the people were carried
off into exile. In 587 B.C. the kingdom of Judah was
destroyed by the Babylonians and was depopulated by a mass 
2deportation. In 539 B.C. Cyrus, King of Persia, conquered 
the Babylonian Empire. One year later the Hebrew exiles of 
Judah were allowed to return to Palestine and resettle.
The small community of Jews who had remained in Israel 
combined with the returning exiles and rebuilt Jerusalem 
and the Jewish temple. This began the Hebrew state of the 
second temple period. The Jewish state was conquered in 333 
B.C. by Alexander the Great. Thus began a period in which 
Israel was under the control of various foreign powers. In 
301 B.C. the country was conquered by Egypt and in 271 B.C. 
by the Seleucids of Syria. The religious policies of the 
Seleucid ruler toward conquered territories cau ed the 
Jews to rebel in 166 B.C. In 164 B.C.the Jewish rebels 
managed to conquer Jerusalem and purify the temple. The 
Jews again set up an autonomous state which lasted until 
the Roman invasion in 63 B.C.^
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The Jews revolted against the Romans in 66 A.D. 
which resulted in the destruction of Jerusalem and the 
second temple in 70 A.D, The majority of the Jewish popula­
tion was exiled and the Jews did not return as a nation
4until 1948. However, a Jewish presence remained in 
Palestine throughout history. Although this presence was 
small Cby 1856 the Jewish population numbered only about 
10,000) the Israeli government regards this continued Jewish 
presence as further legitimacy for the Jewish state.^
Periodic outbreaks of anti-Semitism and continued 
persecution of Jews in many nations caused many Jews to 
believe that they must have their own nation again to serve 
as a refuge. In the late 19th century the first small 
Jewish settlements were formed in Palestine. However, the 
rise of modern Zionism began in 1897 when Theador Herzl 
founded the World Zionist Organization. The objective of 
the WZO was to "secure for the Jewish people a publicly 
recognized, legally secured home in Erez Israel."^ The 
idea sparked new immigration to Palestine which was con­
trolled by the Ottoman Empire. By the start of World War I 
there were approximately 85,000 Jews in Palestine.^
After World War I the British were granted a mandate 
by the League of Nations to rule Palestine. In November 
1917 the British government had issued the famous Balfour 
Declaration which pledged support for the establishment of 
a Jewish state in Palestine. The document, which is viewed 
by the Israelis as a further legal basis for the present
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Israeli state, stated, "His majesty's government views with
favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for
the Jewish poeple and will use their best endeavours to
8facilitate the achievement of this object." However, the 
British never implemented the Balfour Declaration and the 
Jewish state was not established by the British.
Despite the setback Jewish immigration continued. By 
1931 there were 174,0.00 Jews in Palestine; in 1939 the number
ghad risen to approximately 449,000, The increased Jewish 
immigration caused resentment among the Arab population of 
Palestine who initiated periodic riots and attacks against 
Jewish settlements. The largest outbreak of violence was 
in 1936 when the Mufti of Jerusalem proclaimed a general 
strike which sparked widespread attacks against the Jewish 
settlers. The British government was greatly distressed 
by the violence in Palestine. By 1936 they had 20,000 
troops stationed in the country. In order to find the cause 
of the unrest the British sent a Royal Commission of Inquiry 
to Palestine in November 1936. The Commission, known as the 
Peel Commission after its chairman Lord Robert Peel, con­
ducted a two-month inquiry to determine the cause of the 
violence. In July 1937 the Commission issued its report.
The 404-page document stressed the Arab resentment of the 
Jewish settlers and recommended a partitioning of Palestine 
into separate Arab and Jewish states. It further recommended 
that Jewish immigration be limited to 12,000 annually for 
the next five years. Continued Arab violence against the
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Jewish settlers and the recommendations of the Peel 
Commission caused the British government to issue the famous 
"White Paper" of 1939. The White Paper called for the 
establishment of an independent Palestinian state to take 
place over a period of the next ten years. Both the Jews 
and the Arabs were to share power in this new state; there 
was not to be a separate Jewish amd a separate Arab state. 
This policy of no separate Jewish and Arab states in the 
1939 White Paper differs from the recommendations of the 
Peel Commission in 1937 which called for the partition of 
Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states. The reason 
for this turnabout in British policy was the advent of 
World War II and the British government's need for the 
support of the Arab states. The British considered the 
friendship of the Arab states to be of vital importance 
at a time when the world was at the brink of war. The 
British realized that the Arab friendship could not be 
maintained if the Arabs in Palestine were in revolt and 
the Arab rulers were angered over a possible Jewish state 
in Palestine. Therefore, the British decided against 
enacting the recommendations of the Peel Commission, which 
called for separate Jewish and Arab states in Palestine, 
in order to satisfy Arab demands and to insure future 
friendly relations with the Arab states. The result of this 
was the 1939 White Paper.
The most disastrous part of the White Paper was a
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restriction on further Jewish immigration. A quota of
10,000 Jewish immigrants annually for five years was estab­
lished. Furthermore, the White Paper stated that, "After 
the period of five years no further Jewish immigration will 
Be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to 
acquiesce in it."^^ This declaration came at the time when 
Jewish refugees were attempting to leave Europe to escape 
the Nazi Holocaust. In the early years of Hitler's rule 
and even in the early years of World War II, Hitler allowed 
German Jews and Jews in conquered territories to leave. 
However, most nations were reluctant to accept the refugees. 
Only the Zionist settlers in Palestine were anxious 
to accept these Jewish refugees; nevertheless, the British 
government would not allow them to enter Palestine. Many 
Israelis still maintain ill feelings toward the British 
for refusing to allow Jews from Europe to immigrate to 
Palestine. Because the majority of the world also refused 
to accept any large number of Jewish refugees, 6 million 
Jews died in Hitler's concentration camps.
During World War II approximately 30,000 Jewish
12volunteers from Palestine fought in the British Army.
These men gained valuable military expertise which they 
were able to put to use in their own 1948 War of Independence 
in Palestine.
At the end of World War II there existed three 
main Jewish underground military organizations. The largest 
was the Haganah, which in the postwar years until Jewish
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Statehood concentrated primarily on self-defense and 
illegal smuggling of Jewish refugees into Palestine, Even 
after World War II the British refused to lift the restric­
tions of the White Paper and allow the Holocaust refugees 
into Palestine. The other two organizations, the Irgun 
Zvai Leumi (National Military Organization), and the Stern 
gang or Lehi (Lohamei Herut Israel, Israel Freedom Fighters), 
were much more militant and waged open warfare against the
13British. Between September 1946 and May 1948 the Lehi
carried out more than 100 acts of sabotage and killings
14against the British. The Irgun attacked both the British 
and Arab targets. The Irgun believed that only active 
retaliation would stop the Arab attacks and only military 
force could bring about the Jewish state. The Irgun's 
symbol was a hand gripping a rifle superimposed over a map 
of Palestine (including Transjordan) with the motto "Only 
Thus." The Irgun was led by a Polish Jew named Menachem 
Begin. The Irgun is Best known for the bombing of the King 
David Hotel in Jerusalem which contained the British Mili­
tary Headquarters. Ninety-one people were killed in the 
attack and forty-five injured Both the Irgun and the 
Stern gang were labeled terrrorist organizations by the 
British and Menachem Begin had a price on his head.
By 1947 the British had approximately 100,000 troops 
stationed in Palestine to attempt to keep the peace. The 
price was heavy both in terms of lives and money. Despite
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the massive effort the situation continued to deteriorate 
and by February 1947 the families of British personnel were 
evacuated to England.
The British finally decided to refer the problem of 
Palestine to the United Nations in April 1947. In November 
of 1947 the United Nations decided to partition Palestine 
into two states/ one Jewish and one Arab. The Arab state 
was to receive approximately 43 percent of the land area.
The area designated for the Arab state contained approxi­
mately 804,000 Arabs and 10,000 Jews. The Jewish state was 
to encompass 56 percent of Palestine's territory and a 
population of 397,000 Arabs and 538,000 Jews.^^ Under the 
Partition Plan there was to be no transfer of population 
and the two states were to be joined together economically 
in such areas as irrigation, currency, and interstate 
communications. Jerusalem, which amounts to approximately
one percent of the area of Palestine, was to have interna-
18tional status under United Nations control. The Partition 
Plan was adopted by the United Nations on November 29, 1947; 
the British were to withdraw their troops from Palestine by 
May 15, 1948. The Jews in Palestine agreed to the Partition 
Plan. However, the Palestinian Arabs violently opposed the 
plan and began attacks on Jewish targets. On December 17, 
1947 the Arab League Council voiced its opposition to the 
Partition Plan by announcing that it would stop the plan by 
force. The Palestinian Arabs were aided by irregulars 
infiltrated from Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt. As the British.
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evacuated military bases they were turned over to the Arabs.
On May 14, 1948, the day before the last British troops were
withdrawn, the Jewish leaders proclaimed the establishment
19of the Jewish state. Almost immediately the four neigh­
boring Arab states, Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, and Lebanon, 
invaded Palestine to crush the new state. The outcome of 
the war is, of course, well-known. The Israelis, despite 
their lack of military equipment, had anticipated the war 
and were fighting for their survival. The 1948 War ended 
in a victory for Israel and the seizure of much of the 
territory allocated to the Arab state in Palestine. As a 
result of the 1948 War the Israelis increased the territory 
of the Jewish state from 14,500 to 20,850 square kilometers 
and reduced the territory of the Arab state from 11,800 to 
about 5400 square kilometers. Thus, the total area under 
Israeli control increased from 56 percent to about 80 
percent of P a l e s t i n e . T h e  only areas of the Arab state 
not seized by Israel were the two areas which are presently 
known as the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The West Bank
21was seized by the Jordanians and formally annexed in 1950.
The Gaza Strip was seized and subsequently controlled by 
22Egypt. The Israelis point out the fact that the Arab 
governments are now calling for a Palestinian state in the 
West Bank and Gaza which has been controlled by Israel since 
the 1967 War. However, in the years between 1948 and 1967, 
when these areas were controlled by Egypt and Jordan,
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there was never an attempt to establish a Palestinian state 
in these areas.
As a result of the fighting in the 1948 War and 
rumors about acts of retribution by the Israelis, many 
Palestinian Arabs left their homes located in the Jewish 
state and in the territory captured by Israel. Estimates 
of the number of Palestinian refugees of the 1943 War range 
from 470,000 to 750',000. A majority of the refugees moved 
only a few miles to the Arab-controlled areas of the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. Not all of the Palestinian Arabs
fled? approximately 156,000 remained and became citizens
lew 
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of the n Jewish s t a t e . T h e y  now number approximately
412,000.
The refugees in the West Bank, and particularly 
those in the Gaza Strip, conducted continual terrorist 
attacks upon the new Jewish state. The attacks from the 
Gaza Strip, encouraged by Egypt, were one of the primary 
reasons for the 1956 War between Egypt and Israel, The 
1956 War resulted in no permanent territorial gains for 
Israel. Israel seized the Gaza Strip in order to stop the 
terrorists' attacks and also seized the Sinai Peninsula in 
order to take control of Sharm El-Sheikh on the Gulf of 
Aqaba and open the straits of Tiran which Egypt had block­
aded. However, pressure from the United Nations and the 
United States forced the Israelis to withdraw.
However, in 1967 it was different. In the yerrs 
following the 1956 War the Arabs continued terrorist
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attacks across the borders in addition to periodic artillery 
shellings from the Arab armies. Prior to the 1967 War the 
Israeli borders were extremely vulnerable to terrorist 
attack and artillery fire. The pre-1967 borders were com­
pletely undesirable from a military viewpoint. From the 
Golan Heights the Syrians were able to rain down artillery 
shells on Israeli settlements. From the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip Arab artillery could reach most of Israel's population 
and industrial areas. From the West Bank, occupied by 
Jordan, to the sea was only ten miles at one point. The 
pre-1967 borders measured 985 kilometers and were not defined 
or separated from the Arab nations by any natural obstacles. 
After the 1967 War Israel's borders were reduced to 650 
kilometers and were situated along more easily defended 
terrain such as the Suez Canal and the Jordan River. The 
Sinai Desert and the Golan Heights are a buffer zone between
Israel and the Arab nations of Egypt and Syria. Naturally
27Israel is very reluctant to yield this territory. While 
the accruement of this territory gave the Israelis more 
defensible borders it also resulted in a further exodus of 
thousands of Palestinian Arabs. The number of Palestinians 
displaced by the 1967 War is estimated to be between 300,.000
pQto 400,000. A further result of the 1967 War was that the 
territory the Israelis occupied contained almost 1.1 million 
Palestinians who did not flee. Presently almost one-half 
of the estimated 3 million Palestinian Arabs still live in 
the state of Israel or the Israeli-occupied territories.
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Jordan has the second largest Palestinian population
29estimated to be approximately 800,000.
The 1973 Middle East War did nothing for the Palestin­
ian cause. The Israelis won a costly victory and managed to 
maintain possession of the occupied territories. After 1973 
the Israelis began to yield territory to the Egyptians in • 
return for limited concessions. In 1975 the U.S, mediated an 
agreement between Egypt and Israel in which Isreal agreed to . 
withdraw from approximately 2000 square miles of the Sinai 
Desert and relinquish both Banks of the Suez Canal to 
Egyptian control. The Israelis further agreed to return 
the Abu Rudeis oilfield which supplied a large percent of 
Israel's oil need. The Egyptians agreed, in a break with 
the policies of the other Arab governments, "not to resort 
to the threat or use of force or military blockade." 
Furthermore, the agreement stated that Egypt and Israel,
"were determined to reach a final and just settlement by 
means of negotiations."^^ Nowhere in the agreement are the 
Palestinians mentioned and no reference is made to the 
Palestinian problem. The Israelis believe that the Arab 
states should absorb the Palestinian refugees. They also 
believe that the Arab states deliberately keep the Palestin­
ians in the refugee camps and refuse to absorb them in order 
to use them as a pawn in the war against Israel.
The 1978 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel does
provide "for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of
32the resolution of the refugee problem." The agreement
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calls for an unspecified type of autonomy for the West Bank
and Gaza Strip. In addition, "The solution resulting from
the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate rights
33of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.”
The Israelis are adamant about the fact that they cannot 
allow an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and 
Gaza because of security. A Palestinian state could invite 
other Arab states to send in troops which would return 
conditions to the pre-1967 War situation. The Israelis also 
refuse to deal with the PLO whose members are regarded as 
terrorists who kill women and children in acts of indiscrim­
inate violence. A Palestinian state, the Israelis believe, 
would come under the control of the PLO who would use the 
Palestinian state as a base for further terrorist attacks 
against Israel. The Israelis cite the Baghdad summit 
meeting of the "rejection front" held after Camp David. At 
this meeting the Arab nations pledged to establish a three 
billion dollar fund to aid and support the confrontation
states, the PLO, and the resistance in the occupied 
34territories.
At the time of this writing Israel and Egypt are 
still deadlocked over the type of autonomy to be given to 
the occupied territories. The Israelis continue to insist 
that the PLO has no role to play in whatever type of auton­
omous region is established for the Palestinians.
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The Arab Viewpoint 
The Palestinian Arabs trace their occupancy of 
Palestine back to ancient times as do the Jews. Furthermore, 
they constituted the vast majority of the population in 
Palestine until the Israeli seizure of Palestine in 1948. 
During the Turkish rule Palestine was dominated by certain 
leading Arab families who were recruited into the governing 
class of the Ottoman Empire.
According to the Arab viewpoint, the British sup­
ported the Jewish presence in Palestine even before the 
British conquest during World War I. The British first 
opened a consulate in Jerusalem in 1839. Since they had no 
proteges in the area they established a connection with the 
Palestinian Jews. Furthermore, the British promoted the 
Jewish interest in Palestine and encouraged the Turks to 
allow Jewish immigration.^^
According to the Arab view, the advent of Zionism 
changed the character of Jewish immigration to Palestine.
The new settlers were not religious Jews who were coming 
to Palestine to worship and live. The new immigrants were 
young Jews who bought land and established agricultural 
settlements with the purpose of eventually establishing 
a Jewish state. The new Jewish immigrants were ignorant 
of Arab ways and customs and offended the local Arab people. 
Additionally, the government sold land to the Jews which 
belonged to Arab peasants who were unable to pay their 
taxes. The resulting resentment caused the attacks on the
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37early Jewish settlements.
The Arabs view the Balfour Declaration as an attempt 
to gain support of world Jewry. At the time of the Balfour 
Declaration there were 60,000 Jews in Palestine. The Arabs 
numbered almost 700,000. However, in the Balfour Declara­
tion the 93 percent majority of Arabs are referred to as the
38"non-Jewish communities."
The Jewish population of Palestine continued to
increase. By 1931 the number had increased from 60,000 in
1919, to 175,000. Hitler's rise to power further increased
Jewish immigration, mainly from Poland and Central Europe.
By 1939 the Jews numbered 429,605 out of an estimated
population of 1,500,000 or approximately 28 percent. The
Arabs felt a sense of injustice in that they were suffering
39for events in Europe for which they had no responsibility.
Increased Jewish immigration and the lack of 
restriction on Jewish land sales coupled with the increase 
of landless Arabs and unemployed Arabs in the cities led to 
increased tensions. The Arabs called for a restriction on 
Jewish immigration. However, before the British could take 
any action there occurred a violent uprising of the Palestin­
ian Arabs. Strikes, guerrilla warfare, and resistance by 
the Arabs set off an unsuccessful attempt by the British to 
crush the rebellion by force. The failure of force by the 
British subsequently led to the "White Paper" which 
restricted Jewish immigration. There was still widespread 
distrust of British intentions. However, by 1939. the three
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years of rebellion and disorder had weakened the Arabs'
ability to resist. The outbreak of World War II finally
caused the rebellion to die out and overshadowed the events
taking place in Palestine.^0
During the war the Jews formed their underground
military organizations which terrorized the Arabs of
Palestine. The terror attacks against the Aradas increased
after World War II as the Israelis sought to drive the
Arabs out by fear. The climax of the Jewish terrorism was
the attack on the Arab village of Deir Yassin on April 9,
1948 By the Irgun and Lehi. The village was captured and
more than two hundred Arab men, women, and children were
slain. Their bodies were allegedly mutilated and thrown
into a well.^^
After the end of the war President Truman requested
that the British government allow the immediate immigration
of 100,000 Jews to Palestine. The British were already
having severe problems with illegal Jewish immigration and
violence by the Jewish underground. Finally the British
abandoned any hope of solving the problem of Palestine and
handed the matter over to the United Nations. The British
abandonment and subsequent UN vote resulted from strong
economic and political pressure from the U.S. on behalf of 
42the Zionists.
The Arabs totally rejected the Partition Plan which 
was adopted by the United Nations. The Jews in Palestine 
accepted the plan which granted them 55 percent of Palestine
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at a time when they only constituted 30 percent of the
population and owned less than 8 percent of the land. The
resulting 1948 War led to thé exodus of approximately
750,000 Arabs. Thé Bitterness caused by the creation of the
Israeli state was directed not only against Israel but also
against the United States and Britain. This resentment has
been a prime factor in the growth of anti-Western feelings
43by many of the Arab states.
In 1950 Israel passed the "'Law of Return"' which allows 
any Jew of any nationality to immigrate to Israel and receive 
immediate citizenship. However, the Israelis have refused to 
repatriate the Arab refugees of the 1943 and 1967 Wars. The 
Israeli law also provides for strict conditions of citizenship 
for non-Jews; non-Jews can become citizens after 3 years resi­
dency, but citizenship is not automatically granted. There­
fore, over two million Palestinian refugees and their children
44are denied any chance of citizenship in their former country. 
The PLO and the Arab governments also cite massive discrimina­
tion against the Arabs who are Israeli citizens and against 
Arabs in the occupied territories. Torture of Arab prisoners 
has also been a repeated charge leveled at Israel by the Arabs.
The Israelis are also charged with destruction of 
Arab property. According to PLO reports, there existed 
approximately 475 Arab villages in Palestine before the 1948 
Since 1948 the Israelis have allegedly destroyed 335 
Villages. It is further, charged by the PLO that the Israeli 
Military between July 11, 1967 and November 1969 demolished
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7554 Arab homes in acts of retaliation and collective 
punishment for fedayeen attacks.
The 1975 Sinai disengagement agreement was denounced 
by the PLO since it did nothing toward resolving the 
Palestinian problem. The PLO contrived to sabotage the 
agreement but failed completely. After the signing of the 
agreement the fedayeen leadership strongly denounced the 
accord. Yasir Arafat condemned the agreement stating that, • 
"The Egyptian-Israeli agreement has increased the chances 
of war in the Middle East. It hasn't dealt with the basic 
issue in the area, which is the Palestinian problem and the 
cause of the Palestinian p e o p l e . T h e  PLO's "foreign 
minister" and United Nations representative Farauk Kaddaumi 
stated;
The Sinai agreement goes against the (1974) Rabat 
Resolution. We agreed that no one would move alone.
This is the first agreement between an Arab state and 
Israel. It should have been signed after they with­
draw from all the occupied territories, not before,j 
The Israelis have bought time with it, that's all.
The PLO's anger at the Sinai agreement turned to 
outrage with the advent of the Camp David talks and subse­
quent peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. The PLO felt 
betrayed and Sadat moved to the top of their list of enemies. 
Despite the agreement by Israel to grant autonomy on the 
West Bank and Gaza,Israel has refused to consider the idea of 
a Palestinian state or any part for the PLO in the autonomy. 
The Israelis refused to have any mention made of the PLO 
in the peace treaty. In the view of the PLO and the
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CL3DIHERE: An estimated 250,000 Palestinians are scattered
throughout Egypt, Kuwait and other Mideast states.
ALL TOLD, about half of the 3 million Palestinians Live in 
refugee camps.
SOURCE: "Arafat's tfew Drive for Power-Now a U.S. Problem,'
U.S. News -z World Report. May 5, 1975* Pago 35.
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majority of the Arab world, Sadat and Egypt have given 
the Israelis a permanent license to occupy all of historical 
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CHAPTER III
THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION:
STRUCTURE, POLICY, AND LEGITIMACY
Throughout history many groups of people hâve been 
displaced as a result of warfare, the Jews included. However, 
the vast majority of these displaced populations have been 
absorbed into other nations and their causes have been for­
gotten by the rest of the world. This has not been the case 
with the Palestinians. Their cause and sense of injustice 
have not diminished with age. The international recognition 
of the Palestine Liberation Organization increases every 
year. According to Yasir Arafat, head of the PLO, the PLO 
is now recognized in one form or another by 105 nations, a 
number greater than the nations that recognize Israel.^ This 
recognition ranges from full diplomatic recognition to recog­
nition of the PLO as a legitimate liberation front.
How has the PLO managed to avoid slipping into
anonymity? Primarily, this has Been accomplished by its use
of terrorism as a political tool to force the recognition of
its cause. In order to implement its political and military
strategies the Palestinian movement has developed a complex




The PLO is not by any means a unified organization.
It is a loosely linked coalition of several diverse groups 
with, different ideologies, tactics, and objectives. The PLO 
has been beset by constant strife, internal bickering, and 
at times open warfare among the various groups since its 
conception. The one common goal that links the groups 
together is the desire to regain the land mass which Israel 
now occupies.
The origin of the PLO can be found in the early 
attack by Palestinian Arabs on Jewish settlers in Palestine. 
The massive refugee camps established after the 1948 War 
became the breeding ground for the fedayeen ("sacrificers”) 
which began terrorist raids into the new state. The con­
stant fedayeen raids from the Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip 
were one of the primary reasons for the 1956 War between 
Egypt and Israel, in 1956 Israel seized the Sinai and Gaza 
Strip in order to stop the terrorist attacks. Eventually 
Israel was forced to withdraw after insisting that United 
Nations troops be stationed in the Gaza Strip and Sinai to 
stop terrorist raids. However, terrorist raids continued 
and the Arab states became concerned that terrorist attacks 
from their territory would provoke another war in which they 
were unprepared to fight. Therefore, the Arab governments 
sought a way to control the fedayeen activity. The Egyptians 
in particular wished to establish an organization which
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would unite the various fedayeen groups into a single body 
which could be controlled. At the Arab League Summit 
Conference held in Cairo in January 1964 the Arab governments 
acknowledged that they were not yet militarily prepared to 
engage and defeat Israel. They decided to establish a 
United Arab Command (UACj which would acquire arms and 
coordinate activities designed to strengthen the military 
of the Arab nations. The summit meeting further authorized 
the establishment of a Palestine Liberation Organization 
which was to be the official voice of the Palestinian people 
and coordinate the Palestinian fedayeen activités. Further­
more, the PLO was to coordinate its activities with the
United Arab Command which would limit the PLO’s freedom of 
2action.
The PLO's first chairman was Ahmed Shukeiri who was 
the Palestinian representative in the Arab League. Shukeiri, 
born in Palestine, had served as Saudi Arabia*a delegate to 
the United Nations. On May 22, 1964 the first Palestinian 
National Congress was held in Jerusalem. At this meeting 
the PLO was officially established and a Palestinian National 
Covenant was adopted.^ Provisions were also made to estab­
lish military training and camps, to obtain Palestinian 
admission to Arab military academies, and to establish a 
national fund for financing the PLO. The headquarters were
4to be established in Egypt. According to the PLO covenant 
the objective of the PLO is to liberate Palestine. Regarding
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the method of liberation to be used, Article 9 of the 
charter states that, "Armed struggle is the only way to 
liberate Palestine."^ This objective was reinforced when 
the PLO Unified Command met in Beirut in 1970 to agree upon 
an organizational formula for national unity. Part of the 
agreement, signed by all major groups of the Palestinian 
Resistance Movement, stated that, "The aim of the Palestinian 
revolution is to dismantle this entity (Israel) with its 
political, military, social, syndical, and cultural institu­
tions and to liberate all of Palestine."® The PLO has never 
renounced this objective or the method of "armed struggle" 
to achieve this objective.
Despite the purpose and claim of uniting the 
Palestinian Resistance Movanent CPRM) several of the smaller 
groups refused to join the PLO. In addition, the largest 
fedayeen group, Al Fatah, refused to be assimilated into 
the PLO. Yasir Arafat, its leader, feared Egyptian control 
and restriction of its raids into Israel. The competition 
Between Fatah and the PLO coincided with the competition 
between the principal supporter of each group. The PLO was 
primarily an Egyptian-controlled organization while Fatah 
drew its support from Syria.^ Fatah believed that the PRM 
must be free from the political sguabblings and maneuverings 
of the Arab states. Fatah's newspaper, Our Palestine, 
repeatedly emphasized that Palestinians must lead the fight 
for liberation and not rely upon the Arab governments. Fatah
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was viewed as a radical organization by many of the Arab 
governments since it advocated continuous guerrilla attacks 
against Israel from the surrounding Arab countries. Fatah • 
and Yasir Arafat were greatly influenced by the success of 
the National Liberation Front CFLN) in Algeria. Arafat had 
established a working relationship with FLN members during 
his student days in Algeria. Fatah therefore advocated that 
the PEM adopt the protracted guerrilla warfare strategy of 
the FLN.®
After the defeat of the Arab armies in the Six Day
War of 1967 Shukeiri began to lose support in the PLO. He
was viewed as a symbol of the embarrassing defeat of 1967.
As a result Shukeiri resigned and was replaced by Yahya
Haramauda. Also, as a result of the 1967 War defeat Fatah,
and its policy of protracted warfare against Israel,
increased its popularity and following. Prior to the 1967
War the PLO was relying upon the Arab states to defeat
Israel and return Palestine to Arab control. After the
total defeat of 1967 the PLO realized its strategy had to
change. In November 1967 Fatah called upon the PLO to
gdisband and turn its funds over to Fatah. Despite the 
continuing competition between the PLO and Fatah, Arafat 
agreed in 1968 to unite Fatah with the PLO. It is likely 
that Arafat made this move due to Fatah's increasing popu­
larity, which he believed would allow him to dominate the 
leadership of the PLO. At the fourth session of the 
Palestine National Council [PNC) held in Cairo in 1968
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Fatah was allocated 33 of the 105 seats available. The 
next largest groups, the Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine and Saiga, received twelve seats each.^^ 
Therefore, Fatah assumed the dominant position within the 
PLO.
The strife within the PRM did not end with the con­
solidation of the PLO and Al Fatah. In 1967 three small 
fedayeen groups had merged under the leadership of Dr. George 
Habash. This organization, called the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine, became the chief competitor with 
Fatah for leadership of the PRM. The PFLP is more leftist- 
oriented than Fatah, and the PFLP and Fatah have at times 
both claimed credit for the same operations. Fatah is much 
less concerned with ideology than the PFLP. Fatah's main 
ideology is nationalistic and centers around the liberation 
of Palestine. The PFLP, on the otherhand, is more Marxist- 
oriented and views the conflict with Israel as part of class 
warfare. The revolution envisioned by the PFLP extends not 
only to Israel but also to the "reactionary Arab states" 
which are linked to the Western capitalist nations. There­
fore, if Zionism is to be totally defeated and the revolution 
to be completely successful, the reactionary Arab regimes 
must also be overthrown.̂
The PLO of today is still only an umbrella organiza­
tion which attempts, often without success, to coordinate 
the various fedayeen groups. The strife and competition 
of the past continues and is in many respects much worse
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than, it was ten years ago. However, the PLO of today is 
much more independent and free of control of the Arab states. 
The terrorist groups that make up the PLO vary widely not 
only in ideology, but also in objectives. The so-called 
"moderate" groups, such as Fatah, have stated that they are 
now willing to compromise and perhaps settle for an indepen­
dent Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. On 
the otherhand, the "rejection front" has denounced any * 
compromise with Israel and is still dedicated to the 
destruction of the state of Israel. The rejection front will 
be discussed later in this chapter.
Structure
In order to properly understand the PLO it is 
necessary to examine its structure and the various groups 
that comprise its membership. There are eight major groups 
in the PLO plus an extensive array of administrative and 
support offices. The PLO's primary purpose is armed libera­
tion and terrorism; however, it also performs a number of 
other functions. The largest and most prominent of the 
groups is still Al Fatah and this is the group that will be 
examined first.
Al Fatah
The name "Fatah" is a reversed acronym which stands 
for the Arabic words "Haarakat Tahrir Falastin" (Movement 
for the Liberation of Palestine!. The acronym was reversed 
because "HATAF" in Arabic denotes sudden death. "FATAH"
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12means "conquest."
Fatah, with approximately 6000 active members, is 
the largest of the PLO groups. Fatah was originally sup­
ported primarily by Syria. However, it presently maintains 
good relations with most Arab states and is not sponsored or 
controlled by any one Arab state. Fatah was first' formed 
in 1956;'however, it did not really began to function until 
1965.^^ The head of both the PLO and Fatah is Yasir Arafat. 
Arafat was born in Jerusalem in 1928. He received a degree 
in engineering from Cairo University. In 1953 he joined 
other students in carrying out guerrilla operations against 
the British in the Suez Canal Zone. Arafat later joined
the Egyptian Army and attended demolitions school. He
14fought with the Egyptian Army in the 1956 War. Later 
Arafat served as president of the Palestine Student Federa­
tion in Egypt and became connected with the Moslem Brother­
hood. When the Moslem Brotherhood was outlawed in 1957 
Arafat fled from E g y p t . H e  moved to Kuwait and worked in 
the Ministry of Public Works. He was a co-founder of Fatah 
and quit his job in 1964 to work fulltime with Fatah.
Fatah was supported primarily by Syria until 1966 when a new 
faction of the Baath Party came to power and decided to 
demand total obedience from Arafat and Fatah. As a result 
Arafat was imprisoned for a short time by Syria. After his 
release Arafat moved his headquarters to B e i r u t . I n  1965
Arafat met Che Guevara and is believed to have been greatly
18influenced by Guevara's ideas on revolution. Arafat was
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a delegate to the National Day Celebration in China in 197Q.
He returned to China again in 1970 and then traveled to 
19North Vietnam. In 1974 Arafat addressed the United Nations 
General Assembly.
Al Fatah is governed by an eleven-man Central 
Committee headed by Arafat. The number two man in Fatah is 
Saleh Khalef, alias "Abu lyad," who heads the Black Septem­
ber group. Fatah's military arm is called "Al Asifa" Cthe 
Storml and is headed by Khalil el-Wazir, code-named "Abu 
Jihad." He is responsible for the sea-launched terrorist 
attacks of Fatah, of which the most famous are the March 1978 
Coastal Road bus attack and the abortive attempt in September 
1978 to bombard the resort of Eliat.^^
Fatah played a very active role in the Lebanese Civil 
war. It fought on the leftist side against the Christians 
and later against the Syrian Army. After the 1973 Yom 
Kippur War Fatah discontinued its terrorist operations 
abroad for political reasons. Arafat hoped to cultivate the 
image of a national liberation movement conducting a 
territorial-based guerrilla war. However, Fatah has main­
tained both foreign infrastructure and its close ties with
22other terrorist groups throughout the world. The points 
raised in this paragraph will be explained in Chapters 6 and 7 
The Fatah has in the last few years adopted a prag­
matic approach to the Palestinian problem. The group has 
indicated a willingness to participate in negotiations for 
a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza. However,
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Fatah, and the PLO still refuse to recognize the state of 
Israel and continue to condemn the Camp David accords.
Black. September 
The notorious Black. September organization, whose 
extremist actions have been condemned by Fatah, and the PLO, 
is actually a subsidiary of Al Fatah, Black September took 
its name from the incident in September 1970 when King 
Hussein of Jordan drove the fedayeen out of his country and 
reportedly killed at least 2000, The Black September is 
responsible for some of the most horrendous terrorist attacks 
which have been conducted. It specializes in international 
terrorism. The Black September Movement CBSM). conducted the 
Munich massacre and the murder- of one Belgian and two American 
diplomats in Khartoum in 1973. Many of the acts of interna­
tional terrorism of Black September have been condemned by 
Fatah. However, several of the attacks committed by Black 
September were financed directly by Fatah. Intelligence and 
training for operations were also supplied by Fatah. Funds 
raised by Al Fatah have been transferred to Black September
and weapons and explosives used in BSM operations have been
23acquired from Fatah,
After the Khartoum operation by BSM the Sudanese 
Army raided the PLO office in Khartoum and found a large 
number of documents linking Fatah to Black September. Among 
the documents were papers which showed Fawaz Yassin, the PLO 
chief in Khartoum, to.be the "case officer" for the operation.
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His deputy, Rizig Gassan, was the leader of the attack. 
Another Fàtah member named Karam had used the PLO's land 
rover to drive the terrorists to the Saudi Embassy vrfiich 
was the site of the attack. Also among the papers seized 
by the authorities were instructions for the raid and a 
sketch of the embassy and its grounds. Karam later made a 
full confession linking Al Fatah with the operation.
There are several reasons for this support of Black
September by Al Fatah. On the surface the supposedly
moderate Fatah has fostered the impression that Black
September members were extremists who had no link or support
from the PLO or Al Fatah. The underlying concept was to
officially deny any recognition or connection with the
extremists which would cultivate their moderate image. On
the otherhand, their underground support of the BSM would
allow Fatah to carry out acts of terrorism abroad without
having to bear the responsibility for them. It also served
to appease the extremist elements within Fatah who were angry
at being denied their terrorist raids and were beginning to
drift away from Fatah to the more militant PFLP. Thus,
Fatah could maintain its moderate position and cultivate the
illusion of respectability necessary to represent the
Palestinian people before official organizations, such as
the United Nations. Another reason for denying support of
the BSM was to avoid embarrassing the Arab governments that
25finance Al Fatah and the PLO.
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Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
The PFLP was founded in 1967 as a merger of three 
smaller terrorist organizations which were already active 
militarily. The estimated strength, of the PFLP has dropped 
in recent years. In the early'1970's its strength was esti­
mated to be 3000 to 4000 members. In 1979 the Israeli 
military estimated its membership to be approximately 700 to
2g900. Whether this drop is due to losses in the Lebanese
Civil war and/or the 1978 Latani Operation by Israel into
South Lebanon, or other reasons is unclear. The PFLP has a
Marxist-Leninist ideology and is considered to be the most
radical of the PLO groups. The PFLP was the first terrorist
group to utilize international terrorism and was the origi-
27nator of terrorist skyjackings. The PFLP has been respon­
sible for most of the PLO attacks in Europe. The PFLP does 
not restrict its list of enemies to Israel. According to 
the PFLP publication entitled A Strategy for the Liberation 
of Palestine, its enemies are: 1) Israel - According to 
PFLP doctrine the state of Israel must be destroyed.
2) the World Zionist Movement - Israel is viewed as only a 
part of the World Zionist Movement which established and 
supports Israel. 3) world imperialism - Led by the United 
States, the imperialist nations consort to rob the under­
developed nations of their riches. Additionally, the im­
perialists support Israel with both funds and arms. 4) Arab 
reactionaries represented by feudalism and capitalism -
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This refers to the "reactionary regimes" who are supported
by the imperialists and defend their colonial interests.
Because of their feudal structure the "reactionary nations"
28are in reality opposed to any liberation movements.
Attacks of the PFLP include the planting of a bomb in
a Swiss plane in 1970 that blew up in flight killing all 55
persons aboard; the Lod Airport attack in 1972 carried out by
members of the Japanese Red Army in which 26 people.died; and
'29the Entebbe hijacking of the French airliner.
The principal supporters of the PFLP are Iraq, South 
Yemen, Algeria, and Libya. The PFLP is part of the "rejection 
front" which rejects any negotiated settlement with Israel. 
The "rejection front" is comprised of the PFLP, the Arab Lib­
eration Front, the Palestine Liberation Front, and the Popular 
Palestine Struggle Front. The PFLP maintains close alliances 
with other terrorist groups throughout the world. It has 
carried out numerous joint operations with other groups in­
cluding the Japanese Red Army and Baader-Meinhoff Gang. The 
PFLP has opened its training bases to other radical groups 
and extends aid in acquiring arms and other material. In 
September 1974 the PFLP broke away from the PLO Executive 
Committee and the Central Council because of the PFLP's re­
jection of any strategy other than revolutionary violence.
The leader of the PFLP, George Habash, is the 
principal rival of Yasir Arafat. He completely rejects 
Arafat's movement toward a political solution. Habash was
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born in 1926 in Lod, Palestine to a Greek Orthodox family.
He spent most of his early life in Jerusalem and reportedly
engaged in terrorist activities during the 1948 War. Habash
is a medical doctor who studied at the American University
of Beirut from 1944 to 1951.^^ He later founded a political
party (Arab Nationalist Movement) in Lebanon which was a
pro-Nasser movement committed to the concept of Arab unity.
Its slogan was "Unity, Liberation, Revenge." After the 1967
War and the reassessment of the fedayeen movement Habash
32decided to form his own group, the PFLP.
The PFLP feels justified in attacking Israel and 
Israeli interests in any country. After an attack on an 
El Al airliner in Athens, Habash. justified the attack by 
stating:
The non-Israeli passengers are on their way to Israel. 
Since we have no control over the land that was stolen 
from us and called Israel, it is right that whoever 
goes to Israel should ask for our permission. We 
want a war like the war in Vietnam. The prospect of 
triggering a third world war doesn't bother us. The 
world has been using us and has forgotten us. And we 
will continue our present strategy. It is a^gmart one, 
you see, would you really want to fly El Al?
Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine - General Command 
In 1968 a splinter group broke away from the PFLP and 
formed a new group called the Popular Front for the Libera­
tion of Palestine - General Command. It is commanded by 
a former Syrian Army captain, Ahmed Jibril. The PFLP-GC 
is responsible for the April 1974 attack at Qiryat Shemona,
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Israel in which. 16 persons were k i l l e d . D u r i n g  the 
Lebanese Civil War the PFLP-GC became the most active group 
in the Palestinian camp. It fought on the side of the 
leftist forces.
The Syrian intervention into the Lebanese conflict 
and the subsequent fighting between the PLO and the Syrians 
caused a split within the ranks of the PFLP-GC. The split 
was between pro-Syrian and pro-Iraqi factions. In April 
1977 the pro-Iraqi faction formed its own organization 
headed by Abu Abbas and called it the Palestine Liberation 
Front. This split caused considerable damage to the PFLP-GC. 
The PFLP-GC still maintains its representation in the PLO 
Executive Committee; however, its status in the PLO has 
diminished because of its increased dependence on Syria who 
has become its principal supporter. Due to the PFLP-GC's 
pro-Syrian position the rejection front in May 1977 announced 
its intentions of removing Jibril's organization from its 
ranks and replacing it with a splinter group from the PFLP-GC, 
the Palestine Liberation Front.
Popular Democratic Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine 
Another splintering of the PFLP occurred in 1969.
The new splinter group formed the Popular Democratic Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP). Its leader is a 
former Jordanian Christian, Naif Hawatmah. The PDFLP is 
primarily Marxist in doctrine and its primary goal is the
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establishment of a socialist Palstine. Its membership is 
believed to be approximately 1000.^^
>
After the Yom Kippur War the PDFLP, like Fatah,
supported the more moderate political approach of the PLO
instead of the rejection front. The PDFLP maintains close
ties with the Soviet Union and China. However, its primary
financial support comes from Fatah. The majority of the
PDFLP forces are deployed in southern Lebanon. Its main
37headquarters are located in Beirut. The PDFLP's most 
notorious terrorist attacks are the May 1974 attack at 
Ma'alot, Israel in which 21 school children were killed and 
the November 1974 raid at Bet Shean in which four Israeli
■5 0civilians were killed.
Al Saiga
Saiga was formed in 1968 by the ruling Syrian Baath 
Party. It is subordinate to the Syrian Ministry of Defense. 
Saiga was formed in order to give the Syrian government a 
means of participating in the fedayeen movement and the PLO. 
The organization has a membership of approximately 1500 to
392000, of which the majority are Syrians, not Palestinians. 
Saiga ideology is aligned directly with that of Syria. 
Whereas Al Fatah avoids alignment with any one Arab state 
and advocates independence of the PLO, Saiga advocates the 
Syrian solutions to the Palestinian problems.
Saiga was headed by Zuhir Muhsin, a leader in the 
Syrian Baath Party until his assassination in July 1979.
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40The PLO blamed Egypt and Israel for his death. The 
assassination took place only a few days after the Egyptian 
Embassy in Ankara, Turkey was seized by four terrorists' 
belonging to a group called the "Eagles of the Palestinian 
Revolution." The group is allegedly an offshoot of Saiga 
and Egypt placed the blame for the seizure on Syria and 
Saiga.
Muhsin, who was military operations chief for the
PLO as well as head of Saiga, was replaced by two different
Palestinians. A Syrian Air Force general of Palestinian
origin, Mohammed Azzam, assumed the position as head of the
PLO's military operation department and Sami Attari, a
42member of the Baath Party, took command of Saiga.
Saiga's adherence to the Syrian position caused con­
siderable problems during the Lebanse Civil War. In June 
1976 when the Syrian Army invaded Lebanon and subsequently 
stopped the PLO from crushing the Christian forces. Saiga 
had to shift its alliance from the leftist side to the Syrian 
position. After fighting with the PLO and leftists Saiga 
was now compelled to fight with the Syrians against the PLO 
and leftists. This crisis caused considerable internal 
friction which resulted in the disintegration of the organ­
ization. Part of the membership broke away and formed an
organization called the "Vanguard of the Popular Liberation
43War - Palestinian Organization" which soon became defunct.
The disintegration of Saiga caused by the civil war 
in Lebanon made it necessary for Syria to begin a rebuilding
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process. The Syrians rebuilt Saiga's network both in 
Lebanon and within the PLO.*^
The majority of Saiga’s operations have been carried 
out inside of Israel. However, they have operated interna­
tionally in such incidents as the September 1973 "Vienna 
Operation" in vdiich hostages were seized on a train trans­
porting Jewish emigrants from the USSR.^^
The Arab Liberation Front 
After the Syrian Baath Party formed its own fedayeen 
group in 1368 the Iraqi Baath Party followed its example in 
1969. In order to serve Iraqi interests and participate in 
the PLO the Iraqi Baath Party formed the Arab Liberation 
Front. The ALF is headed by Abd el’-Rahim Ahmed and has an 
estimated strength of several hundred members deployed mainly 
in Lebanon. Like the PFLP, the ALF views the liberation of 
Palestine from Israel as only a step in a larger strategy 
aimed at defeating reactionism and Zionism. The ultimate 
goal is the unification of the entire Arab world. The ALF 
is part of the rejection f r o n t . A  majority of the member­
ship of the ALF are Iraqi, Jordanian, and Lebanese citizens
47rather than Palestinians,
The Popular Palestinian Struggle Front
The Popular Palestinian Struggle Front was formed in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip after the 1967 War. The
48organization is headed by Dr. Samir Gusha. In July of 
1971 the PPSF announced a merger with Fatah. However, the
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merger was short-lived and the PPSF continues to function 
independently. The organization has approximately 300 to 
400 members who operate predominantly from Lebanon. Its 
principal supporters are Iraq and Libya. The PPSF is a
4Qmember of the rejection front.
The Palestine Liberation Front 
The split in the ranks of the PFLP-GC over the 
Syrian role in the Lebanese Civil War resulted in a new 
organization, the Palestine Liberation Front, being formed. 
The PLF is headed by Abu Abbas who had insisted that the 
PFLP-GC fight against Syrian forces in Lebanon. When Jibril 
refused and maintained a pro-Syrian position Abbas attempted 
to oust Jibril from the leadership of the PFLP-GC in October 
1976. Abbas failed in his attempt and the rift widened to 
the point of no return in April 1977 when the split occurred. 
The two groups have operated as rivals and at times armed 
clashes have broken out between the two groups.
The PLF is pro-Iraqi and anti-Syrian. Its member­
ship is approximately 200 to 300 members. Its principal 
supporters are Iraq and Libya. The organization is part of 
the rejection front and is yet to have a representative in 
the PLO Executive Committee.
The Abu Nidal Group (Black June)
The Black June group has been the most active group 
in recent years. However, its operations are not directed
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against Israel; they are directed against other Arabs. The
name "Black June" is derived from the June 1976 Syrian
intervention into Lebanon. Its operations are directed
against Syria and the PLO and are supported and encouraged
52by Iraq, who is its principal sponsor.
Black June is a splinter group of Fatâh which broke 
off in 1974. Its leader is Sabri el Sana CAbu Nidal) who 
was Fatah's representative in Iraq. Fatah has placed a 
death sentence on Abu Nidal and Nidal has pledged to assass­
inate Arafat.
In 1977 and 1978 open warfare broke out between 
Black June and the PLO/Fatah. Black June is responsible for 
attacks on the Semiramis Hotel in Damascus and the Inter­
continental Hotel in Amman. It has attacked the Syrian
Embassies in Rome and Pakistan and assassinated a number of
54PLO and Fatah members.
In late 1978 Iraq and PLO/Fatah made moves toward 
reapproachment in order to present a united front against 
the Camp David a c c o r d s . T h e  position of Black June is not 
known; however, given its dependence on Iraq, it will 
probably follow the wishes of the Iraqi government.
The Palestine Liberation Army 
When the PLO was formed in 1964 provisions were also 
made for a conventional army of Palestinians. To that end 
the Palestine Liberation Army was formed as the military arm 
of the PLO. The PLA is independent of the various fedayeen
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groups in the PLO. Although it is organized as a part of the 
PLO, its forces are actually subordinate to the military of 
the Arab nations where it is stationed. The PLA is not a 
guerrilla force. Its purpose is conventional warfare. 
However, it has been very ineffectual and has engaged in 
very little combat with Israeli forces.
The commander of the PLA is General Misbah el Badeiri 
whose headquarters are located in Damascus. Currently the 
PLA is organized into three brigades and several battalions. 
The current strength of the PLA is estimated to be approxi­
mately 4000 men.^^ In 1970 the strength was estimated to be
58between 10,000 and 20,000. This drop is probably due to 
attrition from the war in Lebanon and desertion.
The PLA consists of the following forces:
1) The Hittin Brigade of the PLA is based in Syria, which.is 
its source of training and support. When the Syrians 
entered Lebanon the Hittin Brigade fought with the Syrian 
Army against the PLO and leftists. Eventually the Brigade 
was transferred to Lebanon by Syria and has fought against 
the Christian forces in Beirut.
2) The Qadasiya Brigade was originally supported and trained
by Iraq. It was known as the 421st Commando Battalion
59of the Iraqi Army. In the course of the Lebanese Civil 
War the Brigade disintegrated. Its members were dispersed 
among the various Arab nations. The majority went to 
Syria where the Brigade was reorganized and reestablished 
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Brigade's battalions were transferred to Lebanon and 
fought in Beirut against the Christians.
3) The Ayn Jalut Brigade consists of four battalions and has 
in the past relied upon Egypt for its support. In early 
1976 the Brigade was transferred to Lebanon where it 
operated under the command of Fatah. However, the 
Brigade began to disintegrate and was returned to Egypt 
in early 1977.^^
4) The Yarmuk Brigade, which is nominally a part of the PLA,
works closely with Fatah., which is responsible for its
training and supply. The Brigade has four battalions
and is well-equipped with artillery and tanks. Most of
the personnel of the Yarmuk Brigade are deserters from
62the Jordanian Army.
51 The Karame Brigade was formed in 1971 from personnel of
the Yarmuk Brigade and is located in Syria. It has a
63strength of three battalions.
6) The Popular Liberation Forces was organized in 1968 as 
the commando branch of the PLA. It is supported and 
equipped by Iraq.^^
Deployment of PLO Forces 
The various factions of the PLO are organized into 
both, regular and quasi-regular forces and number approximately 
10,000. In addition, the PLO maintains militias in the 
refugee camps. The various militias have several thousand 
members who have undergone basic military training.
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The majority of most PLO groups are located in 
Lebanon. The majority of the membership is also deployed 
in Lebanon. The majority, approximately 6500, is located 
in southern Lebanon. Approximately 3000 to 5000 are located 
in the Beirut area and in the refugee camps in the vicinity 
of Tripoli.
The PLO is governed by an Executive Committee .of 
14 members who control the everyday workings of the organ­
ization. The chairman of the Executive Committee is Yasir 
Arafat. Of the 14 members of the PLO-EC approximately six
are independent and not aligned with any one group. The
66rest of the membership is from the various PLO groups.
The PLO structure also contains a National Council 
and a Central Committee. The National Council is a legisla­
tive body representing various segments of the Palestinian 
population. The PNC consists of approximately 250 members. 
The Central Committee is utilized to implement the decisions 
of the Executive Committee. It consists of the heads of 
the various fedayeen groups.
One of the primary reasons for the success of the 
PLO and its high degree of acceptance among the Palestinians 
is its structure. The PLO is much more than a terrorist 
organization. Its organization permeates into all areas of 
the Palestinian community, particularly into the refugee 
camps. The PLO has departments which deal with education, 
health, and culture in the refugee camps. This social
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Structure differentiates the PLO from other terrorist 
organizations and gives it a means of controlling and influ­
encing the Palestinian community. According to PLO sources^ 
the PLO Education Department runs hundreds of schools and 
educational programs in the refugee camps. It also awards
PLO scholarships to Palestinian students which enaBle them
68to study at universities aBroad, The PLO has a department 
of the Palestine Red Crescent Organization which runs approx­
imately 50 hospitals and 120 clinics in various Arab states 
where Palestinians live. The PLO's economic institute 
manages small factories and economic projects which provide 
jobs for approximately 5000 Palestinians. The PLO also 
possesses a Cinema Section v ^ c h  produces documentary films 
about the Palestinians. Its most famous work is the film 
produced with Vanessa Redgrave entitled The Palestinian.^^
The various projects, Both military and social, of 
the PLO require millions of dollars a year. The PLO, unlike 
many other terrorist groups, does not need to rob banks or 
kidnap for ransom. Its projects are bankrolled By the 
various Arab states. This support will be examined in detail 
in Chapter 6.
Policy and Legitimacy 
It is difficult to elaborate on PLO policy or goals 
since there exist several diverse groups within the PLO, 
each with its own goals and policies. However, all of the 
PLO groups share one common objective, the dismantlement of
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the Israeli state. Despite a change in rhetoric By some PLO 
groups in recent years, the objective of liberating all of 
Palestine from Israeli control has not Been changed. As 
demonstrated in recent statements By Yasir Arafat, which will 
be covered in the following chapter, the commitment to 
destroy the Israeli state is as strong as when the PLO was 
first formed. However, in order to attract support from 
outside of the Arab world some PLO groups have softened 
their rhetoric and downplayed this objective. Nevertheless, 
this objective, the destruction of the Israeli state, remains 
the primary goal of the PLO, and is one of the few policy 
areas in which all the PLO groups can agree and are united.
Outside of the universally accepted policy among the 
PLO groups of destroying the Israeli state, the PLO is wrought 
with disagreement over policy and objectives. There are three 
main areas of controversy within the PLO. First of all, 
there is no agreement on the methods to be used to achieve 
the liberation of Palestine from the Israelis. This split 
has existed since the early 1970's when some PLO groups 
began to pursue a diplomatic strategy in addition to terror­
ism. This led to a split in the PLO between the mainline 
PLO groups led by Al Fatah and supported mainly By Syria, 
and the so-called "rejectionists" led by the PFLP and sup­
ported mainly by Iraq and Libya. As stated previously in 
this chapter, the "rejectionists" refuse any negotiation and 
view armed struggle as the only means for liberating Palestine.
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The diplomatic strategy of the PLO will be covered in detail 
in the following chapter.
There is no agreement among the PLO groups on the 
issue of acceptance of a Palestinian mini-state on the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip. Again this division is between the 
Al Fatah mainline PLO groups and the rejectionists. The 
Fatah bloc has stated its willingness to accept a Palestin­
ian state comprised of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, 
Al Fatah views this only as an interim step and still refuses 
to recognize the existence of Israel and to relinquish its 
claim to the rest of Palestine that comprises the Israeli 
s t a t e . T h e  rejection front refers to the PLO/Fatah position 
as "surrender solutions" and condemns any solution that leaves 
any portion of Palestine in Israeli hands.
The PLO groups do not agree on the type of govern­
ment that a Palestinian state should have once liberation is 
achieved. As covered previously in this chapter, the ideol­
ogies of the PLO groups vary greatly. Some PLO groups, such 
as Fatah, advocate a type of secular democratic state in 
Palestine while other groups, such as the PDFLP, advocate a 
Marxist style of socialism (see P. 60). A further source of 
strife for a Palestinian state is its future political align­
ment with other Arab states. Naturally the PLO groups sup­
ported by Syria would probably seek close ties with that 
government, while other groups supported by Iraq would also 
seek ties with that regime.
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In the following chapter the PLO's strategies and
tactics will be examined. While reading this chapter it is
important to realize that while the PLO's strategies and
tactics have changed its basic objective has not changed.
The PLO's primary goal is the same in 1980 as it was when
the PLO was first formed. The primary goal of the PLO was,
and still is, the destruction of the Israeli state and the
establishment of a Palestinian Arab state in its place.
In the area of political legitimacy the PLO has
achieved great success in recent years. The PLO's legitimacy
was assured in 1974. In October 1974 the Rabat Summit
Conference of the Arab heads of state recognized the PLO as
the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian 
72people." In November 1974 Yasir Arafat made his appearance
before the UN General Assembly. This appearance and the
granting of observer status to the PLO in the UN has assured
the organization of legitimacy outside of the Arab world. In
1975 a special Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable
73Rights of the Palestinian People was created in the UN.
In 1974 the UN General Assembly passed UN Resolution 3236
which states that Palestinians have "the right to return to
their homeland," "the right of self-determination," and the
74"right of national independence and sovereignty." In 
recent years PLO leaders have met with numerous government 
representatives of various nations. There is no doubt that 
the PLO has achieved legitimacy. The question is "How?" In
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Chapter 4 the tactics and strategies of the PLO will be 
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CHAPTER IV 
TACTICS AND STRATEGIES OF THE PLO
As demonstrated in the preceding chapter, the PLO's 
structure is complex and organized for much more than 
terrorist operations. This reflects the nature of polit­
ical terrorism which is much more than a military tactic. 
Terrorism is a tool that the PLO utilizes for political 
purposes.
The PLO's tactics and strategies have changed and 
evolved over the years. These changes will be examined as 
distinct phases which have evolved in response to certain 
events and changes within the framework of the struggle 
against Israel.
While the tactics and strategies have changed, the 
primary objective of the Palestinian Liberation Organiza­
tion has remained the same throughout its history. This 
objective is the liberation of all of Palestine from 
Israel. The rhetoric has changed but the objective is the 
same. When the PLO was first formed the organization re­
ferred to "throwing the Jews into the sea."^ In recent years 
the PLO's statements have referred to establishing a secular
democratic state in Palestine in which Jews, Christians, and
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Moslems would live together in harmony. However, according 
to PLO doctrine the Jews would not be part of the ruling 
majority which would be comprised of Palestinians. According 
to the PLO National Covenant, only the Jews who lived in 
Palestine prior to the 1948 War and subsequent to the state- 
hood of Israel would be allowed to remain. Since only 
approximately 400,000 Jews fit into this category, the 
remaining 2h million Jewish citizens of Israel would have to 
leave. Although Yasir Arafat and the PLO have indicated 
their willingness to accept a Palestinian state on the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, they steadfastly refuse to relinquish 
their claim to the remainder of Palestine that is the state 
of Israel. In a November 1979 speech in Lisbon, Portugal 
Yasir Arafat stated, "Peace and stability will only be 
achieved in the Middle East with the immediate and uncondi­
tional withdrawal of the forces of the Zionist aggressor from 
all Arab and Palestinian occupied territories."^ At the 1979 
meeting of the Palestine National Council in Damascus a 
resolution was adopted which "affirmed the Palestinian 
peoples' commitment to the total liberation of Palestine from 
Zionist settler colonial domination;" further, "the Palestin­
ian people will never negotiate with, or in any way recognize 
the Urgun terrorists who now head the illegal regime in 
Palestine.
Thus, despite claims of moderation the goal of the 
PLO has not changed; it has, however, been reworded and 
stated in a more diplomatic fashion which is in keeping with
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the PLO's current political strategy. Before examining the 
current strategy and tactics, the preceding phases of tactics 
and strategies will be examined to show the evolutionary 
process which has resulted in the current phase of tactics 
and strategies.
Pre-1967 War Phase 
The first phase of the evolution of the fedayeen 
was the pre-1967 War stage which encompassed the period from 
Israeli statehood in 1948 to the June 1967 War. This was a 
period of formation and organization for the fedayeen and 
the PLO. After the 1956 War there were few significant acts 
of terrorism by the fledgling PLO groups in this period prior 
to the 1967 War. However, after the 1948 War the Israelis 
were subjected to a wave of terrorism sponsored primarily 
by'the Egyptians and launched from the Gaza Strip. The ref­
ugee camps in the Gaza Strip became the headquarters and 
source of recruits for the fedayeen. As a result of these 
terrorist attacks and in response to the closing of the 
straits of Tiran by Egypt, Israel launched Operation Kadesh 
in 1956 and seized the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Desert. The 
fedayeen movement suffered greatly as a result of the 1956 
War. The Israelis were successful in clearing the refugee 
camps in Gaza of terrorists and refused to withdraw from the 
Sinai and Gaza Strip until the United Nations agreed to 
establish the United Nations Expeditionary Force CUNEFl to 
maintain peace and security in these areas.^
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A further result of the 1956 War was a reluctance 
on the part of the Egyptians and other Arab governments to 
support fedayeen raids against Israel and risk retaliatory 
raids and perhaps another war with Israel. Therefore, the 
Arab governments sought a means to control the fedayeen 
groups and their actions. As a result of this need to con­
trol the fedayeen, the Arab governments established the PLO 
in 1964.6
Prior to 1967 the only truly organizational large 
fedayeen group was Al Fatah. During the period between the 
1956 War and the 1967 War the Israelis regarded the Pales­
tinian guerrilla movement as only a minor nuisance. Even 
a majority of the Palestinians were skeptical of the fed­
ayeen. The PLO, formed in 1964, was clearly controlled by 
the Arab governments and reflected their policies and goals.
In this phase the majority of the Palestinians and the PLO 
were relying on the Arab governments to produce a military 
victory over Israel which would produce a Palestinian state. 
The fedayeen groups, and Al Fatah in particular, were ham­
pered by the fact that both Egypt and Syria, particularly 
after the 1956 War, did not allow their territories to be 
used as bases for crossborder operations against Israel.^
King Hussein of Jordan also attempted, with little success, 
to prevent terrorist raids from Jordan. This reluctance 
by Arab governments to support fedayeen operations was 
caused by fear of Israeli retaliation against their territory.
85
However, some PLO groups, particularly Al Fatah, ignored 
the Arab governments' restrictions and occasionally launched 
raids against Israel from Egypt, Syria, and Jordan.
During this period Nasser was one of the most vocal 
opponents of Fatah. The Egyptian press conducted a campaign 
against Arafat. One Egyptian newspaper wrote that Arafat 
was "an agent of Zionism and imperialism sent to stir up
gtrouble to give Israel an excuse to attack the Arab states." 
Nasser also attempted to discourage support for fedayeen 
operations by gaining the support of the other Arab nations. 
At the December 1965 Arab Summit Conference held in Morocco, 
Egypt introduced a resolution calling for a halt to all acts 
of terrorism against Israel for the time being, and proposed 
that no aid be given to the fedayeen. This resolution 
occurred at the same time that Nasser was trying to encourage 
support for the recently formed PLO which generally adhered 
to Egyptian policy. The resolution passed with Syria ab-
gStaining. Clearly Nasser was concerned about possible 
Israeli retaliation.
At this time Nasser's memory of the 1956 defeat by 
Israel was fresh and Nasser realized that Egypt was not 
militarily strong enough to defeat Israel. Nasser also 
realized that confrontation between the Arab states and 
Israel was the aim of fedayeen groups such as Fatah. In 
June 1965 Fatah delegates to the Palestinian National 
Congress in Cairo met with the world press and stated their 
policy, to entangle the Arab nations in a war with Israel.
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The fedayeen also realized that the Arab nations might not 
be able to defeat Israel. However, they realized the great 
numerical advantage the Arab states possessed. Perhaps 
Israel would win the next war and the next; however, even­
tually the Arab nations would prevail. The strategy of 
entanglement was to be induced by utilizing crossborder 
operations which would cause Israeli retaliation against the 
Arab states. This would ignite further military action by 
the Arab nations. Eventually this cycle of violence would 
escalate into war.
Fatah was the largest of the fedayeen groups 
operating independently of the PLO and was the leader of the 
entanglement strategy. With the exception of Syria, the 
Arab governments bordering Israel attempted to stop Fatah 
operations and many Fatah members ended up in Arab jails. 
After several Israeli reprisal raids into Jordan in 1965 the 
Jordanian Army undertook severe measures to stop fedayeen 
operations from its territory. As a result there were 
several armed clashes between the fedayeen and the Jordanian 
Army.
The opposition in Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan caused 
Fatah, to move its headquarters to Damascus in 1965. However, 
the Syrians were also reluctant to allow Fatah to operate 
from their territory and encouraged the group to use Jordan­
ian territory. Despite these difficulties and the fact that 
Fatah, numbered only 200 to 300 members at this time, Fatah 
managed to conduct 35 raids into Israel by the end of 1965;
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1228 of the raids were from Jordan. In total the fedayeen 
conducted approximately 113 raids prior to the 1967 War.^^
In June 1967 the long awaited war broke out between 
the Arab nations and Israel. However, the results were 
devastating for the Arabs. The armies of Jordan, Egypt, and 
Syria were crushed in six days and the West Bank, Gaza Strip, 
and the Golan Heights were seized by Israel. The fedayeen 
were quickly rooted out from the refugee camps of the West 
Bank and Gaza by the Israelis. For the fedayeen this meant 
loosing its closest and easiest accesses to crossborder 
operations.
Post-1967 War Phase; Guerrilla Warfare Phase 
After the total defeat of the Arab armies in 1967 the 
PLO was forced to change its strategy and tactics. The fed­
ayeen leadership realized that the Arab nations could not 
defeat Israel in conventional warfare. The PLO realized that 
relying on the Arab nations to defeat Israel was unrealistic. 
Therefore, a new strategy must be developed. It was at this 
point that Arafat and Al Fatah began to gain dominance within 
the fedayeen movement. For years Arafat had advocated a 
protracted war of attrition against Israel, an Algerian/
Vietnaun-style guerrilla war. After the 1967 Arab defeat the 
fedayeen movement, seeing the success of the Algerian FLN 
and the Cuban guerrilla war, decided to adopt this strategy. 
Al Fatah and Arafat had warned against aligning the 
Palestine Revolutionary Movement with the Arab states and
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had been a practitioner of guerrilla raids prior to 1967. 
This gave Fatah a high degree of acceptance and leadership 
in the PRM after 1967.
After the 1967 War a host of new fedayeen groups 
sprang up. The PFLP, PDFLP, Saiga, ALF, Black September, 
and a number of smaller groups were formed. Also, as a 
result of the 1967 War, the War of Attrition was launched 
by the Arab states. The War of Attrition consisted of 
artillery duels and crossborder raids between the Arabs 
and Israelis. As part of this war the PLO was viewed in 
a new perspective by the Arab states. The PLO became the 
primary source of crossborder raids during the War of 
Attrition. The PLO fulfilled a need in the Arab world.
The Arab world needed heroes and the PLO's propaganda ma­
chine provided heroes in the form of fedayeen raiders who 
infiltrated Israel. After the humiliating defeat in the 
1967 War the Palestinian cause had become the center of 
Arab emotionalism and nationalism. The Arab governments 
had failed completely in the 1967 War to injure the Israeli 
state. When the PLO began to greatly intensify its cross- 
border raids into Israel after the 1967 War its exploits 
captured the attention of the Arab world. The PLO was 
viewed as being a successful striking force against the 
Israelis. The PLO fostered the image of being able to 
accomplish what the Arab armies could not. Therefore, 
the PLO gained in popularity in the Arab world and the
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Arab governments viewed the PLO as a tool which could be 
used to strike out at the Israeli state. Therefore, the 
Arab governments began to support the crossborder terrorist 
operations by the PLO. The words "terrorist operations" 
are used here because the raids were directed against civil­
ian targets, not the Israeli military. After the 1967 War 
the Arab nations opened their territory and army bases for 
fedayeen operations and training. In addition to training,. 
the Arab nations also supplied weapons and financial support 
to the PLO. This intensification of Arab support after 1967 
allowed the PLO to transform itself from a weak coalition of 
terrorist groups before 1967 to a well-trained and equipped 
military force. However, the Arab governments, by providing 
increased support for the PLO, and thereby increasing its 
efficiency and popularity in the Arab world, gave the PLO a 
greater degree of independence from the control of the Arab 
states. CFor a detailed account of Arab support see Chapter 6)
During this period the fedayeen movement began to
expand. In addition to recruiting in the refugee camps, PLO
recruiters were sent to Europe to enlist Palestinians en-
14rolled in European universities.
It was during this phase that the first concentrated 
efforts were made by the PLO to mobilize Arabs living in 
Israel and the occupied territories. In order to wage 
successful guerrilla warfare the support of the population 
is necessary. The guerrillas must have a support network
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among the population. In Israel the Arab population 
numbered over 400,000; over one million Arabs lived in the 
occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. The PLO viewed these 
Arabs as a necessary support network for its operations.
During the last part of 1967 and in 1968 and 1969 
the number of fedayeen incidents rose tremendously. In the 
second half of 1967 there were 115 fedayeen attacks, and of 
these attacks approximately 53 percent penetrated into 
Israeli territory. In 1968 the fedayeen conducted 922 
attacks; however, only 33 percent penetrated Israeli border 
defenses. In 1969 the fedayeen launched over 2000 incidents, 
of which 19 percent penetrated Israeli border defenses.
Many of the penetration incidents involved mine-laying and 
sniping and did not result in Israeli casualties. Many 
other penetrations by fedayeen groups were detected after 
their penetration and the groups were intercepted before 
they could complete their missions.
According to Israeli statistics, in fourteen years 
of fedayeen activity, 1965 to 1979, approximately 650 Israelis 
have been killed and 3000 wounded. Even when one considers 
the small population of Israel, approximately 3 million, 
this is a small number for fourteen years of conflict. 
Currently the PLO can only manage 2 or 3 successful penetra­
tions of Israeli defenses a year.
Clearly the strategy of guerrilla warfare was not 
successful. The reason that the attempt at guerrilla war­
fare against Israel was not successful was because the
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necessary criteria for this type of warfare was not present 
in Israel. Any serious student of guerrilla warfare will 
observe, after only a cursory inspection of Israel, that con­
ducting guerrilla warfare would be extremely difficult. The 
country is relatively densely populated when compared with 
Vietnam or Algeria. Israel comprises a very small land mass, 
completely lacking in large areas with thick vegetation, 
jungle, or forest land. Also, Israel does not possess any 
large inaccessible mountainous areas as was the case in 
Algeria. Therefore, the guerrillas lacked any safe havens in 
which they could hide and base any large number of fighters. 
The Israeli borders are small and after 1967 the borders were 
situated along natural terrain barriers, the Sinai Desert, 
the Jordan River, and the Golan Heights.
As time progressed the Israelis were able to seal the 
small border by means of patrols, security fences, mines, 
observation aircraft, and electronic sensing devices. The 
few fedayeen who penetrated the border defenses still had to 
cross open territory in order to reach civilian settlements. 
Many of the fedayeen who penetrated the border were detected 
and intercepted before they could complete their attacks.
The fedayeen who managed to elude the military and 
police and reach an Israeli settlement faced a further prob­
lem, the settlements and towns have their own defense forces. 
Most Israeli settlements and townships are closely guarded by 
the civilian population which is heavily armed and trained.
An Israeli civilian settlement is far from being a soft
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target.
The population also offered few possibilities to 
the PLO. For a revolution to succeed the guerrilla must have 
the aid and support of the population. Mao states that the 
guerrilla must operate among the population as a fish swim­
ming in water. The guerrilla must be supported, hidden, and 
sustained by the people. However, in Israel the majority of 
the population is Jewish and offers no support to the PLO.
The problem of waging guerrilla war against Israel is best 
summarized by Israeli Major General Harkabi, presently a 
professor at Hebrew University of Jerusalem. According to 
Harkabi:
By means of guerrilla warfare France could be persuaded 
to give up Algeria, But no amount of guerrilla activi­
ties could Bring the French to relinquish their 
sovereignty over France. A guerrilla warfare was instru­
mental in inducing the Americans to withdraw from 
Vietnam, but no guerrilla activities could press the 
Americans to leave the USA.
Even among the Arab population the PLO was unable 
to generate the support necessary for guerrilla warfare. The 
Arab population of Israel (excluding the occupied territor­
ies! comprises only about 15 percent of the total population. 
The Arab population is highly concentrated in certain areas 
of the country which facilitates their control.^® In the 
occupied territories the Arab population is even more con­
centrated and the Israeli security forces maintain strict 
control. Since many Israelis immigrated from Arab nations 
and grew up in an Arab society, speaking Arabic as their
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native language, the Israelis possess a tremendous resource 
for counterinsurgency operations which they utilize in the 
occupied territories. Thus, the strong Israeli counterin­
surgency forces have Been able to keep close watch over the 
Arab population and have been highly successful in identify­
ing PLO cells operating among Israel's Arab population.
A further constraint on the PLO's efforts to conduct 
guerrilla warfare in Israel in the late 1960's was the atti­
tude of the Arabs in the occupied territories. In order for 
guerrilla warfare to be successful the PLO needed a base of 
operations and support among the Arab population, particular­
ly in the West Bank because of its strategic location.
However, the attitude of the Arabs in the West Bank during 
the late 1960's was different from their militant attitude 
of the late 1970's. In the first two years of Israeli occu­
pation the West Bank Arabs Believed that a solution to their 
problem was imminent and adopted an attitude of "samoud" 
C'samoud" is an Arabic term which means "hold your ground.")
By the middle of 1969 the West Bank Arabs had begun to pros­
per from Israeli development projects and joBs.^^ Therefore, 
during the period when the PLO was attempting to wage 
guerrilla warfare inside Israel, the Arab population had not 
yet attained the degree of militancy and self-sacrifice 
necessary for support of the PLO's guerrilla war.
During this phase of development the PLO endeavored 
to gain recognition, credibility, and support from the Pales­
tinian people and the Arab nations. Additionally, the PLO was
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attempting to prove that it was a force to be reckoned with..
The turning point for the PLO movement after the 
1967 War occurred at the battle of Karameh on March 21, 1968 
in Jordan. The size and scope of the battle were not signif­
icant; furthermore, this battle was not a clearcut military 
victory for the fedayeen. However, the battle at Karameh 
was a major symbolic and propaganda victory for the Palestin­
ian Revolutionary Movement in much the same way that the 
1973 Mideast War was a major symbolic victory for the 
Egyptians. The exact facts concerning the battle are hard 
to separate from the conflicting reports made by the two 
opposing sides. The PLO is well-known for exaggerating its 
battle statistics. On the otherhand, the Israeli figures 
usually prove to be accurate concerning their own casualties. 
This is due to the fact that Israel has a small population 
and a relatively small standing army. Additionally, Israeli 
activities are well-covered by the foreign press as well 
as their own news media which enjoys the rights of a free 
press. Therefore, any attempts to conceal casualty figures 
would probably be futile.
The facts of the battle of Karameh, as best as they 
can be reconstructed from different sources are as follows: 
The Israelis launched a large retaliatory raid against the 
PLO base at Karameh, Jordan early on the morning of March 21, 
1968. The force consisted of a reinforced brigade of para­
troopers in halftracks, supported by tanks and aircraft.
The fedayeen estimated the size of the force to be between
96
5000 and 10,000 men. Actually the figure would be closer 
to 4000. The thing that made the Karameh battle unique was 
the fact that the fedayeen did not follow the basic guerrilla 
tactic of "fading away" when confronted by a superior force. 
Instead the PLO made a stand at Karameh and there was heavy 
fighting. Shortly after the attack began the fedayeen was 
reinforced by units of the Jordanian Army. The fighting 
lasted for approximately fifteen hours. The Israelis 
finally gained control and killed or captured the majority 
of the fedayeen and destroyed a number of buildings. The 
Israelis claimed to have killed 150 fedayeen and 100 Jordan­
ian troops. They further claimed to have captured 138 
prisoners. Israeli casualties were said to be 21 dead and
n n70 wounded. The Israelis reported losing one tank and
having four more damaged; one aircraft was also lost. The
PLO claimed the Israelis lost 200 men, 45 tanks, and 4
21aircraft. The PLO claimed to have lost 59 men.
Regardless of the actual loses,the PLO figures 
were believed within the Arab world and consequently Karameh 
was viewed as a great victory. The destroyed Israeli equip­
ment was paraded through Amman and highly photographed by 
the press. The Arabs Became convinced that Karameh was the 
beginning of a new era in the war against Israel. The 
fedayeen was credited with Being able to accomplish what the 
Arab armies failed to do, i.e., win a military victory against 
Israel. The fedayeen^s prestige and popularity increased 
immediately following Karameh. The recruits, began to pour
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in and the sheiks of the oil-rich Arab nations began to 
write checks. The battle of Karameh has come to be regarded 
as the "Stalingrad" of the fedayeen movement. The battle is 
regarded as a symbol of the Arabs', and especially the 
Palestinians', ability to stand up to the Israelis in battle, 
After Karameh the fedayeen believed that it had destroyed 
the myth of the Israeli "supermen."
After Karameh the fedayeen movement and operations 
greatly increased. In the period from the end of the 1967 
War up until the battle of Karameh the fedayeen conducted 
only about 200 operations. By comparison, in 1968 the 
number of fedayeen actions rose to over 900. In 1969,
2777 fedayeen terrorist actions were reported by the Israe­
lis. The PLO claims that there were 3900 fedayeen terrorist
22operations in 1969. Whatever the correct figure is,
increasing activity is clear. However, as previously
stated, the number of successful operations decreased as
time progressed. By 1970 the Israelis had established an
extensive border defense network and had greatly improved
their counterinsurgency tactics. Therefore, in 1970 the
number of fedayeen operations began a steady decline. By
May 19.70 the Israelis claimed to have killed over 1600 
23fedayeen. The Israelis also adopted a stringent policy
of retaliation against Arab sanctuary countries. The
Israeli policy was one of holding the sanctuary country
directly responsible for fedayeen raids originating from 
24its territory.
TERRORISTS KILLED ACCORDING TO ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATION
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The improved position of the fedayeen after Karameh 
led it to assume a very visible and sometimes militant pos­
ture among the Arab nations, especially in Jordan. By 1970 
the PLO had secured a very dominant role in Jordan and 
virtually controlled certain areas of the country. The 
subsequent reaction by King Hussein and the decline in 
successful crossborder operations resulted in the PLO aban­
doning its strategy of guerrilla warfare and adopting a new 
strategy.
The Rise of Tnternational Terrorism;
The Post-Jordanian War Phase
This phase roughly encompasses the period from 
September 1970 to late 1974. In reality the move to inter­
national terrorism began with the PFLP as early as 1968. 
However, the major shift to international terrorism occurred 
after the Jordanian Civil War.
By 1970 Jordan had become a major source of fedayeen 
attacks and King Hussein was under pressure from all sides. 
Hussein had never been happy with the rise of the fedayeen 
movement in Jordan. As a result of the fedayeen operations 
his country was the constant victim of Israeli reprisals.
Not only were the Israelis striking guerrilla bases, but 
they were also striking at selected civilian facilities.
On June 5, 1969, following warnings to Hussein about guer­
rilla activity, Israeli commandos sabotaged the East Ghor 
Canal in Jordan. Again in August the Israelis damaged the
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Canal in reprisal raids, leaving fruit and vegetables of 
Jordanian farmers dying on 500 square kilometers of farm­
land. These reprisal raids were accompanied by statements
25that Israel would not tolerate a guerrilla state in Jordan.
King Hussein was also pressured by members of his own 
cabinet and Jordanian Army officers. Many of these men were 
disturbed about the power the Palestinian fedayeen was 
acquiring in Jordan, especially in the cities. Due to the 
Israeli military actions in the border areas many fedayeen
26members had moved into the urban areas, particularly Amman.
In the Jordanian capital the fedayeen carried its weapons 
openly in defiance of existing laws. Many of the Jordanian 
people were complaining of lawlessness by the PLO members. 
There had been holdups, fake collection of funds, unauthor­
ized roadblocks, and clashes between the army and fedayeen
27members carrying arms without authority. Further pressure
was applied on Hussein from the large number of Palestinians
who were Jordanian citizens. Well over 50 percent of
28Jordan’s population is Palestinian.
By early 1970 the stage was set for a showdown bet­
ween the fedayeen and the Jordanian Army. The outcome of 
this confrontation was by no means assured. Even though 
the Jordanian Army was well trained and equipped, numbering 
about 55,000, one-third of the army was Palestinian. The 
loyalty of these Palestinian soldiers was considered doubt­
ful. The Palestinians were concentrated mainly in the 
infantry units, while the armored brigades were comprised
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29almost entirely of Bedouins. Therefore, when the showdown 
came it was the armored units that were utilized to subdue 
the fedayeen.
Throughout 1970 the situation grew progressively 
worse. The fedayeen demanded that Hussein remove several 
members of his cabinet were considered anti-PLO. Also, 
in June 1970 rioting Broke but after members of the PFLP 
tried to force Jordanian soldiers to contribute to the 
fedayeen cause. The fedayeen involved were jailed and this 
resulted in other fedayeen members seizing hotels in Amman 
and threatening to shoot European guests if their jailed 
comrades were not released. Hussein finally yielded to the 
majority of the fedayeen demands and a shaky truce was 
established.
The "final straw" for King Hussein came about in 
September 1970. On September 2, 1970 a convoy escorting 
King Hussein was fired upon in an apparent assassination 
attempt. Palestinian commandos were suspected of carrying 
out this a t t a c k . O n l y  four days later the PFLP carried 
out a massive act of international terrorism in which four 
airliners were hijacked and three of the aircraft were flown 
to an abandoned former British airfield in the Jordanian 
desert. The hijacked aircraft included a TWA Boeing 707 
with 151 passengers, a Swissair DC-8 with 155 passengers, 
and a British Overseas Airways Corp. airliner with 105 
passengers. The fourth aircraft, a Pan American jumbo jet, 
was too large to land at the desert airfield. Consequently,
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the jet was flown to Cairo where it was blown up after the 
passengers and crew were freed. The PFLP attempted to hi­
jack a fifth airliner, an El Al Boeing 707; however, one
hijacker was shot and killed by an Israeli security guard
32and the other was overpowered.
The PFLP terrorists who hijacked the airliners 
demanded the release of other terrorists held in West 
Germany, Israel, and Switzerland. They succeeded in gain­
ing the release of seven terrorists held in West Germany 
and Switzerland; however, the Israelis refused to release
any of their prisoners. The hijacked planes were eventually
33blown up and the passengers and crews released. However, 
King Hussein refused to tolerate this use of Jordanian 
territory for acts of international terrorism..
The Jordanian Civil War began September 17, 1970 
when units of the Jordanian 3rd Armored Brigade moved into 
Amman with the intention of clearing the capital of fedayeen. 
The fighting quickly spread throughout the country and Jor­
danian armored units shelled Palestinian refugee camps. The
first stage of the civil war lasted until the 27th of Sep­
tember when a truce was agreed upon. However, in December 
fighting again broke out and continued into 1971 and ended
with the final defeat of the fedayeen in Jordan. The num­
ber of fedayeen killed is uncertain with figures varying 
from 6000 to 10,000.^^
The defeat of the fedayeen in Jordan and the subse­
quent loss of Jordanian territory as a base of operation
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ended any remaining hope of waging successful guerrilla
warfare against Israel. The crossborder raids continued;
however, the number of raids dropped significantly. In
1970 the number was approximately 2000; in 1971 incidents
declined to approximately 500,^^ By 1975 the number of
36incidents numbered only about 10 a month.
After the defeat in the Jordanian Civil War the 
majority of the fedayeen groups gave up the strategy of 
guerrilla warfare and came to rely on spectacular acts of 
international terrorism to gain the attention of the world.
Since 1970 and the loss of Jordan as a base, the 
fedayeen has encountered difficulties in its dealings with 
other Arab nations. About nine thousand guerrillas escaped 
from Jordan to Syria. Thousands more moved into Lebanon. 
However, in Syria they were kept on a tight rein. The 
Syrians had no intention of allowing the Palestinians to 
gain the high degree of power in Syria that they had held 
in Jordan. Neither did the Syrians wish to be the victims 
of Israeli retaliation raids as the result of fedayeen 
operations from Syria. This left only Lebanon as a free base 
of operations. (For a more detailed account, see Chapter 7.) 
However, by 1971 Israeli counterterrorism tactics had made 
crossborder operations suicidal. In addition, the few 
terrorist attacks that have been successfully carried out 
have not weakened the state of Israel. The strategy of 
guerrilla warfare had failed. However, the Palestinians 
revised their strategy believing that if Israel
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could not be defeated by inside pressure, then perhaps it 
could be isolated and defeated by outside pressure. Acts 
of international terrorism were found to be highly success­
ful in capturing the headlines of the world and in pressur­
ing other nations to support the Palestinians in order to 
avoid terrorist acts directed against them. Also, acts of 
international terrorism were far from suicidal. As stated 
in Chapter 1, there exists a 79 percent chance that an inter­
national terrorist will escape death or punishment.
The initial tactic of international terrorism was 
hijacking civilian aircraft and holding the passengers and 
crews hostage. This tactic gained both headlines and 
instant concessions. The first hijacking by the PLO occurred 
in July 1968 when an El Al Boeing 707 was hijacked by the 
PFLP enroute from Rome to Tel Aviv. The three Arab terror­
ists ordered the- plane to fly to Algeria. After they 
arrived in Algeria the Israelis were seperated from the other 
passengers and taken to an army camp near the airport. The 
non-Israelis were freed and allowed to depart on other 
flights. The El Al plane and the Jewish passengers and crew 
were held for one m o n t h . D u r i n g  this period the Algerian 
government refused to yield to international pressure to 
release the hostages. Finally, the Israeli government 
acquiesced and released sixteen fedayeen, who had been 
captured while on terrorist raids inside Israel, in exchange 
for the h o s t a g e s . Naturally the hijacking was regarded 
as a great victory by the fedayeen and their prestige was
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further enhanced. Probably the most significant outcome 
of the hijacking was that the fedayeen observed that regard­
less of how outraged world reaction was to the hijackings, 
outrage did not go beyond words. Thus, the fedayeen was 
encouraged to further pursue new acts of international ter­
rorism. The lack of action against Algeria for supporting 
terrorism encouraged other nations to increase their aid of 
international terrorism as well.
In August 1968 the Israelis were again forced to 
acquiesce to terrorist demands. This time the hijacking 
took place on a non-Israeli plane. There was a highly prac­
tical reason for selecting a non-Israeli airliner. After 
the Algerian hijacking El Al became the first airline to 
station civilian security men on every flight and at every 
terminal. Therefore, the terrorists adapted and selected a 
soft target. Non-Israeli airliners were selected as targets 
due to the absence of special security measures at the 
terminals and the lack of security personnel aboard the 
flights. In this case a TWA plane became the first non- 
Israeli airliner to Be hijacked by the fedayeen. The TWA 
Los Angeles-Tel Aviv flight was hijacked by one female and 
two male Arabs to Damascus where the cockpit was blown up. 
All of the 113 persons aboard the flight were released 
except for six Israelis, four women and two men. The women 
were later released. However, the men, one a professor at 
Hebrew University and the other a businessman, were held 
for several months by the S y r i a n s . T h e  hostages were
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finally exchanged for 71 Arabs imprisoned by Israel; many 
of the prisoners were Syrian soldiers captured while conduct­
ing terrorist operations in I s r a e l . I n  these two hijack­
ings the fedayeen suffered no casualties and had succeeded 
in freeing a total of 87 comrades from Israeli prisons. In 
addition, much publicity had been received for the fedayeen 
cause. However, this was the last time Israelis were to 
yield to acts of international terrorism.
During this phase the fedayeen established its ties 
with other terrorist groups and the linkages for combined 
operations were formed. The tactic of utilizing personnel 
from other terrorist groups was a method by which Israeli 
security could be penetrated. A perfect example of this 
occurred in the Lod Airport massacre of May 1972. By 1972 
Israeli security was extremely tight, especially at air 
terminals. However, the security was designed to detect Arab 
terrorists. Therefore, the PFLP utilized members of the
radical Japanese Red Army to conduct the Lod Airport attack.
42In this attack 26 people were killed and 78 wounded. This 
was not the first instance of cooperation between the PFLP 
and other terrorist groups. In September 1970 when the PFLP 
hijacked the four airliners to Egypt and Jordan a fifth hi­
jack attempt was foiled by Israeli security men. A female 
Arab terrorist was captured and the male terrorist was
killed. The dead terrorist was identified as Patrick
43Arguello, a member of a Nicaraguan terrorist group.
The success of international terrorism used by the
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PFLP was widely acclaimed by the fedayeen membership. The 
dominance of the PLO by Al Fatah was threatened by the PFLP. 
Therefore, Fatah sponsored its own international terrorist 
group, Black September. The acts of international terrorism 
in the early 1970's brought world attention to the PLO's 
cause. However, it also greatly damaged its image of being 
part of a legitimate revolutionary movement. Acts such as 
the Munich massacre and the murder of the U.S. diplomats in 
Khartoum helped darken the PLO's image. Therefore, as the 
PLO began to gain worldwide recognition in the mid-1970's 
its use of international terrorism began to fade as a new 
strategy evolved. Groups such as the PFLP continued inter­
national terrorism; however, the Black September movement 
faded out of existence as the fedayeen movement evolved into 
another phase.
This next stage, which will be called the "diplomacy 
stage” was both aided and harmed by the PLO's use of terror­
ism. The PLO has never been able to exert full control over 
its various factions. This became an acute problem in the mid- 
1970's when some PLO groups renounced the use of international 
terrorism while other groups, such as the PFLP, intensified 
their international attacks. The use of terrorism, both inter­
nationally and inside of Israel, by the PLO during this 
period of transition (early and mid-1970's) reflects the dual 
nature of terrorism. The attacks gave the PLO worldwide 
attention and demonstrated its power as a force that must be 
dealt with. At the same time the attacks gave the PLO a bad
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image in the Western world. It appears, however, that the 
need for attention and recognition by the PLO outweighed the 
need for a favorable image in the Western world. The PLO 
attempted to gain both objectives by denouncing the more ex­
treme acts of international terrorism, perpetrated by the 
radical groups of the PLO, and by claiming that attacks inside 
Israel were acts of legitimate national liberation. Also, in 
1974 and 1975 the PLO's most horrendous attacks inside of 
Israel were conducted during the negotiations for the Sinai I 
and Sinai II agreements. It appears that these attacks were 
designed to disrupt negotiations and goad the Israelis into 
taking retaliatory actions, further hampering negotiations.
Despite the terrorist attacks of the mid-1970's the 
PLO became increasingly conscious of its image abroad. By 
utilizing terrorism to show its power and intensifying its 
diplomatic efforts, the PLO entered a new phase in 1974.
Era of Respectability; The Diplomacy Stage 
By 1974 the PLO was recognized worldwide as a force 
to be reckoned with. Governments found it more advanteous to 
deal with the PLO than to risk acts of terrorism perpetrated 
against them. Although respectability had long been an aim 
of the PRM it had taken a back seat to other considerations. 
However, by 1974 the PLO was well established and had demon­
strated its ability to successfully utilize terrorism as a 
political tool. The primary consideration now became 
establishing itself as a legitimate political entity both
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to the Arab nations and to the rest of the world.
The PLO desired not only recognition as a legitimate 
political entity, but also recognition as the only political 
entity representing the Palestinian people. Acts of diplo» 
macy combined with occasional acts of terrorism were aimed 
not only at gaining recognition but also at applying pressure 
on the Arab nations to ostracize any Arab nation that con­
sidered negotiating with Israel.
The first major Breakthrough in the fight for legit­
imate political status came in October 1974 at the Rabat 
Summit Conference of the Arab heads of state. At this con­
ference a resolution was passed which recognized the PLO as
the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people,
44over all liberated territory." At this conference Jordan 
was in essence giving up its claim to the West Bank in favor 
of the PLO. Thus, the PLO had achieved its aim of becoming 
a fully legitimate member of the Arab block of nations.
Arafat is currently regarded by the Arab nations as a legit­
imate head of state.
The next step to worldwide recognition came only one 
month later in November 1974 when Yasir Arafat appeared 
before the UN General Assembly. Over strong objections 
from the United States and Israel the PLO was granted 
observer status in the United Nations. The vote was 95 for, 
17 against, and 19. abstentions. Ninety-five affirmative 
votes in the UN represent a very strong mandate. In 1975 
a special Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable
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Rights of the Palestinian People was formed. Both the
General Assembly and the committee have strongly supported
the PLO/ including the rights of the Palestinian people to
45"national independence and sovereignty."
Despite these successes the PLO also experienced 
significant failures during this period. It has failed to 
win the recognition of the United States which it desperate­
ly needs. Only the United States has the power to pressure 
Israel into making significant concessions. The PLO has 
tried to win acceptance from the United States by cultivating 
a responsible and moderate image. It reportedly aided the 
U.S. in evacuating U.S. diplomats and citizens from Lebanon 
during the civil war.^^ AlsO/ the PLO attempted to mediate 
for the U.S. during the first days of the hostage seizure in 
Iran. This is indeed ironic since many Iranian terrorists 
were trained and supported by the PLO. Additionally, the 
PLO has thus far refrained from conducting terrorist opera­
tions inside the United States.
The PLO has also met with certain U.S. black leaders, 
such as Andrew Young and Jesse Jackson. The PLO meetings 
with important members of the U.S. black community came about 
as a result of the resignation of the United States' UN 
Ambassador Andrew Young in August of 1979. Young had held 
an unannounced and unauthorized meeting with an official of 
the PLO. This was contrary to U.S. policy which rejects any 
dialogue with the PLO until it recognizes Israel's right to 
exist. When the Young/PLO meeting became public the
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Israelis vigorously protested and in the subsequent political
crisis Ambassador Young resigned. Many U.S. black leaders
blamed Israel for Young's resignation and for several weeks
following the resignation denounced Israeli pressure and
47sought open contacts with the PLO.
The PLO has also sought to influence U.S. public 
opinion in other ways. The PLO maintains an information 
office in Washington, D.C. which distributes pro-PLO litera­
ture throughout the U.S. and particularly on U.S. campuses. 
The U.S. college campuses are also the targets of pro-PLO
speakers who pay periodic visits to campuses throughout the 
48U.S. However, the PLO has thus far been unable to sever 
the close ties between the U.S. and Israel. These ties 
between the United States and Israel are long-standing 
and the United States still feels a moral obligation 
to support Israel. The PLO is attempting to emphasize 
the morality of their cause and the alleged immorality 
of Israel's policies. The PLÔ apparently hopes to gradu­
ally erode the U.S.'s historical support for Israel and 
gain support for its own cause.
The PLO was also unable in this period to prevent 
the two interim agreements between Egypt and Israel, the 
Sinai I Agreement in 1974, and the Sinai II Agreement in 
1975.49
The diplomatic strategy of the PLO also caused a 
rift in its own ranks. Groups such as the PFLP, PFLP-GC,
I
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and the Iraqi ALF rejected any strategy except armed 
liberation and formed the "rejection f r o n t . H o w e v e r ,  the 
greatest failure of the PLO has been its inability to prevent 
the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.
The PLO and the United Nations
The United Nations is the principal political forum 
for the world. All major political issues among nations will 
eventually end up before this forum. Since the PLO's admis­
sion to the UN as an "observer” it has utilized the UN system 
for gaining embarrassing resolutions and condemnation against 
the Israeli government and its policies. In the General 
Assembly and in such UN organizations as ECOSOC [Economic 
and Social Council) the large number of Arab, Moslem, and 
Third World nations insures the PLO a base of support. (For 
a detailed account of support of the PLO and the reasons 
behind this support, see Chapter 6). In the UN the PLO, 
with the support of the Moslem bloc and other Third World 
nations, has managed to politically isolate the Israelis by 
continually pressing for condemning resolutions that make 
the Israelis appear as violators of human rights. The UN, 
with its emphasis on human rights and its worldwide exposure, 
is the perfect forum for these attacks.
Since 1974 several pro-PLO resolutions have been 
adopted. In 1974 Resolution 3236 was adopted which recog­
nized the right of the Palestinian people to self-determi­
nation, national independence, and sovereignty.^^ This
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resolution was quickly followed in 1974 by Resolution 3237 
which granted observer status to the PLO in the UN. This 
resolution was vigorously opposed by the U.S. and other 
Western nations. However, the vote was overwhelmingly in
52favor of the PLO, 95 for, 17 against, and 19 abstentions.
In 1975 three pro-PLO resolutions were passed. Resolution 
3375 stated that further resolutions and other measures 
should be adopted which would enable the Palestinian people 
to achieve their "inalienable national rights." The resolu­
tion further stated that the PLO should be allowed to partic­
ipate in all UN-sponsored conferences dealing with the Middle 
East.^^ The next resolution was 3376 which created a special 
Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the 
Palestinian People. This committee was expanded to 23 mem­
bers in 1976; however, neither the United States nor any
54European countries. East or West, are members. Also 
adopted in 1975 was resolution 3379 which declared that 
"Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination."
The U.S. and certain European nations protested against this 
resolution in ECOSOC and in the General Assembly and refused 
to acknowledge the resolution. In addition, Zionism has 
been linked in the UN with the South African policy of 
a p a r t h e i d . T h i s  has helped to form a bond of solidarity 
between the Arab and African states.
Israel has also been subjected to frequent criticism 
by ECOSOC's Commission on Human Rights which has repeatedly 
condemned a wide variety of alleged practices by the
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Israelis in the occupied territories. These alleged
practices include the destruction of homes, interference
with religious freedoms, mass arrests, torture, and ill
treatment of Arab detainees. Israel has argued during
ECOSOC's deliberations on anti-Israeli resolutions that the
resolutions represent, "yet another step in the apparently
insatiable guest of the Arab states to collect anti-Israel
57resolutions in the United Nations,"
While these pro-PLO resolutions were being adopted
in the General Assembly and ECOSOC in the mid and late 1970's,
Israel was protected from similar action in the Security
Council by the U.S. veto power. However, this began to
change in 1979 when the U.S. began to abstain on certain
Security Council votes dealing with Israel. In March 1979
the Security Council adopted Resolution 449 which created
a three-member commission to investigate Israeli settlements
in the occupied territories. The United Stated abstained
in this vote as they also did in the July 1979 Security
Council vote which called for a halt to the building of
58Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. However, 
the greatest blow to the Israelis was the March 1980 
Security Council resolution censuring Israeli settlement 
policy in the West Bank. Instead of vetoing or abstaining 
on this vote the United States voted for the censure. 
President Carter called the U.S. vote a mistake caused by a 
communications breakdown between the White House and the 
U.S. UN delegation; however, this did little to lessen the
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egimpact of the vote.
Without a doubt the PLO has scored several political 
victories in the UN. While the UN resolutions have not 
resulted in substantive changes in the Arab-Israeli conflict 
they have given the PLO symbolic victories which in turn aid 
its political strategy.
Post-Camp David Phase 
This phase and the preceding phase overlap since the 
diplomatic strategy is still being pursued. Additionally, 
this last phase cannot be fully evaluated since it is still 
unfolding and developing.
The year 1978 was a decisive year for the PLO. In 
that year the Israelis invaded southern Lebanon, previously 
known as "Fatahland," in reaction to the Coastal Road bus 
massacre carried out by a seaborne squad of Al Fatah. In 
this March 1978 attack over thirty Israelis were killed and 
seventy w o u n d e d . T h e  subsequent seizure of southern 
Lebanon in the Latani Operation was designed to permanently 
clear this area of fedayeen. The Israeli pullout in June 
1978 took, place only after the UN had agreed to establish 
the United Nations Interim Force CUNIFILl in Lebanon to stop 
PLO infiltration into the country. In addition, the Israelis 
armed and trained the Christian militias in southern Lebanon 
who have an intense hatred of the PLO.^^ As a result the PLO 
not only has to contend with the highly efficient Israeli 
defenses. But also has to cross Both the UNIFIL and
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Christian militia lines to reach Israel. Therefore, the PLO 
has lost southern Lebanon as a base of operation.
The year 1978 also saw the Egyptians and Israelis 
open peace negotiations which resulted in the Camp David 
accords. At Camp David the Israelis succeeded in denying 
the PLO any role in the future autonomy and administration 
of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The exact method used by 
the Israelis to deny the PLO a role in the autonomy negoti­
ations is unknown since the negotiations were closed to the 
public and the press. However, it is likely that, given 
the intense hatred of the PLO by the Israelis, the Israelis 
refused to negotiate or compromise on any issues unless it 
was clearly understood that the PLO would have no part in 
the agreements or Palestinian autonomy. The fact that 
Sadat yielded on this point is evident from the language of 
the Camp David accords. No reference is made in the accords 
to the PLO. According to the "Framework for Peace in the 
Middle East," signed in September 1978 by Egypt and Israel 
after the Camp David negotiations, the resolution of the 
Palestinian problem was to be determined by "Egypt, Israel
and Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian
62people." The representatives of the Palestinians had to 
be "mutually agreed" upon by all p a r t i e s . C l e a r l y  the 
Israelis would not have agreed to any Palestinian represen­
tatives who are connected with the PLO. It appears certain 
that the language of the treaty was a deliberate concession 
to the Israelis.
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The year 1978 was clearly a year of serious setbacks 
for the PLO. A new strategy and tactics had to be developed 
to counter and overcome these setbacks.
In order to counter these setbacks the PLO has 
attempted to intensify its terrorist operations. In order 
to overcome the loss of southern Lebanon the PLO has modi­
fied its method of infiltration and has come to rely heavily 
on seaborne attacks staged from bases in Lebanon and Syria. 
However, the Israeli Navy has proven to be an effective 
counter to these seaborne raids. The PLO tactic of seizing 
Israeli hostages inside Israel has also been modified in 
some instances. Some PLO squads have been intercepted on 
"suicide raids" where their only purpose was to infiltrate
Israel and kill as many people as possible, disregarding
64the tactic of seizing hostages for political ransom.
Another new tactic has been operations designed to 
kidnap Israelis and carry them to Lebanon or other Arab 
countries where they are held for the release of terrorists 
held in Israel. ,This tactic is the result of an incident 
in southern Lebanon where an Israeli soldier was captured 
by a PLO group during the Latani Operation. The soldier 
was held in Lebanon and the fedayeen group demanded the 
release of terrorists by Israel in exchange for the soldier. 
Israel finally yielded to internal pressure and released 77 
captured terrorists in this exchange. Since this PLO success 
other fedayeen groups have unsuccessfully mounted operations 
designed to capture Israeli citizens. The April 1979
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seaborne raid on Nahariya in which four people were killed 
was an unsuccessful attempt to kidnap Israelis and take them 
to Lebanon.
Since the Camp David treaty the PLO has attempted to 
find a strategy that will negate the effects of the treaty. 
The signing of the treaty was greeted by a wave of terrorist 
attacks; the Egyptian Embassy in Bangladesh was seized for
66several hours and bombings took place in Israel and Paris.
The United States Embassies in Syria and Lebanon were bombed 
as well.^^ Less than one month after the signing of the 
treaty a fedayeen group calling itself "Black March" attemp­
ted to attack an El Al airliner in Brussels. The terrorists 
fought a brief gun battle with the security forces and two
of the terrorists were captured. Eleven persons were injured
68in the attack, none fatally. In addition, the PLO has 
threatened to revive Black September in order to punish 
Israel and Egypt.
Part of the PLO strategy appears to be provoking 
Israeli retaliation against PLO targets in Lebanon. The PLO 
deliberately places its bases in civilian towns and settle­
ments. Therefore, when the Israelis retaliate they appear 
to be intentionally attacking innocent civilians. Thus, 
the PLO can attempt to turn world opinion against the 
Israelis.
As a result of Camp David and the dominant role 
assumed by the U.S. in the Middle East conflict, the PLO 
has leveled threats directly against the United States.
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Yasir Arafat has stated, "We must not just strike at the tail 
of the snake [Israel and Egypt!. We must get the snake's 
head [the United States). We must punish Carter, the engi­
neer of the Egyptian-Israeli t r e a t y . S o  far the PLO 
has continued to refrain from attacking on U.S. soil. However, 
if the PLO strategy of countering Camp David is to succeed, 
a way must be found to influence the U.S.
As demonstrated in this chapter the PLO strategy 
has changed and adapted in order to counteract preventive 
measures enacted against it. It has combined terrorism with 
political action and diplomacy. It is for these reasons 
that the PLO and the Palestinian Resistance Movement continue 
to exist and prosper. Its adaptability, political and 
diplomatic maneuvers, reinforced and supported by the Arab 
governments, and its willingness to use terrorism as a 
political tool, combined with the uncoordinated response, 
lack of cooperation and lack of resolve among the rest of 
the world, has made the PLO what it is today.
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CHAPTER V
THE ISRAELI RESPONSE
Just as the PLO has adapted and changed its tactics 
over the years, the Israelis have also had to adapt their 
tactics and countermeasures in order to combat the PLO. A 
change in PLO tactics has resulted in modification of exist­
ing Israeli counterterror tactics.
Strategy of Containment 
After the 1948 War of Independence the main concern 
of the new Israeli government was the military threat posed 
by the Arab nations. As previously stated, the fedayeen was 
relying on the Arab governments to liberate Palestine by 
conventional military force. Terrorist actions were by and 
large utilized as tactics of harassment. Therefore, Israeli 
tactics were primarily concerned with the greater threat of 
conventional war with the Arab nations. Additionally, the 
PLO had not yet been formed and the fedayeen groups were 
disorganized and generally poorly trained. However, the 
fedayeen was aided by easy access to Israeli targets from 
terrorist bases in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. There did 
not exist any natural boundaries along the borders which
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could serve as obstacles to infiltrating fedayeen squads. 
Also, the resources of the new state were under severe strain 
and funds were unavailadale for construction of the sophisti - 
Gated man-made barriers which currently exist on the borders. 
Therefore, frequent terrorist raids were launched into 
Israel. However, the success of these raids in terms of 
real damage was relatively slight. In 1956, for example,
26 percent of the attacks consisted of throwing hand grenades
and firing on civilian settlements; 23 percent of the attacks
..
were directed against civilian vehicles; 16 percent were 
sabotage of water installations; 13 percent were indiscrimi­
nate attacks on people in the streets; 9 percent were demo­
lition attacks against buildings and other installations; 
and 8 percent involved mine-laying or highway sabotage. Only 
4 percent were deliberate attacks against Israeli military 
units.^
Since Israel was concerned primarily with combating 
the Arab governments, Israeli anti-terror strategy was pri­
marily one of containment. However, by 1956 fedayeen actions 
from the Gaza Strip, supported by Egypt, became intolerable 
and resulted in the 1956 War with Egypt. The Israelis seized 
the Sinai and the Gaza Strip and refused to withdraw until 
the UN Emergency Force was established to guard against 
border infiltration. After the 1956 War and until 1967 
terrorists were restricted from operating from Egyptian 
territory. Fedayeen activity did not again become signifi­






After the 1967 war Israeli borders were situated 
along natural terrain features that constituted obstacles to 
infiltration. The Jordan River, Golan Heights, and Sinai 
Desert serve as obstacles to terrorist raids and this is 
one reason why'Israel is currently reluctant to relinquish 
this territory. In addition, the borders were pushed back 
further from Israeli population centers. Thus, the fedayeen 
had a greater distance to travel before they could reach their 
targets. The greater the distance an infiltrator has to 
travel, the greater the chances of detection and intercep­
tion. However, the improved border situation was offset 
initially by the vast increase in fedayeen activity after 
the 1967 War. The total defeat of the Arab armies in 1967 
and the acquisition of buffer zones removed the immediate 
threat posed by the Arab governments. Therefore, the 
terrorist raids, sponsored by the Arab nations, became the 
primary concern.
A new problem arose after 1967 which became a concern 
to the Israelis. Prior to the 1967 War the Israelis did not 
have serious problems with world public opinion. However, 
after 1967 and the pre-emptive surprise attack on the Arab.na­
tions Israel was criticized and even condemned by many nations. 
Thus, the Israelis since 1967 have had to fight the battle
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of public opinion. In the opinion of many experts Israel 
has been much less successful in the war for favorable pub­
lic opinion than the war against terrorists. According to 
Professor Yehoshafat Harkabi of Hebrew University, the 
former head of Israeli Military Intelligence, the Israelis 
after 1967 failed to aggressively seek to win favorsible 
world opinion. The Israelis failed to fight back particu­
larly in the area of ideology while the Arabs devoted much 
time and resources to developing the ideological war. 
According to Harkabi:
From the beginning Israel should have seized upon the 
weakness in the politicidal position of the Arabs and 
harped on them in order to mobilize the support of 
world opinion against such a position. As just as the 
Arab case might be, it could not justify politicide. 
Israel should have exploited the ugly features in the 
Arab position— the very high frequency of invective, 
vilification, anti-semitism— so as to exert pressure 
on them; it should have demonstrated the organic 
connection between politicide, genocide, and the re- 
vilenent of the Israelis and Jews. Politicide as a 
political objective produced a tendency on the part of 
many Arabs to describe Israel as fundamentally and 
deeply depraved, as deserving a death verdict, and from 
such a stand to consider its builders, the Jews and their 
culture, as evil.
After 1967 the Israelis had to find tactics which
would counter and contain border infiltration and internal
terrorism. The Israelis concentrated their counterterror
tactics in three areas: 11 border defense and interception,
21 territorial based reprisals, and 3) population control-
Border Defense and Interception of Infiltrators 
The unsuitability of the terrain of Israel to
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Between 1967 and 1970, Arab terrorists on the West Bank killed 12 Israelis, as well as over 50 Arabs 
whom they accused of 'collaborating' with Israel. Israeli forces were active in driving the terrchsts 
towards the Jordan river, and on 21 March 1968 crossed the river in force to attack the terrorist base 
at Karame. Following this raid, the Israeli army established a fortified line along tne Jordan, 
with a border fence and minefields, effectively sealing the border, and the terrorists themselves 
withdrew eastwards from the valley to the mountains. During 1970 terrorist acts on the West 
Bank stopped almost completely. They began again, on a smaie scale, after October 1973I Z. O  M wtinSiltvtSCURCS: The Arab-Igraeli Conflict, its History In Maps
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guerrilla warfare has already been discussed and will not be 
reiterated here. However, the unsuitability of the terrain 
caused the PLO to rely primarily on hit-and-run crossborder 
terrorist raids. Therefore, the Israelis implemented an 
elaborate system of border defenses. The Israelis con­
structed security barriers along the borders with Jordan, 
and later along the Lebanese border. These defenses con­
sisted of security fences supplemented by mine fields and 
detection devices. Patrol roads were constructed along the 
fences and were frequently patrolled by Israeli troops look­
ing for signs of infiltration. In the mountains of the 
Jordan Valley small teams of Israelis manned observation 
posts and patrolled extensively looking for terrorists.
Once signs of terrorist infiltration were detected, mobile 
strike teams were immediately dispatched to intercept the
4terrorists. In this manner the majority of the terrorists 
were intercepted before reaching their targets.
Some of the methods of border defense were considered 
harsh by the international community and provided the PLO 
with good propaganda material. One such example was the 
destruction of Arab villages along the 1967 Israeli-Jordanian 
border. The populations were evacuated and the villages 
were destroyed as a security measure. ̂
Another security measure by the Israelis was the 
establishment of the Nahal Program in which armed agricul­
tural settlements were set up in the border areas which were 
considered too dangerous for civilian settlements. The
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soldler-farmers of the settlements performed the territorial 
defense functions in these frontier areas and at the same 
time paved the way for future civilian settlements.
Territories. Based Reprisals
The cornerstone of the Israeli counterterror strategy 
has been reprisal attacks and other acts of retaliation.
The Israeli government has three main reasons for employing 
acts of reprisals: 1] for revenge, to satisfy the internal
pressure for retribution, 2} to destroy terrorist bases, 
leaders, and members, and to disrupt further attacks, and 
3) to modify the behavior of the Arab governments and there­
by discourage support of the terrorists.
Israeli reprisals have varied widely in degree of 
severity and range from light shelling incidents to the 
Beirut Airport raid of 1968. This raid by Israeli commandos 
resulted in the destruction, on the ground, of thirteen 
Lebanese airliners with no loss of life. The raid was in 
retaliation for an attack on an El Al airliner at Athens 
Airport in which one passenger was killed and another wounded. 
The attack was carried out by the PFLP which was headquar­
tered in Beirut.^ Clearly the Israeli retaliation was aimed 
not at the terrorists. But at the Lebanese government in an 
attempt to modify its behavior and stop the support of the 
PFLP.
A major study entitled The Impact of Israeli Reprisals 
on Behavior of the Borderinc Arab Nations Directed at Israel
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was conducted by Barry Blechman In 1972. According to 
Blechman reprisals are designed to compel negative or posi­
tive goals or behavior modification on the part of the Arab 
governments. Reprisals for negative compellence are de­
signed to persuade Arab governments to cease two types of 
behavior: 1) direct support of fedayeen groups, such as
training, equipping, and financing and 21 direct actions 
against Israel, such as shellings, etc. Positive compellence 
reprisals are designed to persuade the Arab governments to 
stop fedayeen use of their territory for raids against Israel 
and to induce cooperative behavior by the Arab governments
7towards settlement of the overall conflict. Blechman 
classified the specific types of terrorists actions as 
reflected in Chart 4.
Blechman then performed analysis of the various Arab 
nations and the Palestinians looking at the type of compel­
lence desired by the Israelis and the time period involved. 
This is shown in Chart 5.
Blechman found that the frequency of terrorist 
activity was likely to diminish following reprisals. However, 
the impact of reprisals was short-lived and rarely lasted 
longer than thirty days. Also, there was almost no evidence 
that reprisals compelled Arab governments to become more 
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The strategy of control of the Arab population of 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip utilized both incentives and 
deterrents. The Israeli military, which was charged with 
controlling these areas, issued *A Compilation of Proclama­
tions and Orders" and a detailed code called the "Order 
concerning Security Instructions.” . These documents were 
distributed to all local officials in the administered 
territories and established military court procedures and 
clearly defined security violations, such as possession of
Qillegal arms and membership in illegal organizations.
On the positive side, the Israelis realized that a 
stable economy and prosperous civilian population were strong 
inducements for cooperation with the Israelis by the Arab 
population. Therefore, the Israelis allocated funds for 
stabilizing the economies of the occupied territories and 
initiated large-scale public works programs. The Israeli 
Department of Agriculture sponsored many projects designed 
to improve the agriculture of these areas. West Bank 
agricultural production rose from 114 million Israeli 
pounds in 1968 to 350 million Israeli pounds in 1972. In 
addition, the Arab population was able to find well-paying 
jobs inside of Israel. By 1973 the number of Arabs working 
inside Israel numbered more the 3C,0QQ, or approximately 
one-third of the Arab work force of the occupied territories.^*^
While it appears that the Arabs have prospered eco­
nomically under Israeli occupation, in recent years the
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West Bank Arabs have become increasingly militant. The 
majority of the West Bank population have totally rejected 
the Camp David accords and support the PLO as their represen­
tative. The Israeli government has further antagonized the 
West Bcmk Arabs by continuing to build settlements in the 
West Bank. This has proved to be a tremendous propaganda 
asset for the PLO.
At Camp David Israeli Prime Minister Begin pledged to 
freeze construction of new West Bank settlements during the 
negotiation period. However^ the ambiguous language of the 
treaty did not clarify which negotiation period this pledge 
referred to. Begin stated that the pledge referred to the 
3-month period from the signing of the Camp David accords to 
when the final Egyptian-Israeli treaty was ratified and became 
effective. President Sadat and President Carter believed 
that the pledge was to cover the five-year autonomy transi­
tion period for the West Bank. Since the Camp David summit
Israel has founded or legalized Cas of February 19801 four-
12teen new settlements on the West Bank. As of April 1980 
there are some 14,000 Israelis living on the West Bank in 64 
settlements? 39 of these settlements have been constructed 
since Begin came to power in 1977. These 14,000 Israeli 
settlers live among approximately 900,000 Arabs who comprise 
98 percent of the West Bank population.
The Begin government insists that the West Bank 
settlements are necessary for security and pose no threat to
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Palestinian autonomy. Furthermore, Begin firmly believes 
that Jews should have the right to settle in the land that 
was historically Samaria and Judea.
The continued construction of settlements on the West 
Bank has focused attention on the Palestinian cause and has 
eroded support for the Israeli position in the West. This 
erosion of support is evident in the March 1980 UN Security 
Council vote censuring Israeli settlements in the West Bank. 
Even the U.S. voted in favor of the censure (this vote was 
later called a mistake by President C a r t e r ) B e g i n  has 
also encountered opposition to his settlement policies within 
the Israeli government. After the UN vote Israeli Deputy 
Prime Minister Simha Ehrlich (Liberal Party) stated that as 
painful as the UN vote was, "perhaps some basic soul search­
ing is now called for. The Justice Minister Shmuel Tamir
stated that the UN vote should lead the government to "draw
17some new conclusions" about settlement activity. Despite
»
this internal opposition to the settlement policy of Prime 
Minister Begin, it is highly unlikely that the opposition party, 
if it gained power, would agree to either a dismantlement of 
existing settlements or an independent Palestinian state in 
the West Bank. Therefore, the dispute is unlikely to be
resolved in the foreseeable future.
The Israelis do have a legitimate security concern in
the West Bank; a militant independent state in the West Bank
could pose a threat to peace. However, a definite threat to
peace will exist until a solution for the West Bank is found.
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The Post-Munich Massacre Period;
Non-Territorial Based Reprisals 
With the rise of international terrorism originated 
by the PLO in the early 1970's the Israelis were faced with 
an external threat. Therefore, the Israelis had to find à 
strategy to counter the terrorism which was operating out­
side of the territorial area of the Middle East. At first 
the Israelis were content to respond to individual acts of 
terrorism with the standard reprisal raids of the past 
directed against PLO bases. The Israelis also began to 
utilize political pressure combined with, the threat of retal­
iation. After the Lod Airport massacre of 1972 the Israelis 
did not launch a massive retaliation raid. However, they did 
state that Lebanon was to blame for the attack since the PFLP 
headquarters were located in Beirut and the terrorists had 
trained in Lebanon. The Israelis called for a boycott of 
Beirut Airport and demanded that Lebanon instantly bring all 
terrorist activity in that country to an end, and threatened 
reprisals. The Lebanese government, mindful of the Beirut
Airport retaliatory raid of 1968, did what it could to control 
18the fedayeen. After much negotiation between the Lebanese 
government and the PLO, and some clashes between the fedayeen 
and the Lebanese Army, an agreement was reached. In this 
agreement of June 28, 1972 Arafat agreed to Lebanon’s mini­
mum demands. He agreed to freeze all operations in and from 
Lebanon and pull his forces back from the border with Israel. 
However, the fedayeen would maintain a presence near the
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border. The positions at the border were occupied by 
Lebanese soldiers. Despite this agreement some hardline 
Fatah and PFLP members remained in the area and the
19Lebanese Army was never able to really control PLO activity.
During this period the Israelis were also reacting
to a new type of terror tactic, the letter bomb. At least
sixty-six letter bombs were posted in Amsterdam and other
European cities and mailed to Israeli diplomatic' officers
around the world. The only fatality of the letter bomb
camipaign was the Israeli agricultural counselor at Israel's
London embassy. The Israelis quickly countered the letter
bomb campaign by using x-ray machines to screen suspicious 
20letters.
After the Lod Airport massacre and the letter bomb
campaign the Israelis began to employ terror tactics of their
own. On July 9, 1972 Ghassan Kanafani, the PFLP's number
four man in the party hierarchy, was killed by a bomb planted
in his car in Beirut. On July 19, 1972 Anis Sayegh, a
senior PLO official and a member of the PFLP, was injured
by a letter bomb. Then on July 25 Bassam Abu Sharif, the
PFLP spokesman in Beirut was partially blinded by a letter 
21bomb. The Israelis denied responsibility for the bombings; 
however, most experts agreed that the Israelis were striking 
back at the terrorists by using terror. However, this 
Israeli campaign had only begun. In September 1972 the 
Israelis were given a new reason for revenge, Munich.
The murder of the eleven Israeli athletes by Black
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September caused a violent reaction by the Israeli government. 
No longer would its reprisals be territorial-based and lim­
ited to the Arab world. After Munich the Israeli government 
gave the Israeli intelligence organization "Mossad" the 
go ahead to hunt down and kill the PLO leaders responsible 
for Munich wherever they found them. Insult was added to 
injury when only seven weeks after the Munich massacre the 
three surviving Black September members responsible for the
attack were freed by the West Germans after Black September
22hijacked a Lufthansa airliner. The three terrorists were
flown to Libya where they were given a hero's welcome and
President Ghadafi even arranged a press conference for them.
It was also alleged that Ghadafi paid Yasir Arafat a reward
23of five million dollars for the Munich massacre.
After Munich the Israelis declared a universal and
unconditional war on the fedayeen. One week after the Munich
attack Golda Meir stated in the Knesset that Israel would
fight Arab terrorists wherever possible. She stated, "We
24have no choice but to strike at them."
Israeli retribution for Munich was not long in
coming. The day after the burial of the Israeli athletes
Israeli fighters struck ten fedayeen bases in Lebanon and
Syria. These raids were the deepest penetration of Arab
25territory since the Six Day War. However, the main instru­
ment of retaliation was not the Israeli Air Force or Army; 
it was a special organization of Israelis who used terror 
against the terrorists. This organization was reportedly
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called "Mivtzan Elohim," or the "Wrath of God.
After the Munich massacre many PLO leaders, stationed 
in different parts of the world, began to meet with violent 
deaths. The Fatah representative in Rome, stationed at the 
Libyan Embassy, was shot twelve times by two men. The 
Israelis claimed that this man, Wael Zwaiter, was a Black 
September member, and was partially responsible for the Lod 
Airport massacre. The PLO representative in Paris was 
killed by a bomb planted in his telephone. Hussein Easier, 
the PLO man in Cyprus, was blown up by a bomb planted in his 
bed. In June 1973, Mohammed Baudia, the boss of the Black
September network in France, was killed by a bomb planted in
27his car.
These examples are but a few of the numerous assass­
inations of fedayeen leaders. However, these were all small 
operations involving the killing of only one fedayeen leader 
at a time. Furthermore, the hierarchy of the fedayeen move­
ment had gone underground or was in highly-guarded guerrilla 
strongholds in the Arab countries. Therefore, the Israelis 
planned a massive operation designed to eliminate the top 
fedayeen leaders.
The Israelis had received a great deal of criticism 
because of their overkill tactics in the Beirut Airport raid. 
Israel had also Been heavily condemned throughout the world 
for the shooting down of a Libyan airliner that strayed over 
Israeli territory in February 1973; all 107 persons aboard 
were killed. The 727 was on a flight from Benghazi to Cairo
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when it strayed off course. The Israelis stated that they 
had tried to make contact with the airliner to force it to 
land. However, the airliner's flight recorder later revealed 
that the pilot first thought that the Israeli planes were 
friendly Egyptian aircraft. By the time the pilot realized
his mistake the Israeli phantoms had already begun their
28attack. The Israelis stated that they had no option but
to shoot down the airliner. Black September had threatened
on several occasions to hijack a plane and dive it into the
heart of Tel Aviv. However, no amount of Israeli reasoning
could eliminate the fact that 107 innocent people had been 
29killed. The incident received heavy publicity throughout
the world.
It is probable that in the wake of all the bad pub­
licity the Israelis were reluctant to mount an anti-guerrilla 
attack, intent on assassination, in a foreign capital. One 
would Believe that the Israelis would be concerned with the 
possible reaction of friendly governments, particularly the 
U.S. government, Israel's main source of arms. However, in 
March 1973 the situation changed. An incident occurred that 
would insure that the U.S. would not object to a major anti- 
fedayeen operation outside of Israel. This incident was the 
murder of the new and the former U.S. ambassadors to the 
Sudan By members of Black September.  ̂̂ After this incident 
in Khartoum the Israelis knew that the U.S. would not object 
to their operation in Beirut.
On April 5, 1973 six Israeli agents posing as
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tourists booked into two hotels near the Beirut seafront.
They also rented six cars from a local rental firm. On the
night of April 9th they guided into the beach a force of
Israeli commandos who landed in small b o a t s . T h e  Israeli
commandos and agents, all heavily armed, drove to three
apartments belonging to high-ranking fedayeen leaders. At
the apartments the commandos broke down the doors and began
shooting. The shooting lasted for about ten minutes and
when it was over Abu Youssef, Kamal Adwan, and Kamal Nasser,
three of the fedayeen*s top leaders, were dead. Three of
Abu Youssef's bodyguards were also killed in the attack, as
was Youssef * s wife and a seventy-year-old Italian woman who
32lived in the apartment building.
While this attack was taking place, a second group
of commandos drove to the large refugee camp of Sabra where
they'blew up the headquarters of the PDFLP and killed a
number of fedayeen. They also attacked three other terrorist
33offices in Beirut.
When it was all over, after two-and-a-half hours in 
Beirut, the commandos drove their rented cars back to the 
beach and were picked up by small assault boats. The six 
Israeli agents went with them, leaving behind their luggage 
and their unpaid bills. The Israelis later announced they 
had two men killed and two wounded in the operation.
After the Beirut operation the fedayeen leadership 
went even further underground, or took strong steps to 
increase their personal safety. These actions were due not
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only to the fact that the Israelis had struck inside a 
fedayeen stronghold, but also because during the Beirut 
operation the Israelis had captured the files of Al Fatah, 
which listed the members and supporters of Fatah inside of 
Israel and its occupied territories.^^
Despite the success of the Israeli "hit teams" they 
were unable to eliminate the number one man on their hit 
list, the planner of the Munich massacre, Ali Hassan Salameh. 
It was the attempt to assassinate Salameh that led to the 
exposure of the Mossad operation.
In July 1973 Israeli intelligence located and identi­
fied an Arab living in Lillehammer, Norway as Salameh. A 
hit team was dispatched to Lillehammer and assassinated the 
man believed to be Salameh. Several members of the hit team 
were apprehended by the authorities and some of them broke 
down under interrogation and confessed the crime and impli­
cated the Israeli government. It was also revealed that the 
dead man, believed to be Salameh, was actually a Moroccan 
waiter who lived in Lillehammer and was married to a Norwe­
gian w o m a n . H o w e v e r ,  on January 22, 1979 in Beirut, Ali
Hassan Salameh was killed along with four of his bodyguards
37by a bomb planted in his car.
After the embarassment caused by the Lillehammer 
incident the Israeli assassination teams apparently curtailed 
their operations. In addition, the October 1973 War over­
shadowed the external threat of the PLO and Israeli energies 
were directed against the greater threat posed by the armies
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of Syria and Egypt.
The Strategy of Containment in 
the Era of Diplomacy 
If there is one specific area where the Israelis 
have failed in counterterrorism strategy, it is in the area 
of diplomacy. During the middle and later 1970's the PLO 
began to make tremendous gains in the diplomatic arena. As 
stated in Chapter 4 the PLO is now recognized by more nations 
than Israel and has observer status in the UN. The Israelis 
have continued both their defensive and offensive strategies 
against terrorism But have by and large failed to effectively 
counter the PLO's diplomatic successes.
Two probable reasons for this failure in Israeli 
diplomacy are the influence of the Arab oil states, which 
strongly back the PLO, and the nature of the Israeli leader­
ship. The current leaders of Israel are generally military 
men. Dayan, Rabin, Weizman, and even Begin, who was the 
commander of the Irgun, are all former military commanders. 
Most of their adult lives have been spent in the military 
faced with a constant war environment with the Arabs. 
Therefore, their orientations and reactions in government are 
those of military commanders, not politicians. Decisions 
are often made out of military rather than political consid­
erations. A recent example of this can be seen in the 
Latani Operation. In March of 1978 a group of eleven Fatah 
terrorists landed on the Israeli coast and seized a tourist
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bus killing over thirty people and wounding seventy. Three 
of the terrorists were captured and the rest were killed.
As a result of this attack the Israelis reacted by invading 
southern Lebanon which was heavily occupied by the PLO and 
known as Fatahland. The Israelis cleared out the terrorists 
from southern Lebanon up to the banks of the Latani River.
The Israelis occupied this area until international pressure 
forced a withdrawal. In order to gain the withdrawal the 
UN established the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. 
However, the Israelis were highly skeptical of the value of 
United Nations troops and took measures of their own to 
prevent the PLO from reoccupying this area. Before with­
drawing the Israelis trained and armed Christian militiamen 
and turned this area over to their control. The Christian 
militiamen have refused to allow either the Lebanese Army 
or the UN into this area. Therefore, this area serves as a 
buffer zone for the Israelis. Since the Latani Operation
the PLO has to cross both UN lines and the Christian militia
38area before it can even reach the Israeli border.
Another example of Israeli military-oriented policy 
decisions regarding terrorism is the reaction to the April
1979. PLO attack at Nahariya. In response to this terrorist 
attack, in which four Israelis were killed, Israeli Defense 
Minister Ezer Weizman announced that Israel was adopting 
a pre-emptive aggressive policy toward terrorists. Since 
that time the Israeli military has conducted periodic strikes 
Both on land and by air against PLO positions in Lebanon.
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Many of these attacks are preventive strikes and are not 
in reprisal for PLO attacks. The Israeli reasoning in 
adopting this policy is tactically-oriented; however, it 
has resulted in bad strategic implications due to political 
considerations. It is in essence a tactical military suc­
cess, but politically it is a strategic blunder. There is 
little doubt that the aggressive policy of continued aerial 
bombardment and occasional land-launched attacks against PLO 
positions have kept the PLO off balance. It has been proven 
that when you keep your enemy on the defensive it is diffi­
cult for them to launch, offensive operations. The Israeli 
strikes have forced the PLO underground, disrupted training, 
and made it difficult to launch operations from southern 
Lebanon. However, the Israeli strikes have had a high 
political cost. In launching these attacks the Israelis have
occasionally struck population centers where the PLO inten-
39tionally locates its training bases. The PLO has maxi­
mized media coverage of civilian casualties which has caused 
the tide of international public opinion to sway away from 
the Israelis. Even the usually supportive United States has 
expressed concern and dismay over the Israeli strikes into 
Lebanon.
Currently the Israelis classify their counterterror 
policy as a "strategy of containment." According to Major 
General Aharon Yariv, head of the Center for Strategic 
Studies at Tel Aviv University and former head of Israeli 
Military Intelligence, the Israelis do not have a strategy
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that can achieve absolute results. According to Yariv the 
only hope of truly containing the PLO is a strategy which 
will combine the military elements with a political solution 
to the Palestinian problem acceptable to both sides. The 
aims of the strategy of containment should be: 1) to prevent
Palestinian terrorism from achieving its declared political 
purpose, 2) to limit Israel's damage and to maintain normal 
day-to-day activity as well as the morale of the public, and 
3) to cause maximum possible damage to the terrorist organ­
izations, without impairing Israel's overall military capa­
bility and without injuring political interests.
The third aim will be the most difficult to achieve 
since the military tactics necessary to damage the PLO will 
harm Israel's political position. In the future Israel may 
have to choose which aim is more important, preventing 
terrorist attacks or winning political support.
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CHAPTER VI
THE PLO: SUPPORT NETWORK AND
INTERNATIONAL LINKAGES
One of the primary reasons for the power of the PLO 
is its extensive support network. The major difference 
between the PLO and other terrorist groups is that the PLO 
has numerous nations that openly support its operations.
While most other terrorist groups are hampered by the 
operation constraints of conducting clandestine training, 
commiting robberies for financing, and stealing weaponry, 
the PLO has all of these necessities furnished free of 
charge by the Arab nations and certain other governments.
Training
The Arab governments, primarily Syria, Lebanon, 
Algeria, Crag, Libya, and South Yemen, permit the PLO to 
operate training camps in their countries. Additionally, 
these countries open their own military schools and academies 
to members of the PLO. Other countries, such as the U.S.S.R., 
Cuba, North Korea, and Iran, also furnish training and sup­
port for the PLO.^ Since the end of the Lebanese Civil War 
Czechoslavakia and Hungary have provided training for the
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PLO. In the summer of 1978 some 32 Palestinian pilots and
60 mechanics returned to the Middle East after completing
advanced courses in Eastern Europe. Cuba has reportedly
2sent advisors to train PLO members in Lebanon. Libya has
also provided pilot training and instruction in the use of
antiaircraft missiles to the PLO.^ Despite the Camp David
accords the Egyptians have continued to provide some support
to the PLO. In early 1980 it was reported that 38 members
of the PLO were being trained in advanced seamanship in
Egypt. All 38 were studying at the Egyptian Maritime School,
a civilian school which, trains naval officers. In light of
the increased dependence of the PLO on sea-launched attacks,
4this training is of particular concern to the Israelis.
The U.S.S.R.'s influence on the PLO is hard to gauge; 
however, it has been known for years that the Soviets have 
been training terrorists including the PLO. Yasir Arafat 
first visited Moscow in 1969. In 1974 the PLO opened an 
office in Moscow. It is difficult to pinpoint exactly 
when Soviet training of the PLO began; however, numerous 
captured PLO terrorists and even some PLO personnel inter­
viewed by the news media in Arab countries have admitted to 
receiving training in the Soviet Union. It is estimated that 
over 200 Palestinians train in the Soviet Union each year. 
Training is conducted in Moscow, Tashkent, Baku, and partic­
ularly at Sanprobal, near the city of Simferopol, which is 
the Soviet academy for foreign training. The training in­
cludes courses in guerrilla warfare, command, artillery,
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engineering, communications, demolitions, and of course, 
political training on communism.^
Financial Support 
The PLO does not lack, for funds; it is supported 
financially by some of the wealthiest nations in the world, 
the Arab oil states. At the Arab Summit Conference in Rabat, 
Morocco in December of 1969 the Arab states reportedly de­
cided to allocate 26 million English pounds to the PLO.
Libya has allegedly been the largest contributer to the PLO.
In recent years Libya has contributed approximately 73 
million dollars to various terrorist groups. Libya even 
pays special Bonuses for specific terrorist operations. As 
stated earlier, Gadhafi of Libya reportedly paid approximate­
ly 5 million dollars as a reward for the Munich massacre. 
Another 2 million dollars was paid to the international 
terrorist "Carlos,* who is affiliated with the PFLP, for the 
Vienna OPEC hijacking of the Arab oil ministers in 1975. 
Gadhafi has reportedly offered 16 million dollars to the 
PFLP, for the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.^ 
Libya partially finances its PLO contribution by a six per­
cent tax on all Palestinian salaries in Libya and a three 
percent "jihad" tax on all Libyans. Kuwait also provides 
considerable financial support to the PLO by means of a 
three and one-half percent tax on Palestinians' salaries and 
a general two percent tax on petrol sales and movie tickets.^ 
Kuwait•s annual contribution to the PLO is estimated to be
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17 million dollars. Saudi Arabia contributes approximately
10 million dollars annually, A rough estimate of the PLO's
0annual income would be between 40 and 50 million dollars.
Logistical Support 
The majority of the terrorist organizations through­
out the world must obtain weapons, ammunition, and other 
supplies By theft or By purchasing them through clandestine 
sources. However, the PLO has a generous supply of free 
weaponry supplied By AraB governments. This includes not 
only small arms and explosives. But also surface-to-air 
missies CSAMl, artillery, and tanks. The majority of PLO 
weaponry is of Soviet or Warsaw Pact origin and is supplied 
through the Arab governments. However, at least some weap­
onry is supplied directly from the Soviet bloc to the PLO.
In July 1972 Arafat journeyed to Moscow and reportedly 
received a pledge for the first direct weapons shipments to
9the fedayeen.
An example of the effect of the Soviet supply line 
can Be seen By an examination of the types of explosives 
utilized by terrorists inside Israel. The type of plastic 
explosives utilized in Bombing attacks by the PLO inside 
Israel was until the mid-1970's generally of U.S. manufac­
ture. These explosives, usually C-4 [plastic explosives), 
were sold by the U.S. to AraB governments, such, as Saudi 
AraBia, for military usage. Some of these explosives 
eventually ended up in the hands of the PLO. However, since
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the mid-1970's PLO terrorists have begun to rely heavily on 
Soviet bloc explosives such as Czechoslavakian Centax. The 
PLO maintains a scientific institute in Beirut that manu­
factures highly sophisticated booby traps and explosive 
devices, including plastic d e t o n a t o r s I t  is probable that 
some of the technology utilized at this institute was ob­
tained by training provided in the U.S.S.R.
Another important type of logistical support supplied 
by the Arab governments is documentation. Various Arab 
governments, and particularly Libya, have furnished false 
passports for members of the PLO. For example Ribhi Halaum, 
a Fatah member, was detained in Holland carrying an Algerian 
diplomatic passport. Libya allegedly supplied the passports 
for the PLO terrorists who staged an attack on El Al in 
Istanbul, Turkey in 1976. The infamous Abu Daoud, who was 
apprehended and quickly released by French authorities in 
1977, was carrying an Iraqi passport.
■ Political Support
In many respects the political support furnished the 
PLO by the Arab states has been more beneficial than all the 
weapons and training given to them. The power of the Arab 
oil states has greatly facilitated the PLO's drive for 
recognition. Many oil-dependent states have found it advan­
tageous to recognize the PLO and condemn Israel rather than 
risk incurring the displeasure of their Arab oil suppliers. 
The Moslem nations also constitute a large block in the United
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Nations and will vote support for any resolution supporting 
the PLO and the Palestinian cause. .The Moslem nations repre­
sent a powerful voting bloc in the ON (see illustration!,
The European governments with their dependence on Arab oil are 
particularly susceptible to pressure from the Arab govern­
ments. Thus, the PLO has made considerable political gains 
in western Europe, In 1979 Yasir Arafat visited Austria, 
Turkey, Spain, and Portugal seeking increased influence for 
the PLO, As of early 1980 the head of the PLO's political 
department, Farauk Kaddaumi, has visited Paris and Brussels. 
The political influence of the Arab states on behalf of the 
PLO can be seen in the March 1980 recognition of the "Pales­
tinians' right of self-determination," acknowledged by French
President Valery Giscard d' Estaing at the end of an official
12visit to Kuwait, Additionally, in March 1980 Austria became 
the first Western European nation to grant full diplomatic 
recognition to the PLO,^^
The United States has in recent years been the 
staunchest supporter of Israel. However, as the U.S. seeks 
to increase its presence and influence in the Persian Gulf 
area it becomes more susceptible to pressure from the Arab 
oil states. Perhaps the political support of the PLO by 
the Arab states and the power of oil will be able of achieve 
for it what guns and bullets have failed to achieve.
Sanctuaries
This last type of support provided by the Arab states
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is invaluable to the PLO. Without a safe haven from which to 
operate and a place to escape to, many of the PLO's operations 
could not have succeeded. Particularly since the rise of 
international terrorism by the PLO, Arab states, such as Syria, 
Algeria, Iraq, South Yemen, and Libya, have provided sanctu­
ary for terrorists. It is not by accident that terrorists 
choose these countries as the destination for hijacked air­
craft. In most Arab states PLO hijackers will not be prose­
cuted or extradited. If terrorists can manage to escape to 
these countries after commiting an act of terrorism against 
Israel or a symbolic Israeli target, they will not only be 
free from prosecution, but they will also probably receive 
heroes' welcomes.
In the late 1970's this blatant granting of asylum 
to terrorists began to fade due to international pressure.
This does not mean that it has stopped or that Arab support 
for the fedayeen has diminished. Rather it is a reluctance 
by the Arab governments to commit a blatant overt act of sup­
port for terrorists by openly granting asylum. Since the 
Iranian revolution in 1979 and the subsequent rise of a radi­
cal anti-Western, anti-Zionist government, it is possible 
that Iran will become another sanctuary for terrorists.
International Linkages
The effect of Palestinian terrorism reaches far 
beyond the Middle East. The influence and impact of the 
PLO has effected many nations by virtue of the PLO's
164
interaction and cooperation with other terrorist groups.
For several years intelligence agencies have acknowledged 
the existence of a "terror international" comprised of 
several terrorist groups that cooperate with one another in 
the areas of training, equipment, intelligence, loaning of 
personnel, and joint operation. "Terror international" is 
not a formal organization; instead it is comprised of left­
ists, anti-imperialists, and Marxist groups who find it 
advantageous to cooperate with each other. It often appears 
that terrorist groups from various countries display a great­
er degree of cooperation and coordination among themselves 
than do the nations who are their targets. At the center of 
this "terror international" is the PLO. The PLO has been 
linked with terrorists from fourteen countries in various 
international terrorist operations. The PFLP has the great­
est number of links with other terrorist organizations and 
over the past decade has worked with terrorists from Japan,
the Netherlands, Brazil, France, Venezuela, Britain, Columbia,
14Turkey, and Italy. However, the foundation and core of 
terror international is made up of four terrorist organiza­
tions including George Habash's PFLP, which, is the corner­
stone. The other three organizations are the Japanese Red 
Army (JRA), the West German offshoots and remnants of the 
Baader-Meinholf Gang/Red Army Faction, and the Junta de 
Coordinacion Revolutionara. The Junta is an umbrella organ­
ization comprised of South American revolutionaries from 
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay
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Since the early 1970*s the PLO and other terrorist 
organization.? have conducted numerous joint operations. 
Additionally, one terrorist group may conduct a terrorist 
operation in support of another group, or else one group may 
include ransom demands of another group as part of their own 
demands in a hostage/barricade operation. When Black Septem­
ber seized diplomats in the Sudan in 1973 one of their demands 
was the release of captured members of the Baader-Meinholf 
Gang, held in West Germany. Another example is the seizure of 
a Greek freighter in Karachi in 1974 by three Pakistani mem­
bers of the Moslem International Guerrillas, a group which is 
active in the Phillipines and Indonesia. The terrorists de­
manded the release of two Black September members who were 
imprisoned in Greece for participating in an attack at Athens 
Airport in which, five people were killed. The BSM terrorists 
were released and deported from Greece to Libya where they 
were freed
Some of the most infamous terrorist attacks have been 
the result of joint operations and international cooperation 
and support by several terrorist groups. The three Japanese, 
members of the JRA, who committed the Lod Airport massacre 
for the PFLP in May 1972 were trained by the PFLP in the 
Middle East, utilized documents forged in Germany, and 
carried weapons they had received in Italy. The Munich 
massacre by Black September in 1972 was carried out with the 
assistance of the Baader-Meinhoff G a n g T h e  famous hijack­
ings to Entebbe, Uganda in 1976 and to Somalia in 1977 were
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both joint operations involving the PFLP, German terrorists, 
and Latin American terrorists. The hijacking to Somalia was 
conducted in support of the kidnapping operation of Hans
Martin Schleyer in West Germany and was designed to reinforce
13the demands of the kidnappers. For a more detailed list of 
joint operations see Appendix I.
The coordination among various terrorist groups in­
cludes a type of service industry providing documentation, 
training, and weaponry. Some groups specialize in providing 
documentation and stolen weaponry while other groups supply 
training and other services. Occasionally groups will pay 
for their training by conducting proxy attacks for another 
group. The Turkish People's Liberation Army has attacked
Israeli targets in Turkey in return for training received by
19its personnel at PLO camps in Syria.
The PLO, with its government supported terrorist 
training bases, is the primary source of training for terror­
ists throughout the world. The PLO bases are open to virtu­
ally all radicals who profess a leftist, anti-Zionist, or 
Marxist ideology. In addition to European, Asian, Latin 
American, and Middle Eastern terrorists, the PFLP has also
allegedly trained U.S. radicals, including members of the
20Black Panthers. Members of the Irish Republican Army have
also been receiving training from the PLO for several years.
The IRA's adoption of the classic underground cell structure
is believed to be a direct result of its contact with the
21PLO who utilizes the same type structure. The PLO has also
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been linked to the 1979 assassination by the IRA of British
Parliament member Airey Neave. Mr. Neave's car was blown up
as he left the Parliament's underground parking lot by a
highly sophisticated "dual trigger” bomb. This type of bomb
has been widely used by the PLO. Members of the Irish
National Liberation Army CINLA), a splinter group of the IRA
which claimed responsibility for the bombing, are known to
22have been trained in PLO camps.
The PLO is a principal supplier of weapons to many 
terrorist groups. The PLO furnished rockets, anti-tank 
weapons, explosives, and small arms to a variety of different 
terrorist organizations. In November 1977 five tons of PLO 
weaponry, including mortars, rocket launchers, small arms, 
and explosives, were intercepted by authorities in Belgium. 
The weapons were hidden in electrical transformers that were 
being shipped from Cyprus to the Irish Republic. The weapons 
were intended for the use of the IRA and were being provided 
by the PLO. In 1978 the IRA received a new shipment of wea­
pons from the Middle East, including U.S. made M-6Q machine 
guns. These weapons enabled them to launch a new offensive. 
Also in 1978 the Monteneros of Argentina received Soviet 
manufactured RPG-7 anti-tank weapons from the PLO.
The connections between the PLO and other terrorist 
organizations are the results of meetings between the leader­
ship of these organizations. Contact between the Japanese 
Red Army and the PFLP is believed to have been established 
in 197Q when George Habash was in North Korea to address a
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symposium on revolutionary strategy. While at the symposium 
Habash met with members of the JRA CRengo Sekigunl. The 
PFLP and the JRA allegedly made an agreement pledging coop­
eration whenever possible. After members of the JRA had
received training in PFLP camps they reciprocated by conduct-
24ing the Lod Airport attack, in 1972. In 19.70 representatives 
of a dozen groups attended a conference organized by the PFLP 
which was held at a refugee camp in Lebanon. . The meeting was 
held to explore the possibilities of transnational coopera­
tion. Since this conference in 1970 terrorist groups have 
held several other meetings. For example, in July 1974 the 
IRA organized an "Anti-Imperialist Festival" held in Belfast 
and Dublin. More recently a Danish radical group held a
"solidarity" conference. Participating groups included the
25PFLP, the Fatah, and several European radical groups.
One interesting aspect of the cooperation among 
terrorist groups is the rise of groups which specialize in 
international operations. The primary groups in this cate­
gory are the PFLP-Special Operations group, which was led by 
Wadi Haddad until his death in 1978, and the Carlos Network 
Ca.k.a. Mohammed Baudia Commando and the Arm of the Arab 
Revolution). There are some who classify these two groups 
as one since the Carlos Network has worked with the PFLP on 
most operations. The Carlos Network has approximately 40 
multinational members and is led by Illich Ramirez Sanchez, 
alias Carlos or the "Jackal." Sanchez is the son of a wealthy
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Venezuelan lawyer who is a staunch communist. Sanchez 
briefly attended Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow from 
which he was reportedly expelled in 1970 for dissolute living 
and improper attitudes. After he left the U.S.S.R. it is be­
lieved that he journeyed to the Middle East where he became a 
member of the PFLP. The Carlos group is believed to operate 
in the Middle East, the U.K., and Europe. The Carlos/PFLP 
are thought to have been deeply involved in the planning of 
the Japanese Red Army seizure of the French Embassy in the 
Hague in September 1974. In June 1975 a Lebanese informer led 
French authorities to Carlos' hideout in Paris. The three 
French counterintelligence agents accompanying the informant 
were unarmed; Carlos was not. Carlos escaped leaving the in­
formant and two French agents dead and the third seriously 
wounded. In December 1975 the Carlos Network committed its 
most famous operation, the seizure of the OPEC oil ministers
at a meeting in Vienna. The six terrorists included Carlos,
26two Germans, and three Palestinians. The whereabouts of 
Carlos is currently unknown.
The international linkages of the PLO also extend to 
Iran and the PLO was instrumental in the Iranian revolution 
as a result of its training, equipping, and support of the 
Iranian revolutionaries. Since the overthrow of the Shah 
Arafat has made several visits to Tehran and the PLO has been 
given the abandoned Israeli Embassy as its headquarters.
Prior to the overthrow of the Shah the Iranian National Front 
and the PLO established close ties and the PLO provided
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27weapons and training. The People's Sacrifice Guerrillas,
a Marxist organization, are believed to have patterned their
organization after Al Fatah and were financed by both the 
28PLO and Libya. Since the overthrow the Iranian government 
has become violently anti-Zionist and has been training 
Iranian volunteers for duty with the PLO in Lebanon. As of 
December 1979 an Iranian volunteer force of 1080 members has
29been trained, equipped, and awaits transportation to Lebanon.
As demonstrated in this chapter, the impact and 
effect of the PLO and Palestinian terrorism goes far beyond 
the Middle East. The influence of the PLO is increasing and 
for the Western world this probably means trouble. As the 
network of terrorism spreads the status of the PLO will 
continue to grow. Even if the PLO should achieve its terri­
torial goals it will probably continue to aid other terrorist 
organizations and its success will only encourage other groups 
to emulate its methods. Given the close ties the PLO has 
established with other groups, a PLO-controlled state might 
well become another Libya, lending encouragement, training, 
and support to other radical groups throughout the world.
Reasons for the Support of the PLQr by 
the Arab, Moslem,. and Third World Nations 
As demonstrated in this chapter the primary support 
(financial, material, and political) of the PLO comes from 
the Arab nations. At this point it is necessary to ask why 
the Arab states back the PLO and what do they have to gain
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by this support?
The primary reason for the Arab support of the PLO is 
based on the fact that the Arab nations have never accepted 
the existence of a Jewish state in Palestine. The Arab 
states lack the military might to eliminate Israel. Also, 
given the American and European public sympathy for the Jews 
since World War II, the Arab states have found it difficult 
to justify the war on Israel until recent years. The 
Palestinian cause, manifested By the Arab states' support 
of the PLO, gives the Arab nations a justification for con­
tinuing the struggle against Israel. The Arab nations 
justify their support of the PLO by putting it in the context 
of supporting a national liberation movement. This is a 
cause with which much of the Third World can identify.
After the Arab defeat in the 1967 War Palestine 
became a rallying point for Arab nationalism. The Arab's 
humiliating defeat in 1967 and the loss of Arab territory, 
including the holy city of Jerusalem, sparked intense emo­
tionalism throughout the Arab world. The emotionalism 
spanned the entire Arab world and there was rioting as far 
away as Algeria and Tunisia. In Arab countries such as 
Morocco and Tunisia, which had in the past protected their 
Jewish minorities, there were anti-Jewish actions. Since 
the 1967 War every Arab summit conference, Arab League meet­
ing, or Third World meeting in which Arab nations were 
present discussed P a l e s t i n e . T h e  issue of Palestine and 
the Palestinian Arabs became the primary concern of the Arab
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nations and became synonomous with Arab nationalism.
Because of the intense emotionalism of the Palestinian issue 
all Arab leaders and Arab governments became obligated to 
support the Palestinian cause. When the PLO, through the use 
of terrorism, became recognized as the only representative 
of the Palestinians, the Arab support naturally solidified 
behind the PLO.
The Arab states and the PLO have also placed a 
religious context on the conflict and attract additional 
support from the Moslem world. For example, emphasis is 
placed on regaining the holy city of Jerusalem, which is 
the third holiest site for Moslems, from Israeli control. 
Furthermore, the Israelis have become identified with 
Western imperialism in the eyes of the Moslem world and the 
Afro-Asian bloc. The Arab nationalism which supports the 
Palestinian cause has evolved into a Moslem nationalism 
which supports the Palestinians who are regarded as victims 
of imperialism and oppressed Moslems. The non-Moslem Third 
World nations are also able to empathize with the PLO's 
image as a victim of imperialism. .Many of the Third World 
nations had their own pre-independence liberation movements 
which Became post-independence governments. Therefore, 
much of the Third World feels a type of kinship with the 
Palestinian cause. The Arab governments have aided the PLO 
in fostering this image of being a victim of imperialism.
For example, in March 198Q Iraqi President Sadam Hussein
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stated that the struggle against Israel is linked with 
"the developing nations' struggle against imperialism,
Zionism, conspiracy and all kinds of p r e s s u r e . B y  
emphasizing the "national liberation" context of the conflict, 
the Arab states and the PLO have been able to gather support 
from beyond the Arab world.
In essence, the PLO and the "Palestinian cause" are 
weapons the Arab states utilize to strike against the Israeli 
state. This does not mean that the Arab nations lack genuine 
support and sympathy for the Palestinians cause. However, 
it must be noted that Arab opposition to an Israeli state 
predates the Palestinian issue and the Palestinians have not 
always received favorable treatment by the Arab states.
An interesting aspect of the PLO is that it is able 
to attract support from such a diversity of nations. The 
Arab states are a very politically dissimilar group of na­
tions which range from conservative monarchies to radical 
Marxist regimes. The reason that the PLO is able to attract 
support from both religious conservative Arab states, and 
revolutionary leftists, is the diversity of the PLO itself.
As stated in Chapter 3, the various PLO groups differ widely 
in their ideological and political orientations. The PLO 
is currently split between the relatively moderate groups, 
led by Fatah, and the rejectionists, led by the PFLP. The 
ideological split in the PLO corresponds with the ideolog­
ical diversity of the Arab states. Thus, the more moderate 
Arab governments back the moderate PLO groups while the
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radical Arab states, such, as Libya and Iraq, back the PLO's 
rejection front. Some Arab governments, such,as Syria and 
Iraq, have formed their own PLO groups in order to satisfy 
Arab pressure to support the PLO, and in order to have their 
own policies and objectives represented within the PLO 
ruling council. Other Arab states support the PLO groups 
which most closely represent their own political ideology.
As previously stated, support of the Palestinian 
cause has become synonomous with Arab nationalism and Islamic 
nationalism; support of the fedayeen has become mandatory 
for Arab rulers and governments. Failure to support the 
PLO can result in loss of popularity and credibility for 
Arab leaders. For conservative Arab governments, such as 
Saudi Arabia and Jordan, failure to support the fedayeen 
can result in punitive actions by the radical Arab states 
and the PLO. Therefore, Arab support of the Palestinian 
cause is universal in the Arab world.
A further reason for Arab support of the PLO is that 
is focuses the attention and energies of the Arab population 
on an external cause and enemy. Several of the ruling Arab 
regimes are concerned about internal stability and potential 
internal oppostion. Therefore, the Arab governments find 
it politically expedient to focus the populations' attention 
on an external issue, thereby alleviating potential internal 
opposition.
The high degree of support by the Arab governments 
and the forging of support links beyond the Arab world are
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testimonies of the political successes of the PLO. The PLO 
has added a new dimension to the phrase "protracted 
conflict;" this phrase no longer applies primarily to mili­
tary successes. The PLO has waged a successful protracted 
war for diplomatic recognition. What the PLO could not 
achieve militarily may be achieved by diplomacy. However, 
this diplomacy has been based on the use of terrorism and 
constitutes a diplomacy of confrontation.
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CHAPTER VII
PALESTINIAN TERRORISM; ITS EFFECT 
ON THE ARAB WORLD
Much has been written regarding the PLO's war against 
Israel and the effect of Palestinian terrorism on the Israeli 
state. However, the effect of the PLO on the Arab world is 
often overlooked. When the record is examined one can see 
that the Palestinian Resistance Movement has been more harmful 
to the Arab states than to Israel in regard to casualties and 
physical damage. The PLO has caused many more casualties and 
deaths in the Arab countries than in Israel. The PLO has been 
the cause, or least a major factor, in two costly civil wars 
in Jordan and Lebanon. It has also caused Arab casualties by 
operating against Israel from surrounding Arab countries which 
has resulted in Israeli reprisal raids against these countries. 
In areas such as southern Lebanon the PLO locates its bases in 
or near villages; the villagers may or may not be willing to 
allow the PLO into their community. However, the strength and 
force of arms of the PLO make consent by the villagers imma­
terial. When reprisals are mounted against PLO camps it is the 
villagers who are caught in the middle and suffer the most.
The fate of the Palestinians is currently the primary
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obstacle to peace in the Middle East. Even the U.S. now 
acknowledges that a solution must be found to the Palestinian 
problem before a lasting peace can be achieved. However, the 
Israelis will not negotiate with the PLO and the PLO refuses 
to acknowledge the existence of the Israeli state or its 
right to exist. Since the Arab states recognize the PLO as 
the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people 
they are constrained into a hardline stance. Even if certain 
moderate Arab states were willing to work toward a peaceful 
resolution of the Arah-Israeli conflict they would be unable 
to do so because of the PLO's position of strength in the 
Arab world. By pledging cooperation and support to the PLO 
the Arab leaders have greatly limited the options for achiev­
ing a peaceful settlement. The PLO has bound the Arab leaders 
and nations into a position of intransigence.
This does not mean that if the PLO did not exist all 
the Arab states would be willing to accept the existence of 
Israel. The deep anomosity and distrust between Israel and 
the Arab states is a difficult obstacle to overcome. However, 
without the constraints imposed by the PLO and the Arab 
rhetoric in support of the PLO, the leadership of some Arab 
nations could find it politically and economically expedient 
to accept the existence of Israel. Currently any Arab nation 
or Arab leader who seeks compromise with the Israelis faces 
a variety of punitive measures. This includes, threat of assass­
ination, civil war, political and economic boycott by the rest 
of the Arab world, and even military attack by other Arab states,
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All of these measures have, in the past, been implemented 
against various Arah nations and leaders. This chapter will 
Briefly outline the past effects of the PLO on the Arab 
nations and the consequence faced By Arab leaders and nations 
who fail to support the PLO position.
The Jordanian Civil War 
After the Arab defeat in the 1967 War Jordan became 
the primary Base of operations for the fedayeen. The con­
stant terrorist raids from Jordan resulted in frequent 
Israeli reprisals. The Israelis not only attacked PLO tar­
gets but also hit Jordanian targets in attempt to pressure 
King Hussein of Jordan into restricting fedayeen activity. 
Other Arabs states, such as Syria and Egypt, had in the past 
refused to allow fedayeen operations from their territories 
in order to maintain control over the fedayeen and prevent 
Israeli reprisals. However, in Jordan the Palestinians 
possessed greater strength than in Egypt or Syria. Both 
Syria and Egypt maintained large armies and the Palestinians 
represented only a small portion of the population. However, 
in Jordan the Palestinians represented over 50 percent of the 
Jordanian population.^ The Jordanian Army numbered only 
approximately 55,000 men, of which one-third were Palestin­
ians. The remainder of the army was predominantly Bedouins,
2
f̂̂ ho were loyal to Hussein. The fedayeen operating inside 
Jordan were well armed and numbered several thousand men. 
Additionally, the position of Syria, which bordered Jordan
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and strongly supported the fedayeen cause, was a further 
source of concern to Hussein. Therefore, King Hussein 
allowed the fedayeen to operate from Jordan.
The situation continued to worsen as the FLO gained 
power in Jordan and by 1970 the fedayeen in effect constitu­
ted a state within a state. The fedayeen carried their 
weapons openly in violation of Jordanian law, collected 
funds illegally, and intimidated the Jordanian population. 
King Hussein, in order to keep the peace, was obliged to 
make continual concessions to the fedayeen. In June 1970, 
after clashes between the Jordanian Army and the fedayeen, 
the King had to dismiss two top military men in order to 
appease the fedayeen and end the violence. The two men.
Major General Nasser Ben Jamil, Hussein's uncle and the 
commander-in-chief of the army, and the commander of the 
Third Armored Division, had long been regarded as enemies’ 
of the fedayeen.^ The constant compromise by the King was 
gradually eroding his authority and power and there was 
concern that the fedayeen might take control of the country. 
Finally in September 1970 after an unsuccessful assassination 
attempt against Hussein and the use of Jordanian territory 
as the destination for three hijacked airliners by the PFLP, 
the King was forced to take action. The King unleased his 
Third Armored Brigade comprised of loyal Bedouins. The 
fedayeen reacted by seizing much of the countryside and 
several towns in the northwest. The Jordanian Army, relying 
on its armored units, began to retake the towns and moved to
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4cut the fedayeen supply lines from Syria and Iraq. At this 
point the Syrians decided to intervene on the side of the PLO^ 
and on September 20 a large Syrian armored unit of approxi­
mately 250 tanks with FLA markings crossed the border into 
Jordan. The Syrian invasion was met by the Jordanian 40th 
Armored Brigade and the Jordanian Air Force. In the result­
ing battle a large number of Syrian tanks were destroyed and 
the Syrians retreated across the border. Of significance in 
this battle is the fact that the Syrian Air Force did not 
enter the fighting. There are several possible reasons for 
this lack of support by the Syrian Air Force. One possible 
reason could be the existence of political rivalry in Syria 
between General Assad, the commander of the Air Force, and 
his political enemy, Salah Jadid, the Assistant Secretary 
General of the ruling Baath Party. Another reason could have 
been the reaction of the U.S. and Israel. The Israelis 
reacted by stating that they would intervene militarily if 
the Syrians did not withdraw. The U.S. reacted by ordering 
a Sixth Fleet task force, including two aircraft carriers 
and an amphibious force of 1500 marines, to a position off 
the Israeli-Lebanese coast. In addition, two U.S. airborne 
battalions in Europe and the 82nd Airborne Division in the 
U.S. were placed on alert.^ It is clear that both Israel 
and the U.S. were signaling to the Syrians and the U.S.S.R. 
that they would not tolerate a PLO/Syrian takeover of the 
relatively moderate state of Jordan. Such a takeover would 
have led to a radical fedayeen state on Israel's Border
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which could only have led to war.
As a result of the Jordanian Civil War the fedayeen
suffered approximately 6000 to 10,000 casualties and lost
Jordan as a base of operations.^ Additionally, King Hussein
and his staff moved to the top of the PLO's list of enemies.
The subsequent formation of the Black September Movement by
the PLO was originally designed as a means of retribution
against Jordan. On November 28, 1971 the Jordanian Premier
Wasfi Tal was assassinated by the BSM during a visit to Cairo.
On December 15, 1971 the chief of Hussein's personal staff
was the victim of an assassination attempt in London. In
February 1972 five Jordanians in West Germany, believed to
be friendly with the Israelis, were assassinated by the BSM.^
By 1972 Black September began its infamous operations against
Israel; however, since 1971 there has been one confirmed
assassination attempt against Hussein and rumors of other
8attempts which have not been verified. The PLO leadership 
and Hussein remained enemies until the Camp David accords 
accomplished what the Arab nations had failed to do, estab­
lish ai reapproachment between Hussein and Arafat.
The Lebanese Civil War 
;vhen the fedayeen were driven out of Jordan they had 
to find a new base of operations. Countries such as Iraq 
and Libya did not border Israel and were therefore unsuitable 
as bases for crossborder military operations against Israel. 
Both Egypt and Syria were unwilling to allow unrestricted
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terrorist operations from their territory. Therefore,
Lebanon became the primary base of operations for the PLO.
Prior to the Jordanian Civil War the PLO was already 
well established in Lebanon and clashes had begun to occur 
between Palestinians and Lebanese by the late 1960^s. In 
1969 after repeated clashes between the Lebanese security 
forces and the fedayeen, the- Lebanese government requested 
the mediation of Egypt's President Nasser. In November 1969 
a secret agreement was signed by the commander-^in-chief of 
the Lebanese Army and Yasir Arafat, Under this agreement, 
known as the "Cairo Agreements," the Palestinians were 
authorized to live and work in Lebanon and to establish 
committees to watch over Palestinian interests. The Pales­
tinian Armed Struggle Command CPASCi was given authority 
to administer the Palestinian refugee camps. The fedayeen 
were permitted free movement in the country; however, the 
Lebanese military was to have full jurisdiction and authority
9throughout the country. In essence the "Cairo Agreements" 
granted authority for PLO operations from Lebanon, while the 
fedayeen were to abide by Lebanese laws.
The Cairo Agreements were never able to restrict the 
activities of the PLO in Lebanon. After the influx of Pales­
tinian guerrillas the situation grew progressively worse.
The increased fedayeen attacks from southern Lebanon resulted 
in large scale retaliations from Israel. This led to renewed 
strife between the Lebanese and the PLO, As in Jordan, many
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Lebanese politicians, military leaders, and civilians were 
opposed to the PLO, However, there were significant differ­
ences between the situation in Lebanon and the situation in 
Jordan at the time of the Jordanian Civil War, In Jordan 
the army numbered 55,000 men, of which two-thirds were 
Bedouins who were loyal to King. The Bedouins were concen­
trated in armored units; thus, when the civil war broke out •
10the King had specific military units he could depend upon.
In Lebanon the army numbered only about 10,00.0 to 15,000 men. 
The officers were predominantly Christians and the enlisted 
men were predominantly Moslems, The army was further divided 
between rightists who opposed the PLO, and leftists, who 
supported the PLO,^^ Therefore, the Lebanese could not depend 
upon the army to curb PLO activity. Furthermore, the feda­
yeen had almost as many men under arms as the Lebanese Army.
Another difference between the Jordanian and the 
Lebanese situation was that in Jordan there existed a strong 
central monarch that enjoyed widespread support. In Lebanon
the government was a delicate coalition of Christians and
12Moslems, and leftists and rightists. The presence of the 
PLO in Lebanon upset this delicate balance of power. When 
the civil war broke out there did not exist a government or 
a politician who could command the respect and loyalty of a 
majority of the Lebanese population.
The continued strife and conflict between the various 
factions in Lebanon finally escalated into full-scale warfare 
in 1975, The country and government became divided into
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pro-PLO and anti-PLO factions. The Lebanese Army refrained 
from intervention in the civil strife due to its own internal 
political diversity. Finally, in January the army was forced 
to intervene and attempt to stop the fighting. However, as 
feared, the army disintegrated as Moslem and Christians, 
rightists and leftists, deserted the army and joined the 
warring .factions. The factions were divided along both polit­
ical and religious lines. The Christians were generally 
rightists and were strongly opposed to the PLO. Various 
Christian leaders had formed strong militia units which 
fought against the PLO and the Moslem leftists.
By 1976 the civil war threatened to upset the balance 
of power among the Arab states. At this point the Syrians 
sent units of the Palestine Liberation Army stationed in 
Syria into Lebanon to stop the fighting. The Syrians suc­
ceeded in establishing a short truce. However, renewed 
fighting broke out and the leftists and PLO proclaimed their 
intent to completely crush the rightist-Christians. This led 
to an unpredictable reaction from the Syrians who had long 
supported the PLO. The Syrian Army and the Syrian-supported 
PLO group. Saiga, entered the fighting on the side of the 
Christians. The Syrians turned the tide in favor of the 
Christians and the balance of power between the rightist- 
Christians and leftist-PLO was r e s t o r e d . T h e  primary 
reason for the Syrian intervention on behalf of the Christians 
was the Syrian fear of a PLO-leftist victory which could lead 
to a radical PLO state bordering Syria. Since several PLO
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factions were aligned with. Syria's rival, Iraq, the Syrians 
were uncertain of the allegiance of a PLO-controlled Lebanese 
state and also feared Israeli intervention.
The Syrian intervention deepened the animosity and 
strife between Syria and Egypt and both nations accused each 
other of betraying the Arab cause. In late 1976 Saudi 
Arabia exercised its influence, assured by its financial aid 
to other Arab nations, to call a mini-summit meeting; The 
presidents of Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon, and the PLO met in 
Riyadh and formulated a peace plan calling for a cease fire 
and the creation of a 30,QOO-man Arab "peacekeeping" force to 
supervise the plan. The bulk of the peacekeeping force was 
comprised of Syrian troops. This in turn led to concern by 
the Israelis and threats of intervention if the Syrians 
crossed over an unspecified line in southern Lebanon.
The Lebanese Civil War lasted nineteen months and 
caused billions of dollars in damage. An estimated 60,000
people were killed in the war and several times that number
were wounded. Approximately one million people, nearly one- 
third of the Lebanese population, were displaced by the 
fighting and much of Beirut was d e s t r o y e d . T h e  delicate 
political balance has never fully been regained and full 
peace has not been restored. The country is still divided
into Christian and Moslem sectors and the 30,000^man peace­
keeping force still remains in the country. In October 1978 
heavy fighting again commenced as the Syrians fought to bring 
the Christian militias under control and to stop a movement
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by the Christians to partition the country along sectarian 
l i n e s . A  further result of the Lebanese Civil War was the 
widening of the rift between Syria and Iraq. The rise of 
Black June led to a wave of assassinations and terrorism 
enacted by Arabs upon other Arabs. The Black June movement 
is covered in detail in Chapter 3.
As of this writing the situation in Lebanon remains 
a no peace/no war situation. Without a doubt the Palestinian 
Resistance Movement has cost the Lebanese much more than the 
Israelis.
■ Egypt and Camp David
The Arab states have never been united and inter-Arab 
strife and conflict has a long history. The Palestinian 
problem and the differing solutions advocated by the various 
Arab states has served to increase animosity. This does not 
mean that an Arab world minus the PLO would be strife-free; 
the feelings of distrust and animosity are too deep-rooted. 
However, the Palestinian Resistance Movement has most defi­
nitely had a negative impact on inter-Arab relations.
The feelings of hatred for the state of Israel are 
deep and intense in the Arab world and are manifested in the 
PRM and the Arab support thereof. This feeling of hatred is 
so intense that it extends to any Arab leader or state that 
refuses to fully back the aims of the PRM, The ostracism 
of Egypt by the rest of the Arab world is an example of the 
intense feelings that surround the Arab-Israel conflict.
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The loss of Egypt as an enemy of Israel was a severe
blow to the Arab world. Egypt possesses the most powerful
military in the Arab world. Egypt had borne the brunt of the
fighting against Israel and was the only Arab nation to have
fought in all four wars against Israel. Also, Egypt has
suffered the greatest number of casualties. The Egyptians
have criticized other Arab governments for waging a war of
rhetoric against Israel while depending on Egypt to do the
fighting. The Egyptian economy, already greatly overburdened,
was further hampered by high defense expenditures. Egypt
had suffered greatly as a result of the conflict with Israel
and had gained little. Therefore, Sadat in November 1977
took an unprecedented step and visited Jerusalem and began a
peace dialog with the Israelis. The subsequent peace treaty,
signed in March 1979, shocked and outraged the Arab world.
In the peace treaty Sadat negotiated a vague type of autonomy
for the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However,
the PLO was excluded from any part in the autonomy process
18and settlement,
Only days after the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli 
peace treaty eighteen Arab nations and the PLO met in Bagdad 
to formulate plans for retaliatory actions against Egypt.
At the Bagdad conference the Arab nations agreed to take 
diplomatic and economic actions against Egypt, including the 
breaking of diplomatic relations and the suspension of Egypt 
from the Arab League. On the economic side, technical and 
financial assistance to Egypt was to be cancelled and a ban
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19on petroleum shipments would be imposed.
The United States had hoped that the more moderate 
Arab states of Jordan and Saudi Arabia would endorse the 
treaty. However, the U.S. had greatly misjudged the reac­
tions of the Arab world. Although Saudi Arabia balked at 
some proposals of the PLO and radical states at the Bagdad 
conference, the Saudis eventually agreed to support the boy­
cott. The Saudis dissolved the mutual arms industry they 
had established with the Egyptians in Cairo, suspended 
flights to Egypt in compliance with the Bagdad agreement,
and refused to abide by an agreenent to finance the purchase
20for Egypt of U.S. F5E aircraft.
The Jordanians not only refused to endorse the treaty,
but they also reestablished their links with the PLO. As a
result Arafat and Hussein met together in late March 1979.
This type of meeting was unthinkable between these two
21enemies prior to Camp David. The U.S. government had hoped 
for Jordan's support of Camp David and was surprised when 
Hussein, who is widely regarded as a moderate Arab leader, 
totally rejected the Camp David accords. It is speculated 
that Hussein rejected Camp David because he was disappointed 
in how little the accords actually accomplished. Hussein 
felt that Jordan was not assured of any gain by its support 
of the Camp David agreements and repeatedly stated that 
Jordan must know the end result of its involvement in the 
negotiations before Jordan would commit itself to join the 
negotiations. Prior to the Camp David accords Hussein was
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"sitting on the fence," waiting to see the results of the
agreements. To Hussein the only acceptable result of the
agreements would be a complete Israeli withdrawal to the
pre-1967 War borders and some type of Palestinian self-
determination . When it became clear that Camp David did not
guarantee these results King Hussein came "off the fence"
and joined the other Arab governments in condemning the
agreements. However, King Hussein has not joined the hard
core "rejectionists" who condemn the peace process. Hussein
has only rejected the results of the peace process, not the
22process itself and has, therefore, left his options open.
A further reason for the rejection of the Camp David 
efforts by Hussein was that it was necessary for him to 
appear as a supporter of Arab solidarity and the Palestinian 
cause to Jordan and the rest of the Arab world. After the 
Jordanian Civil War many Arab states condemned Hussein and 
viewed him as an enemy. By rejecting Camp David Hussein 
was able to reduce the pressure on his regime from Syria, 
Iraq, and the PLO. As part of Hussein's appearance of main­
taining Arab solidarity he has sought a reapproachment with 
Arafat and the PLO. Furthermore, the rejection of Camp David
has also enabled Jordan to obtain a substantial amount of
23Arab financial aid.
Hussein was also afraid of internal strife if he did 
not reject Camp David. There had been campus unrest in 
Jordan during 1979. and clashes between Palestinian and Jor­
danian students. Since the PLO still maintains a large
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number of supporters in Jordan, Hussein clearly wants to 
avoid another "Black September."
While Hussein has joined the other Arab governments 
in condemning Egypt and Camp David, Hussein has carefully 
avoided cutting his ties with the West. Hussein is keeping 
his options open and could possibly still be a part of the 
peace process if he is assured of a positive gain from the 
negotiations.
A further disappointment to the U.S. was the lack of 
strong public backing for the Camp David accords by the 
European allies. Once again the power of oil was demon­
strated. The European Common Market Nations receive 68 per-
25cent of their oil from the Middle East. Therefore, the 
European reaction and support was less than enthusiastic 
since they wished to avoid angering their Arab oil suppliers.
The anger and outrage of the Arab nations at the
Camp David accords and the Egyptian government show no signs
of lessening. At the 1980 meeting of the Arab foreign
ministers in Islamabad, Pakistan a resolution was passed
calling for all Islamic nations to boycott the Sadat regime
26because of its "collaboration with the enemy." The 
conference further condemned the alliance formed by the 
Egyptians, the Israelis, and the Americans. This alliance 
and the peace treaty were called acts of flagrant aggression 
against the Arab Islamic states and the resolution called on 
all Islamic states to "confirm their solidarity with the 
Arab countries for the liberation of all the occupied Arab
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territories.
The sanctions imposed upon Egypt as a result of the 
peace treaty enacted with Israel will cause other Arab 
nations to think twice before contemplating any relaxation 
of tensions in the conflict with Israel. They also serve to 
illustrate the continuing change in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
A decade ago King Hussein of Jordan became the number one 
enemy of the PLO and the radical Arab states. As a result 
of the Camp David accords King Hussein has moved back into 
the fold and President Sadat has become the number one enemy.
The Palestinian problem is the center of the contro­
versy in the Middle East situation. However, it should be 
noted that if the PLO and Palestinian problem did not exist, 
the majority of the Arab nations would still be violently 
opposed to the state of Israel. The Arab nations opposed 
the creation of Israel and fought a war with the new state 
before the Palestinian problem existed. The Palestinian 
problem is utilized By some radical Arab nations as a 
popular international cause and a convenient excuse to 
continue the state of war with Israel. Nevertheless, the 
PRM, its acts of violence, and the support rendered it by 
the Arab governments has cost the Arab nations dearly. This 
is not meant to be a value judgment concerning the legitimacy 
or illegitimacy of the PRM; rather it is a statement of fact.
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This Study has been concerned primarily with the 
ramifications of Palestinian terrorism on the Middle East 
conflict. From this study several conclusions can be drawn 
which reflect both on the Middle East and on the world in 
general regarding the threat posed by radical groups who rely 
on terrorism to achieve their political goals. In this con­
cluding chapter the specific impact of Palestinian terrorism 
on the conflict in the Middle East will be examined first. 
From these conclusions regarding Palestinian terrorism further 
conclusions may be drawn regarding the future direction of 
political terrorism in the world at large.
1) PALESTINIAN TERRORISM HAS WORSENED THE CONFLICT IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST AND HAS MADE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT EXTREMELY 
DIFFICULT. Terrorism by the PLO has kept the Palestinian 
problem in the headlines and has insured that the Palestinian 
cause does not fade into obscurity. However, this reliance 
on terrorism to achieve PLO political goals has resulted in 
an escalating cycle of violence. Terrorist actions have 
resulted in increasingly severe reprisals which in turn en­
tangle the Arab nations and lead to more terrorist actions.
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The casualties resulting from this cycle of violence, 
particularly the civilian casualties, increase animosity and 
hatred on both sides. As hatred increases the probability 
of compromise decreases. It becomes unthinkable for the 
Israelis to deal with the PLO due to the memories of the acts 
of terrorism perpetrated by this group. The reprisals by 
the Israelis, which inflict casualties on the fedayeen, and 
in some cases, Arab civilians, reinforce both Arab propaganda 
and the desire for revenge. There is some proof that repri­
sal raids do inflict damage on the fedayeen and their ability 
to conduct operations. However, reprisals may also add 
recruits to the movement and fuel to the fire of PLO propa­
gandists.
2) PALESTINIAN TERRORISM HAS MOVED THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT
INTO A HARDLINE POSITION. At the Camp David negotiations 
the Israelis were adamant and unyielding on one point, no 
negotiations with or mention of the PLO in the Camp David 
accords. The Israelis will not tolerate or allow any role 
for the PLO in the occupied territories. The hatred of the 
PLO caused by terrorist actions and the continual threat of 
terrorism has resulted in this uncompromising and hardline 
position of the Israelis. Even if the PLO were to renounce 
the use of terrorism and cease terrorist operations it would 
be years before the Israeli government and people would be 
willing to deal wtih the PLO. Years of fear, hatred, and 
distrust resulting from terrorism cannot be erased overnight.
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31. TERRORISM IS LESS COSTLY IN TERMS OF BOTH LIVES AND
PROPERTY WHEN COMPARED WITH CONVENTIONAL WAR OR GUERRILLA 
WARFARE. HOWEVER, ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT MAY BE GREATER. 
This point is closely linked with the preceding conclusion 
regarding terrorism constraining a government into a hardline 
position. The Israeli government has estimated its casualties 
resulting from fourteen years of terrorism by the PLO (1965 
to 1979) to be approximately 650 killed and 3000 wounded.^
The CIA estimates the number of casualties worldwide from all 
international terrorist acts for the period 1968 through 1978 to 
be 2102 killed and 5078 wounded.^ While this number of deaths 
is tragic, it does not begin to compare with the number of 
casualties from conventional war or even guerrilla warfare.
The Israelis have stated that many more Israeli citizens are 
injured in traffic accidents than in terrorist operations.^ 
Therefore, the question becomes, why does terrorism have such 
a profound impact when the casualties from terrorist opera­
tions are so light? The reason is that terrorism is a very 
personal type of warfare. Many acts of terrorism are delib­
erately abhorrent. Acts such as the Munich massacre of 
Israeli athletes and the seizure in Maalot, Israeli of a 
schoolhouse which resulted in the death of 21 schoolchildren,
4result in a very personal sense of loss and outrage. On 
the otherhand, in conventional war, and to a large extent, 
in guerrilla war, the majority of the casualties are military 
or government personnel. Civilian deaths do occur but they 
tend to be overshadowed by the magnitude of the conflict and
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the large number of casualties. There is also the realiza­
tion that the other side is suffering in a similar manner. 
However, in acts of political terrorism the population may 
be frustrated by an inability to strike back immediately at 
those directly responsible for these actions. Thus, a pro­
tracted campaign of political terrorism, in Israel or other 
countries, causes an impact far out of proportion to the 
amount of resulting casualties.
4) THE SUCCESSES OF THE PLO MAY CAUSE OTHER RADICAL GROUPS 
TO EMULATE ITS METHODS. While no terrorist group has yet 
achieved its primary goal, the PLO has made considerable 
progress and it is not unreasonable to assume that the PLO 
will eventually gain control of a Palestinian mini-state on 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The political recognition and 
legitimacy given the PLO by the UN and over 100 individual 
nations may be interpreted as a reward and an end result of 
its terrorist operations. This assumption may be debatable; 
however, it is a fact that the Palestinian cause received 
little attention or recognition between 1948 and 1967. It 
was only after the rise of the PLO and its subsequent reli­
ance on terrorism that the Palestinian problem began to 
receive the high degree of worldwide exposure and recognition. 
This, in effect, means that terrorism may not achieve the 
primary goal of a radical group, but it does insure the 
worldwide attention and recognition that may be a prerequi­
site for achieving their goal.
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As demonstrated in Chapter 6 the PLO maintains close 
ties with and exercises influence over the majority of the 
major terrorist groups in the world today. The imitation 
and duplication of PLO tactics by other terrorist groups is 
a reality. Therefore, it is logical to assume that the 
diplomatic successes of the PLO will encourage other radical 
groups to utilize similar tactics and strategies to achieve 
their political goals. In essence, the world will increas­
ingly witness a movement By radical groups toward utilization 
of terrorism.
51 AS THE DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION AND.RESPECTABILITY OF A 
TERRORIST GROUP INCREASES THE GROUP'S USE OF TERRORISM 
WILL DECREASE. Since the PLO's recognition By the UN 
and the majority of the nations of the world it has 
de-emphasized terrorist operations. However, the PLO main­
tains the threat of an escalation of international terrorism 
as a means of maintaining its political gains. The PLO has 
continued its operations inside Israel But it emphasizes 
that this constitutes a "war of national liberation" and not 
terrorism. The PLO is currently recognized as a legitimate 
non-state actor, or even a type of government in exile. In 
order to cultivate this image the PLO and Arafat have signif­
icantly curtailed their international operations and have 
concentrated on winning the propaganda victory. The PLO has 
already demonstrated its ability to act violently in Behalf 
of its cause. Now that it has achieved international
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recognition it hopes to make the world forget its violent 
side and recognize the legitimacy of its cause. In light of 
this conclusion it would appear, at least on the surface, 
that the best means of stopping terrorism could be to grant 
the terrorist group the recognition and publicity it desires. 
However, this could only lead to a worldwide increase of 
terrorism as obscure radical groups resorted to the use of 
terrorism to gain recognition of their cause.
61 CERTAIN NATIONS UTILIZE AND SUPPORT TERRORIST GROUPS TO 
FORWARD THEIR OWN AIMS. Countries such as Libya and the 
U.S.S.R. support various terrorist groups as a means of 
forwarding their own interests, Libya supports the most 
radical elements of the PLO in order to strike against Israel 
and the so-called "reactionary" Arab states. The U.S.S.R. 
supports and trains terrorist groups in order to destabilize 
certain governments and spread Marxist ideology, which com­
prises a large percentage of the training given to terrorists. 
The most effective terrorists are those that are closely 
connected to and supported by sovereign governments. The 
successes of the PLO would have been greatly diminished with­
out the support of the Arab governments. If terrorism is to 
be successfully countered punitive measures must Be enacted 
against nations that support terrorist groups.
71 ANTI-TERROR MEASURES CAN BE TACTICAL SUCCESSES BUT 
STRATEGIC FAILURES. As illustrated by the example of
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Israel, defeating terrorist actions tactically and militarily 
is not enough. In order to successfully counter terrorism 
the target group must also be defeated symbolically and dip­
lomatically. The government must put as much emphasis into 
winning the propaganda war as it does the military victory. 
Radical groups resort to terrorism because they are too weak 
to defeat the government militarily. Therefore, they aim 
at winning a symbolic victory. Jn the case of the PLO, it 
attempts to incite the Israelis into taking actions which 
will alienate the rest of the world. The reprisal raids by 
the Israelis into southern Lebanon are used by the PLO as 
a propaganda weapon. The PLO maximizes and encourages media 
coverage of these reprisals. A retaliatory strike against 
PLO bases in Lebanon is made to appear as a deliberate attack 
upon innocent civilians. Hence, the Israelis may harm the 
PLO militarily and win a tactical victory by the reprisal, 
but they lose strategically by giving the PLO a propaganda 
victory.
Other terrorist groups have emphasized the symbolic 
victory as a means of humiliating the government. The kid­
napping of former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro by the Red 
Brigades was a propaganda victory for the group. For weeks 
the Italian police and government were made to appear inept 
and helpless. The current hostage seizure of U.S. Embassy 
personnel in Iran has made both the U.S. government and the 
elected Iranian government of President Bani Sadr appear 
helpless. In cases such as these military might is virtually
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useless. Propaganda and symbolism must be countered with 
even stronger propaganda and symbolism by the government.
8) PALESTINIAN TERRORISM HAS HARMED CERTAIN ARAB NATIONS 
MORE THAN ISRAEL. This conclusion requires little expla­
nation in light of Chapter 7. Without a doubt the amount of 
strife and casualties resulting directly or indirectly from 
Palestinian terrorism has been greater in the Arab nations 
than Israel.
9) TERRORIST TACTICS ARE ADAPTABLE AND FLEXIBLE AND ARE 
CONSTANTLY CHANGING IN ORDER TO CIRCUMVENT ANTI-TERROR 
MEASURES, For example, in the late 1960's and early
1970's airliners were soft targets resulting in a prolifera­
tion of airliner hijackings. When some air terminals and 
air carriers began to take preventive measures the terrorists 
shifted their operations to the air terminals and carriers 
with nonexistent or lax security. Hijackings from U.S. 
terminals and aboard such carriers as El Al dropped appreci­
ably due to increased security measures. On the otherhand, 
hijackings from certain European countries with lax air 
terminal security increased. Eventually the security at most 
major air terminals and aboard the major carriers was tight­
ened, As a result terrorists began to seize hostages in 
buses, trains, and buildings and demanded aircraft as part 
of the concessions. Furthermore, just as police study ter­
rorist tactics, the terrorists also study police tactics. 
Terrorists study carefully both police/military successes
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and failures, which are generally covered in detail by the 
media, and learn from their mistakes.
The adaptability of terrorist groups, such as the 
PLO, is greatly facilitated by their loose structure and 
favorable cost/benefit ratio of personnel. The informal 
structure of many terrorist groups is conducive to flexibil­
ity of operation. Also, the international connections 
between various terrorist groups make it easy to shift to 
other areas of operation from which attacks may be launched, 
planned, or conducted. Furthermore, the small number of 
personnel involved in most terrorist operations allows for 
experimentation in new tactics. Because of this low invest­
ment of personnel a failure of some operations is not a 
significant loss and will not have a crippling effect upon 
the group.
10) THE CONTRASTING VIEWS OF MANY NATIONS REGARDING WHETHER 
CERTAIN ACTS OF REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE CONSTITUTE TER­
RORISM OR A WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION REFLECTS THE- 
DIVERSE DIFFERENCE IN THINKING BETWEEN THE FIRST WORLD 
AND THE THIRD WORLD. In the United Nations resolutions 
designed by the Western industrial nations to combat terror­
ism have met with opposition from the third world. For 
example, in December 1972 the U.S. voted against a UN General 
Assembly resolution calling for a study of the underlying 
causes of international terrorism. In the opinion of the 
U.S. government the resolution contained nothing of substance
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that would aid in curbing terrorism. Furthermore, the 
resolution failed to condemn both acts of international 
terrorism and those who resort to terrorism. In fact, in 
parts of the resolution terrorism appears to be condoned.
The resolution stated that it, "reaffirms the inalienable 
right to self-determination and independence of all people 
under colonial and racist regimes and other forms of alien 
domination and upholds the legitimacy of their struggle, in 
particular the struggle of national liberation movements.^
No doubt the Third World members of the General Assembly 
included the PLO in the category of "national liberation 
movements." This underscores the fundamental difference 
between the First World and the Third World regarding polit­
ical violence. To the Western nations terrorism is acts of 
violence, often directed against civilians, designed to win 
political concessions. To the West these acts are senseless 
violence; however, to many Third World nations they are just­
ifiable acts of national liberation. To the Third World 
terrorism is the result of repressive acts of violence by 
illegitimate governments which continue to repress the legit­
imate political aspirations of the people of that country or 
region.
Most experts agree that terrorism cannot be stopped 
until there is international cooperation among all nations 
toward the prevention of terrorism. Since there exists a 
basic disagreement as to what constitutes terrorism, it is
2Q6
highly unlikely that international cooperation will 
materialize.
11) IN THE 1980*S THE WORLD WILL POSSIBLY WITNESS AN ESCALA­
TION OF BOTH ACTS OF POLITICAL TERRORISM AND THE NUMBER 
OF GROUPS THAT PRACTICE TERRORISM. It has been stated by 
some that terrorism is the weapon of the weak and oppressed.
To a certain extent this is correct. Terrorism is a weapon 
that is utilized by groups that are too weak or lack suffic­
ient support to make a political impact or influence politi­
cal events by conventional means. Furthermore, it is a 
weapon utilized by groups that consider themselves oppressed, 
exploited, and politically or economically deprived. In some 
cases this may be true; in other cases it may not be true. 
Regardless of the legitimacy of their cause, the groups' 
belief in and dedication to their cause will necessitate some 
type of action. Increasingly this action will turn out to be 
political terrorism. The overall success of terrorism is 
debatable. However, the ability of terrorism to gain recog­
nition and notoriety for a group is a proven fact. Therefore., 
as new- radical groups are formed terrorism will for some 
groups Become the primary vehicle for gaining recognition.
If the PLO should succeed in its goal of replacing Israel 
with a PLO-controlled Palestinian state its success will be 
a source of inspiration for other groups who will emulate the 
same methods. If this happens then perhaps Mao was right, 
"Political power comes out of the barrel of a gun."^
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APPENDIX I CONNECTION BETWEEN PLO AND OTHER .TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS -  OPERATIONAL PLANE
Gcnnan Terrorist 
Organizations___________
Planting o f explosive  
charges in West Ber­
l in  at El Al o f f ic e ,  
Anerica House, US 




Attempted m iss ile  attack  
on El Al plane, Nairobi, 
January 1976. 
Responsible: Habasii's 
Front t  Baader-Meinlioff.
Air France Lod-Rome 
f lig h t  hijacked to Uganda 
(Entebbe), 28 .6 .76 . 
Perpetrators: Mabash's 
Front and the Revolution­
ary C ells (W ilfrid Bazeh 
and "llalinieh").




Front, for Baader-Mein- 
h o f f . t o  reinforce de­
mands o f kidnappers o f  
Hans Martin S ch le icr .
Explosives planted at 
AGREXCO o ff ic e s  in  
Frankfurt, 2 0 .6 .7 6 . 
Perpetrator: Revolu­
tionary C ells for 
Habash's Front.
Dutch Red Aid and 
Belgian Radicals__________
Several members of the 
Dutch Red Aid train  at 
a Popular Front (Habash) 
camp in  South Yemen pre­
cursory to perpetrating  
ser ie s  o f attacks in  
Europe -  August 1976.
Plan to hijack Air France 
f lig h t  192 to Lod frustra­
ted by detention o f  Dutch 
nationals Ludwina Jannsen 
at Lod and Marius Neuwen- 
borg at Bombay, 24 .9 .76 . 
Responsible: Dutch Aid, for  
Habash's Popular Front.
Detonation o f gas works in  
Holland, 5 .2 .7 2 . 
Perpetrators: Fatah/Black 
September with participa­
tion  o f Belgian teacher 
Stefan van den Bermatt.
E U B Û R E
Palestine-Sw iss Conanittee and 
Scandinavian Radicals____________
Swiss national Bruno Brigeh -  
sent by Habash's Popular Front 
to carry out attacks in  Israel -  
detained a t Haifa Port, 2 3 .6 .7 0 .
Exposure o f  te r r o r is t  network 
in Egypt in  which P a lestin ia n s, 
Swiss and Red Brigades members 
worked together for Abu N id 'a l. 
Announced by Egyptian attorney- 
general, 26 .4 .78 .
Detention o f Swiss national Nani 
Albuniko a t Beirut a irp o rt, who 
was carrying dynamite, apparently 
to carry out actions against 
Isra e li ta rg ets . May 1978.
Norwegian student Louis Cola 
detained a t Beirut a irport en 
route to Frankfurt and Israel to  
carry out sabotage acts for  
Hawatmeh's Democratic Front,
6 .5 .7 7 .
Irish Republican Army and 
B ritish  Radicals
Arms ship sent* by Fatah to IRA 
from Cyprus detained at  
Antwerp, December 1972.
August '76: IRA mender revealed 
to be training in  camp of 
Habash's Front in  South Yemen, 
together with Dutch Red Aid 
people.
"Irish Times" o f  14.6 .78 re­
ports that PLO is  training  
IRA terro r is ts  in  southern 
Lebanon and that UN o ff ic e r s  
in  the area know o f  th is .
B ritish  Trotskyite group, the 
Workers Revolutionary Party, 
among whose members i s  the 
actress Vanessa Redgrave, 
maintains t ie s  with the Fatah, 
April 1978.
to
Three te r r o r is ts ,  one o f  them 
Swedish, detained in  Copenhagen,
2 2 .5 .6 9 , while planning attempt 
on l i f e  o f  Ben-Gurion during v i s i t  
he was to make to  Latin Auierica. 





Computer o f  German secret  
serv ice  arrives at con­
clusion  that Aide Moro's 
kidnappers almost certa in ­
ly  connected with Pales­
tin ian s: according to 
several Ita lia n  papers,
30 .3 .78 ,
Exposure o f  te r r o r is t  
netv/ork in  Egypt in which 
P a lestin ia n s, Swiss and 
Red Brigades, members work 
together for Abu N id'al: 
according.to Egyptian a t­
torney-general, 2 6 .4 .7 8 .
Japanese Red Army_____
Lod Airport massacre by 3 
members o f Japanese Red - 
Army, for Habash's Front,
3 1 .5 .72 .
• Turkish Organizations
Hijacking o f Japanese Air 
Lines jumbo j e t  en route . 
Paris-Tokyo, 20 .7 .73 . 
Perpetrator: Habash's 
Front, Japanese Red Army 
and two South Americans.
Sabotage o f "Shell" o i l  
containers at Singapore, 
takeover o f ship in  the 
harbor, 31 .1 .74 . 
Perpetrators: Habash's 
Front and Red Army (two 
P alestin ian s, 2 Japan­
e s e ) .
Takeover o f Japanese Em? 
bassy in  Kuwait in order 
to lib era te  terro r ists  
of Simapore raid ,
6 .2 .7 4 .
Perpetrators: Habash's 
Front, Japanese Red 
Army.
Takeover o f French Em­
bassy in The Hague,
13 .7 .74 .
Perpetrators: Japanese 
Red Army with aid o f  
Carlos network.
Murder o f  Isr a e li consul-general 
in  Istanbul, 2 8 .5 .71 . 
Perpetrator: Turkish Liberation  
Army.
Turkish au th orities announce on 
24.5.72 that they have se ized  14 
Turkish terro r ists  in  a boat 
near the Syrian border; were en 
route to Turkey a fter  undergoing 
training in Syria.
IDF detains Turkish te r r o r is t  
Faik Hassan B u llit  in  operation  
at "Nehar al Berad" in  Lebanon. 
He trained a t  Fatah camp there.
2 1 .2 .7 3 .
French secu r ity .fo rces  detain  
13 terro r ists  in  Paris suburb, 
among them several from Turk­
ish  Liberation Army. Had 
planned, with aid o f  Habash's 
Front, to attack Israel Embas­
sy in  P aris. 19.12 .73 .
Turkish News Agency "Haber" 
reports on 30.5.73 that about 
18 Turks k ille d  in  figh tin g  
that month in  Lebanon.
Iranian Organizations
Algerian paper."Al-Sha'ab" re­
ports on 22.10.71 that Iranian 
Revolutionary Movement has s e t  
up P alestin ian  group o f  45 
figh ters who fought alongside 
P a lestin ia n s, returned to Iran.
Iranian terro r ist  named Mouzfar, 
bearing forged B ritish  passport, 
hurls grenade in  Tel Aviv's 
"Chen" cinema, 11 .10 .75 . Was 
sen t by Habash's Front.
O ffic ia l statement in  Iran (ac­
cording to "Al Anwar," 22.5.76) 
says Iranian rebels gettin g  
arms and money from Libya and 
from Habash's Front, and that 
lin k  between them proved in  
confiscated documents.
Attempt to attack Jewish Agency 
o ff ic e s  in  Teheran. Carried 
out by Iranian underground for  
P alestin ian  organization.
lO
U1
Islamic Liberation Movement, 
organizing current resistance  
to Shah, opens information 
centre in  B eirut, May 1978.
APPENDIX I (cont.)
INTERNATIONAL NETWORK
South American O rgan izations
Grenade thrown in to  yard o f  r e s ­
idence o f  I s r a e l i  honorary consul 
in  Guatemala» 3 .7 .7 0 .
P erp etra to r: Guatemalan o rg a n iza ­
t io n  connected  w ith  PLO.
A bortive attem pt to  h ija c k  El Al 
Lod-London f l i g h t ,  6 .9 .7 0 .  (L e ila  
Khalcd wounded in  f ig h t  in  p la n e .)  
P erp etra to rs: Habash's Front and 
N icaraguan underground o rg a n iza ­
t io n .  (P a tr ick  A rgu alo).
Plan exposed to  a s s a s s in a te  I s ­
r a e l i  Ambassador to P aris by 
V enezuelan C a rlo s . 2 7 .6 .7 5 .
A ttack on OPEC b u ild in g  in  
V ienna, 2 1 .1 2 .7 5 ,  in  which OPEC 
M in isters  s e iz e d  as h o s ta g e s ,  
ca rr ie d  o u t fo r  Habash's Front 
w ith  C a rlo s' p a r t ic ip a t io n .
A ir France p lane h ija ck ed  to  
Uganda, 2 8 .6 .7 6 .  H ijack ers  
jo in e d  in  Entebbe by A ntonio  
Degas B ou v ier , b earer o f  Ecua­
dorian  p a ssp o r t , who headed  
C arlos network in  London.
C arlos Network
Grenade thrown in to  P a r is  D rugstore by unknown 
t e r r o r i s t  o f  C arlos netw ork, December 1973.
A ttack on S ir  Joseph S i e f f  in  London, 3 0 .1 2 .7 3 .  
C arried o u t by Carlos p e r s o n a lly .
Two a tta ck s  on El Al p lan es a t  O r ly , January
1975.
P erp etra to r: C arlos network fo r  H abash's Front,
A ttack on OPEC b u ild in g  in  V ienna, 2 1 .1 2 .7 5 ,  
in  which OPEC M in isters  s e iz e d  as h o s ta g e s ,  
c a r r ie d  o u t fo r  H abash's Front w ith  C arlos' 
p a r t ic ip a t io n .
A ir France p lane h ija ck ed  to  Uganda, 2 8 .6 .7 6 .  
H ija ck er s' commander W ilfr id  Bozah con­
nected  w ith  C a r lo s . A ntonie Degas B o u v ier , 
who jo in ed  up w ith  h ija c k e r s ,  headed C arlos  
network in  London.
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CONNECTION BETWEEN PLO AND OTHER TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS -  TARGET!
DEFENCELESS CIVILIAN TARGETS AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVE!
Mass Slaughter Diplomatic Representations
Arson at Jewish home for the Takeover of Israel Embassy 
aged in Germany. Seven elder- in Bangkok by. Fatah/Black 
1y persons k illed . 13.2.70. September. 28.12.72.
Planes in Air/on Ground
Attack on El Al plane at Atl 
by gang o f Habash's Front. I 
person k ille d , 2 wounded. 
26.12.78,
Massacre at Lod Airport by 
Japanese Red Army trio  for 
Habash's Front. 26 k illed , 
76 wounded. 31.5.72.
Mass slaughter at Athens 
airport of TWA passengers 
arriving from Lod, by Arab 
hat'onal Youth Organiza- 
tij.'i for Liberation o f Pal­
estin e . 4 k illed , 52 
wounded. 5 .8 .73.
Mass-destruction device 
goes o ff in TWA building 
at New York's La Guardia 
airport. 14 k ille d , 77 
wounded. 29.12.75.
Grenade thrown inside TWA 
plane at Rome airport on
17.12,73 by Arab. National 
Youth.Organization for Li­
beration o f Palestine.
35 persons k illed .
Takeover of Saudi Embassy 
in Kliartoum by 8 Fatah/ 
Black September terror­
i s t s .  Three Western dip­
lomats, including US Am­
bassador, k illed . 1 .3 .73.
Takeover of Japanese Em­
bassy in Kuwait, demand 
for release of 4 terror­
is t s  who carried out at­
tack on o il  tanks in 
Singapore. Perpetrators: 
Habash's Front and the 
Japanese Red Army.
Takeover o f French Embas­
sy in The Hague by 3 ter­
rorists o f Japanese Red 
Army who demand release 
of terrorist held in 
Fra ce France releases 
him. 13.9.74.
Band o f Japanese Red Atv\y 
takes over American con­
sulate and Swedish Embas­
sy at Kuala Lampur, de­
manding that Japanese 
Government release de­
tained terro r ists . Japa­
nese Gov't releases 7 
terro r ists . 4 .8 .75 .
Explosion on Swiss Air f l i ÿ  
from Zurich-Lod, carried ou 
J ib r il's  Front. 38 passenge 
9 crew members k illed .
21.2.70. i
Hijacking of 4 planes (Pan j 
erican, Swiss Air, BOAC, TU 
with 400 passengers. One pi 
blown up in Cairo, 3 at Zar 
Jordan. Perpetrated by Haba 
Front. 6 .9 .70 .
3 attempts by J ib r il's  Fror 
to get bombs on to El Al pi 
with aid o f innocent passer 
Roroe-Lod 28.7.71.
London-Lod 1.9 .71 .
Rome-Lod 16.8,72.
Hijacking o f Lufthansa plan 
5 terrorists  o f Habash's Fr 
Plane and passengers releas 
after Lufthansa pays ransa 
S5 m illion . 22.2 .72.
ETWEEN PLO AND OTHER TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS -  TARGETS OF TERRORISM: 
DEFENCELESS CIVILIAN TARGETS AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES
lomatic Representations
ecver o f Israel Embassy 
Bangkok by Fatah/Black 
tember. 28.12.72.
ecver o f Saudi Embassy 
partoum by 8 Fatah/ 
ijck September terror- 
5 . Three Western dip- 
(ats. Including US Am- 
jsador, k illed . 1 .3 .73 .
;eover o f Japanese Em- 
|isy in Kuivait, demand 
 ̂ release of 4 terror- 
who carried out at-
Planes in Air/on Ground Explosions
I on o il tanks in
napore. Perpetrators: 
ibsh's Front and the 
6nese Red Army.
ijeover o f French Embas- 
|in The Hague by 3 ter- 
msts of Japanese Red 
1̂  who demand release  
te r r o r is t  held in  
ir-ce. France released 
ii. «3.9.74.
^ o f  Japanese Red Arny 
:|es over American con- 
ijate and Swedish Embas- 
Ipt Kuala Lampur, de­
eding that Japanese 
lernmcnt release de- 
hed terro r ists . Japa- 
e Gov't releases 7 
ro r ists . 4 .8 .75 .
Attack on El Al plane at Athens Explosive charges go o f f  in well* 
by gang of Habash's Front. One known Jewish-owned London shop,
person k illed , 2 wounded. Aarks and Spencer.
26.12.78. Perpetrator: Habash's Front.
18.8.69.
Explosion on Swiss Air f lig h t  Explosive device goes o ff a t
from Zurich-Lod, carried out by Jewish school in Teheran,
J ib r il's  Front. 38 passengers, 23.8.69.
9 crew menders k illed .
21.2.70.
Hijacking of 4 planes (Pan Am­
erican, Swiss Air, BOAC, TWA) 
with 400 passengers. One plane . 
blown up in Cairo, 3 a t Zarka, 
Jordan. Perpetrated by Habash's 
Front. 6 .9 .70 .
Three bombs discovered and d is­
mantled at library in UN build­
ing in New York -  had been set  




3 attempts by J ib r il's  Front Molotov cocktail thrown at Leb* 
to get bombs on to El Al planes anese Maronite monastery in  
with aid of innocent passengers. Rome.
Rome-Lod 28.7.71. Perpetrator: The Assan Kanfani
London-Lod 1 .9 .71 . Anti-Zionist Commando.
Rome-Lod 16.8.72. 25.9.76.
Hijacking of Lufthansa plane by Dozens of cases known of plant-
5 terrorists of Habash's Front. 
Plane and passengers released  
after  Lufthansa pays ransom of  
55 m illion . 22.2.72.
ing o f bombs and throwing of 
grenades a t El A l, Zim, Is­
raeli tou rist o f f ic e s ,  and at 
American, German and other 
firms throughout world. For 
example: explosion at o ffic e  
of Mediterranean Club, Paris,
10.6.78.
mmmm
APPENDIX II ( c o n t .)
Economi c O b.lecti ves
D etonation  o f  fu e l tanks 
a t  Port o f  Rotterdam by 
band o f  Fatah t e r r o r i s t s ,  
4 .3 .7 1 .
Gas works In Holland de­
to n a ted  by Fatah/B lack  
S ep tem b er,* 5 .2 .7 2 . With 
p a r t ic ip a t io n  o f  B elg ian  
tea ch er  S te fa n  van den 
Berm att.
Sabotage o f  e le c t r o n ic s  
p la n ts  in  Hamburg and in  
Hamburg o i l  p ip e l in e  by 
Fatah/B lack  Septem ber, 
February 1972.
O il in s t a l la t io n s  a t  
T r ie s t e  a tta ck ed  by Fatah/ 
B lack .S ep tem b er, 4 .8 .7 2 .
Murder, K idnapping. Taking o f  H ostages
P o iso n in g  o f  I s r a e li .a n d .  
Spanish oranges by unknown 
P a le s t in ia n  o r g a n iz a t io n  
c a l l in g  i t s e l f  the F ron t/ 
P a le s t in ia n  Coimi.:nd, 
January 1978.
Jordanian Premier Wazfi a l fa l 
a s sa s s in a te d  in  Cairo on 
2 8 .1 1 .7 1  by 4 Fatah/B lack  
September t e r r o r i s t s .
Takeover o f  q u arters o f  I s ­
r a e l i  sportsm en a t  Munich Olym­
p ics  , 6 .9 .7 2 ,  by Fatah/B lack  
September t e r r o r i s t s .  As a re­
s u l t  o f  a c t io n ,  11 sportsm en  
k i l l e d .
Saika t e r r o r i s t s  take over  
tr a in  ca rry in g  new immigrants 
on C zech-A ustrian  bord er. In 
retu rn  fo r  r e le a s e  o f  h o s ta g e s ,  
A u str ia  c lo s e s  Schanau t r a n s i t  
camp fo r  new inini gran ts from  
USSR. 2 3 .9 .7 3 .
Takeover o f  Greek boat to  P ort  
o f  Karachi (P a k is ta n ) , w ith  de­
mand fo r  r e le a s e  o f  two t e r r o r -  . 
i s t s  who c a r r ied  ou t s la u g h te r  
a t  Athens a ir p o r t  (August 1 9 7 3 ) .  
P erp etra to r: Arab N ational 
Youth O rgan ization  fo r  L ibera­
tion of Palestine. 2.2.74.
Murder o f  3 W estern d ip lo m a ts . 
In c lu d in g  US Ambassador, on
1 .3 .7 3  by Fatah/B lack Septem­
b er  gang which took o v er  Saudi 
Embassy in  Khartoum.
Murder o f  US Ambassador to  
Lebanon during c i v i l  v;ar th e r e  
in  1976 , by members o f  J ib ­
r i l ' s  F ront.
Sending o f  hundreds o f  l e t t e r -  
bombs to  le a d e r s  and ord in ary  
c i t i z e n s  in  I sr a e l and e l s e ­
w here. I s r a e l i  a g r ic u ltu r a l  
attachë^ in  London k i l l e d ,  
September 1972.
Wave o f  k idnappings and murders 
in  I t a l y ,  Germany, South Amer­
i c a .  Two b e st-k n o w n .in sta n ce s:  
kidnapping and murder o f  Aldo 
Moro and o f  Hans M artin S c h le ie r .
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APPENDIX III CONNECTION BETWEEN PLO AND OTHER TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 
ARAB STATES AS A REFUGE FOR TERRORISTS
LIBYA SOUTH YEMEN ALGERIA LEBANON
Two terro r ists  o f Habash's 
Front who threw grenades 
at El Al o f f ic e s  in Brus­
s e ls  end The Hague on 
8.9.C9 apprehended; a fter  
interrogation, transferred  
to Libya and there released.
Hijacker o f  plane o f  Jor­
dan's Alia a ir lin e  who 
forced i t  to land in  L ib - . 
ya, 8 .9 .7 1 , released in  
Libya. Fatah member.
Hijackers of Lufthansa 
plane on 29.10.72 who de­
manded release o f  murder­
ers o f Israeli sportsmen 
at Munich, found haven in  
Libya togetlier with th eir  
co lleagu es, and were re­
leased. Members o f  Ha­
bash's Front.
Two gangs o f Arab Youth 
Organization for Libera­
tion o f  Palestine who 
operated at same time 
against Israel Embassy in  
Cyprus and El Al plane a t  
Nicosia airport (9 .4 .7 3 )  
released and go to Libya 
follow ing hijacking o f - 
KLM plane in  November 1973,
Hijackers o f  Japanese 
Air Lines jumbo (from 
Habash's Front and Ja­
panese Red Army) on
20,7.73 compel plane 
to land in Libya where 
they blow i t  up. Hi­
jackers released.
Terrorists who took 
over train  of new im­
migrants from USSR on 
Czech-Austrian border 
on 28.9.73 released by 
Austria and trans­
ferred to Libya.
Japanese Red Army ter­
ro r is ts  who took over 
US consulate and Swe­
dish Embassy in  Kuala 
Lampur found haven in  
Libya. 4 .8 .7 5 .
Terrorists from Habash's Front 
who attacked Isra e li tanker 
"Coral Sea" in Bab el-Mandeb 
s tr a it s  on 11.6.71 came from 
and returned to South Yemen.
Hijackers (Habash's Front) o f  
Lufthansa plane on 22.2 .72  re­
ceived ransom for re lease  o f  
plane in South Yemen and de­
parted that country without 
any del ays.
Four terro r ists  (2 P a lestin ­
ia n s, 2 Japanese) o f  Habash's 
Front and Japanese Red Arn\y 
who sabotaged "Shell" o i l  
tanks in Singapore on 31.1 .74  
released follow ing th e ir  com­
rades' takeover o f Japanese 
Embassy in  Kuwait and went to  
South Yemen.
Terrorists o f  Abu a l-  
Abas' Front for Lib­
eration o f Palestine  
hijack KLM plane en 
route from Spain-Hol­
land (4 .9 .7 6 ) , force  
i t  to land in  Cyprus, 
and leave for Libya.
Released hijackers o f  
El Al plane seized  by 
Habash's Front en 
route from Rome-Lod. 
23 .7 .68 .
Four Fatah terro r ists  
who took over Egyp­
tian  Embassy in  Mad­
rid on 15.9.75 -  de­
manding Egypt leave  
Geneva Conference -  
arrive a t A lg iers , 
and released .
Six terro r ists  o f  Ha­
bash's Front who took 
over OPEC building in  
Vienna on 21.12.75 and 
took OPEC M inisters 
hostage, arrive in  Al­
geria and are released.
Japanese Red Army ter­
ro r is ts  who hijacked  
Japanese plane en route 
from Paris-Tokyo (5 .1 0 ,  
77) forced i t  to  land 
in  Bangladesh, Kuwait, 
Damascus and, f in a l ly ,  
A lgeria , where they  
were released .
Four terro r ists  
o f Habash's Front 
seized  in  Cyprus 
aboard ship; 
th e ir  aim was to  
get to Israel to  
carry out ra id s. 
Deported to Bei­
ru t, 9 .1 .7 3 .
ro
APPENDIX III (cont.)
SYRIA EGYPT KUWAIT IRAQ
Took p art In n e g o t ia t io n s  
fo r  r e le a s e  o f  TWA plane  
and p assen gers h ija ck ed  
on Rome-Lod f l i g h t ,  
2 9 .8 .6 9 .  Two I s r a e l i  
p assen gers r e le a se d  in  
exchange fo r  two Syrian  
p i l o t s  b e in g .h e ld  p r i s ­
oner in  I s r a e l .
Three Fatah/D lack Septem­
b er  t e r r o r is t s  who tr ie d  
to  l u t  Schanau new immi­
gran ts camp In A u stria  
d e ta in e d , g iv en  suspended  
se n te n c e , deported  to  
S yria  in  March 1973.
Two t e r r o r is t s  o f  Ha­
b a sh 's  Front who t r ie d  
to  a tta ck  El Al p lane a t  
Rome a ir p o r t  (4 .4 .7 3 )  
d e ta in e d , ca rry in g  p i s ­
t o l s  and gren ad es. Re­
le a se d  th a t September 
and s e n t  to S y r ia .
H ijack ers o f  KLM plane  
in  B e ir u t , 2 5 ,1 1 .7 3 ,  
fo rc e  i t  to  land a t  
Dubai, and d e p a r t .fo r  
S y r ia . Members o f  Arab 
N ational Youth O rganizar 
t io n  fo r  L ib e r a tio n  o f  
P a le s t in e .
H ijack ers o f  Olympic A ir T e r r o r is t  o f  Habash's Three t e r r o r i s t  o f-J a p a n ese  Red An
Lines p lane en rou te from Front who t r ie d  to  fo r c e  who took over French Embassy at.Thi
B eirut-A thens ( 2 2 ,7 .7 0 ) ,  h is  way in to  El Al o f f i c e  Hague on 1 3 .9 .7 4  tr a n sferred  to
members o f  Popular S tru g- in  A thens, s e iz e d  (1 9 .7 .7 3 )  S y r ia  and then to  Ira q ,
g le  F l'on t, a r r iv e  in  C a iro , R elea sed , he le a v e s  fo r
where th ey  are r e le a s e d . Kuwait.
A ssa ssin s  o f  Jordanian  
Premier Wazfi a l-T a l 
( 2 8 .1 1 .7 1 ) ,  members o f  
Fatah/B lack Septem ber, 
r e le a se d  by Egypt.
Fatah/B lack  September 
t e r r o r is t s  who took o ver  
Isr a e l Embassy a t  Bang­
kok on 2 8 .1 2 .7 2 ,  re­
le a se d  in  C airo .
15 F atah /B lack  September 
t e r r o r i s t s  who sought, to  
a s s a s s in a te  King H ussein  
during Rabat Sunmit meet­
in g  r e le a se d  and tra n s­
fe rred  to  Caii'O,
1.10.74.
5 Fatah/B lack September t e r -  Two t e r r o r is t s  o f  Habash's Front w 
r o r i s t s  who took o ver  Saudi t r ie d  to  a tta ck  El Al p lane a t  Orl 
Embassy in  P a r is  flow n  to  on 1 9 .1 .7 5 ,  apprehended and tr a n s-  




CONNECTION BETWEEN PLO AND OTHER TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 
DIVERSIFIED AID OF ARAB STATES TO TERRORISM
Cauntry Training camps, o f f ic e s ,  
recruitment o f volunteers
Financing Means o f Warfare and 
In te llig en ce  Aid
Documentation .
LEBANON All Palestin ian  organiza** 
tien s have openly opera­
tin g  o f f ic e s ,  training  
camps. Foreiqn terro r ists  
. (Turks, e t c .)  take part 
in  training camps.
LIBYA Training camps including  
naval training and p ilo t  
training for-P alestin ians  
and others. Recruitment 
o f f ic e s .  Set up Arab Na­
tion al Youth Organiza­
tio n  for Liberation o f  
Palestine which, operates 
under Libyan supervision.
IRAQ Training camps under auSf 
pices o f  Arab Liberation  
Front and in Iraqi army 
camps. In the main, 
training o f  Abu Nid'al*s 
men and o f  Habash's Front.
IU.6ER1A Training camps for the 
P olisario  Front. Fatah, 
Habash's Front, O ffices  
o f  most o f  the organiza­
tions ,  “Voice o f  Falas- 
tin" radio s ta t io n .
$75 m illion  annual aid  
to Palestin ian and other 
te r r o r is t  organizations. 
Kaddafi, i t  w ill be re­
c a lle d , donated £5 m il­
lio n  to murderers o f  I s ­
ra e li sportsmen at  
Munich.
Provides ongoing finan­
c ia l a id , mainly to the 
rejectio n  organizations: 
Habash's Front, Abu 
N id 'a l, Palestine Liber­
ation  Front.
S e lec tiv e  financial a id ,  
in  lin e  with i t s  in ter ­
e s t s .
Chief arms supplier to 
te r r o r is t  organizations 
in  world. Supplied arms 
to rejection  organiza­
tion s in  Lebanon, to 
IRA. “Claudia," carry­
ing arms from Libya, 
seized  by B ritain  in
1976. Libyan represen-, 
ta tions gather Informa­
tio n  for te r r o r is t  a c ts .
Supplies arms and in te l­
ligen ce aid to  organiza­
tion s working under I ts  
a eg is .
S e lec tiv e  supply o f  arms 
and in te llig e n c e  in for­
mation.
Supplies su itab le  passports to .te r ­
r o r is ts , e .g .  passports to El Al 
attackers In Istanbul, August *76.
Is>to
Supplies passports in  lin e  with  
need, e .g .  ,to Abu Daoud who ar­
rived in  France in  January 1977 
with Iraqi passport.
Supplies passports. For example, 
Fatah menher Ribhi Haloum.detained 
in  Holland (Oct. '7 2 ) , bearing.Al 
gerian diplom atic passport, c a n y  





T rain ing camps, o f f i c e s ,  . 
recru itm sn t o f  v o lu n teers
T rain ing camps o f  Habash's 
Front where members o f  
European o r g a n iz a tio n s  
t r a in .
F inancing Means o f  Warfare and 
I n t e l l ig e n c e  Aid______
P rovides m ean s.o f war­
fa r e  and in t e l l ig e n c e  
a id .
Documentation
S u p p lies  p a ssp o r ts . R e c e n t ly .. 
learn ed  th a t  i t  gave p a ssp o rts  





Provide f in a n c ia l a id .  
PLO rep . in  Saudi Arab-, 
la  s a id  th a t country  i s  
PLO's c h ie f  su p p o rter . 
Gave $40 m il l io n  to  PLO 
in  1977 .
T rain ing camps fo r  S a ik a , Aids o r g a n iz a t io n s  un- 
J i b r i l ' s  F ron t, Fatah; der i t s  a e g is :  S a ik a .
freedom o f  movement fo r  and J i b r i l ' s  F ron t.
Japanese Red Arny.
Arms s u p p lie r  to  Fatah 
in  Lebanon and to  
S a ik a , J i b r i l ' s  organ­
i z a t io n .
Aids w ith  p a ssp o rts  t o  Saika ai 
















Libyan d ip lom atic  s e r v ic e  used  
for  tr a n s fe r  o f  arms. This was 
method employed by murderers o f  
sportsmen a t  Munich.
Arms and su p p lie s  tra n sfer re d  
via  Iraqi d ip lo m a tic  s e r v i c e . * 
In December 1976 , learn ed  th a t  
Ira q 's  UN o f f i c e  i s  s to r in g  
arm s.
A lger ian  d ip lo m a tic  s e r v ic e  
a id s  t e r r o r i s t  o rg a n iz a tio n s  
s e l e c t i v e l y .
South Yemen d ip lo m a tic  s e r v ic e  
a t  d isp o sa l m ainly o f  Habash*s * 
F ront.
Syrian  d ip lo m a tic  s e r v ic e  a t  





MEMBERS OF PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ELECTED A! THE THIRTEENTH SES! 








Chairman of Execative 
Commi ttee
Additional position
Chairman of the Central 
CoRimittee of Fatah
ruQ el Kadouffli 
T>u Luft)
Fatah Head of Political Dept. Secretary of the Centr Committee of Fatah
iheir Hubs In
I
Saiqa Head of Military Dept. Secretary General of Sa





Head of Dept, for Information 
and Culture
Member of the Palestlnj 
Bureau of the "Dem. Fr
]





Head of the Dept, of 
Popular Organization





Head of the Dept, of Education 
and Higher Education.
Aid and advisor for Jit 
political affairs.
SOURCE; Israeli Defense Force Spokesmans Office.
'XECUTIVE COMMITTEE ELECTED Af TilE TlllKTEENTH SESSION
[STINE NATIONAL COUNCIL •
1in on the Additional position Former positions





Chairman of the Central 
Committee of Fatah
Chairman Palestinian Student union 
in Egypt In the '50's; was a past 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood; 
Chairman of the PLO Executive 
Committee since I969.
1 Political Dept.ij Secretary of the Central Commi ttee of Fatah Member of the Executive Committee since Feb. I9&9 (with the exclusion of Jan.-AprII '73). Chairman of the 
political dept, of the Executive ■ 
Committee since April '73.
f Military Dept. Secretary General of Salqa Member of Exec. Com. as head of Military Dept, since April '71.
F Dept, for Info'matlon
iture
e ;
Member of the Palestine 
Bureau of the "Dem. Front"
A founder of the Wabash Front, late»
broke away; was a founder of the •
"Dem. Front". Member of the Exec. Ct
Com. since Jan. '73. Chairman of
Information Dept, during 12th. saoet
session. 10to
f the Dept, of 
r Organization
Secretary General, Arab 
Liberation Front
A new member of the Exec. Com.
f, the Dept, of Education 
ghcr Education.
Aid and advisor for Jibril's 
political affairs.
Member of the Exec. Com. since July 
'74. One of the founders 'Palestine 
Liberation Front" in tf>e I960's.






tTnr~wn»«ftfcTMgw‘.H»«g y IPosition un the Executive ComiitteePalestine Natlunai 
Front " e
g Apparently wl 11 coitinueas 
head of the Financ al Dept. 
(Chairman ol*‘t h e ‘i* ileVlTniaK"' 
National Fund).
Abd el Jawad Saleh 
(Abu Jaleh, Abu Haiti)
Palestine National 
Front
Member of the Committee for 
Occupied territories Affairs 
of the Exec. Com.;apparently 
will continue as Dep. Chairman 
of Dept, of Occupied Territories 
Affairs.
And el Huhsin Abu Mayzu Palestine National Front
Head of Dept, of National and 
International Affairs - PLO 
Exec. Con. Spokesman, member of 
the Dept, of Occupied Territories.
Dr. Alfred Tubas I Independent/
Communist.
Member of the PLO Committee on 
the Occupied Territories.
Hajdi Abu Ramadan Independent/ 
. Pro-Egypt.
Head of Social Affairs; Head of 





Habib Kuhwagi Independent/ (Basically Al- 
Fatah-pro Syrian)






u 1Fosi tion un the j 1 Execut i ve CommIttce |Ktdditlonal position j Former Positionsg - — ' Apparently will coitiiiue as 
head of the FInamc al Dept. 
(Chairman ol the ‘PileVtTnlah* 
National Fund).
ferric'r Kcinber of el Kumyoun e.l-"" 
Arab. Mentor of Exec. Com. in 
iS64-6S. Re-elected in July *7*» 
and was head of the Financial 
Dept.
B ’
Member of the Committee for 
Decupled 'territories Affairs 
of the Exec. Com.;appar'ently 
will continue as Oep. Chairman 
of Dept, of Occupied Territories 
Affairs.
Major of El BIreh between 1963* | 
74. Elected to Exec. Com. in 
July '74 as Oep. Chairman of 
Dept, of Occupied Territories 
Affairs.
K:
Head of Dept, of National and 
International Affairs - FLO 
Exec. Cora. Spokesman, member of 
the Dept, of Occupied Territories.
Past member of Jerusalem City 
Council and Supreme Muslim Coun­
cil. Member of the Exec. Com. 
since July '74 where he seived a 
as Chairman of the Dept, of Na­
tional and Refugee Affairs.
Member of the FLO Committee on 
the Occupied Territories. •
Member of Ramallah City Council 
between '62-'74. New menter of 
the Exec. Com. in
Head of Social Affairs; Head of 
Central Bureau for student affairs 
In Egypt.
Member of Palestinian 
National Council since 1968.
Member of PLO Exec. Com. between! 
1967-68.
• J
Hemb'icr of \ A e  PLO "Commlftee On 
the Occupied Territories,
Director of *'E*i Ardh” 
foundation for research 
In Syria as a meed>er of 
the Palestinian writers 
and Journalists Assoc.
Founder of "El Ardh"; a Syrian | 
Syrian intelligence Agent; a nev«f 
member of the Exec. Com, j
,
I. Or 3m bin«tÊÊn  mmmjn iz a lio n
Name
I Or. Alimed Sidki 
Oajani
Il A ffi l ia t io n  
Independent
mwmtx. ««nt i
l io n  o:* I lie 
E xecu tive  Co»inlt(cc
i.-w:'’/  n a ra iK trT w -im « œ nntam fsata
j Chairman of the Council for
4 1'ov. « I 
i jE xecu l
I  Education and C ulture.
r.s .V»..»* JI«1,1: Xtlonai •'
Chairman o f  
to* the P ila i  





A dm inistrative S ecretary .
Ilamid Abu Si ta Independent/ 
(w ith  leanings  
towards Fatah)
Chairman o f the Dept.on the  
Occupied T e r r ito r ie s .
9mm "«Mm
if’O 'w t io »  o r  titc
taMrtejmf's . w *  u r
ù /I ; : * t  J ooû • «’O'-1 : t «»n
ïe« R * er* e '^ w iiw * fii« < ieeB
1 f ».r M r  t î o n s .
g  thaïrman of the CauncI1 for 
■  Education and Culture.
C h a 1Iman of the PLO d(legation 
CO* the Dilateral European- 
Arab talks.
Tormi'f nivrJivi' of the Joreanian 
Parliament. Member of Exec. Cc 
between July '66-Dec. '67. |
H  Administrative Secretary. • Forii^r Member of the 8a'th par Leadership member of the Exec, 
since 1373. Administrative Set: 
tary to former Exec. Com.
|i Chairman of the Dept.on the 
|| Occupied Territories.
.
Henler of the Exec. Com. sinci 
1964 (except for a short peril! 65*66) - held the same posicii 
in the former Excc.Com.
N)K)CTl
mm mmm
APPENDIX VI PALESTINIAN TERRORIST 
ATTACKS ON FOREIGN SOIL
Oace PU c« O esc r lp t io r t O rg an iza t io n The P e r p e t r a to r s *  F a te
1968
2 3 .7 .6 8 . A lg e r ia Three t e r r o r i s t s  took over  an  El AI p lan e  en  ro u te  from 
Rome to  Lod and fo rced  I t  t o  land  In A lg e r ia .
Habash "Front** H ija c k e rs  Imprisoned by the  A lg e r ia n  
g o v ' t . ' U n t i l  re le a s e d  a s  p a r t  o f  an 
exchange.
2 6 .1 2 .6 8 Athens Two t e r r o r i s t s  a t t a c k e d  an El AI p lan e  w i th  small arms an 
and hand g re n a d e s .  One Isrc;^II pa ssen g e r  was k i l l e d  and 
two s tew ard esse s  in ju r e d .
Habash " F ro n t" T e r r o r i s t s  d e ta in e d  by Athens p o l i c e  
u n t i l  f reed  In th e  wake o f  the  h l j a c k l r g  
o f  am Olympic p la n e .
1969
1 8 .2 .6 9 . Z urich A squad o f  fo u r  t e r r o r i s t s  a t ta c k e d  an El AI p lan e  
w ith  small arms and handgreandes .  The c o - p i l o t  (an 
I s r a e l i  c i t i z e n )  as  k i l l e d  and f iv e  p assen g e rs  In ju re d .
Habash " F r o n t" One o f  the  t e r r o r i s t s  was k i l l e d .  Three 
o t h e r s  were A r r e s te d  by Swiss au th o r*  
I t l c s  and r e le a s e d  In S e p t .  I970 in  the  
wake o f  the h i ja c k in g  o f  a S w is sa i r  
p lan e  to  Jo rdan .
2 2 .S .69. Copenhagen Three t e r r o r i s t s  accused o f  p l o t t i n g  to  a s s a s s in a t e  
David Ben Cur ion were a r r e s t e d .
Habash*s " F ro n t" The th re e  were r e le a se d  a f t e r  t h e i r  
g u i l t  was n o t  p roven.
29 . 9 . 69 . Rotne-
Oamascus
TUA p lan e  en  ro u te  from Rome to  Lod was h i ja c k e d  
by two t e r r o r i s t s  and fo rced  t o  land in  Damascus. 
Two I s r a e l i  p a sse n g e rs  f r e e d  in  r e tu r n  f o r  the 
r e l e a s e  o f  two S y r ia n  pi l o t s  he ld  in  I s r a e l .
Habash " F ro n t"
18. 8 . 69 . Copenhagen An e x p lo s iv e  charge  p laced  In the  I s r a e l  t o u r i s t  
o f f i c e  was d ism a n t le d .
Habash ' f r o n t "  .
1 8 .8 .6 9 . London Explosions In the  "Marks and Spencer" commercial 
e s t a ! 1ishm ent.
Habash " f r o n t " to
2 3 .8 .6 9 . Izmir
(Turkey)
An e x p lo s iv e  charge went o f f  In the  hands o f  a 
t e r r o r i s t  who Intended to  sabo tage  the I s r a e l  
commercial p a v i l i o n .
Hawetmah " F ro n t" One t e r r o r i s t  was k i l l e d ,  the  second 
wounded and a r r e s t e d .
2 3 .8 .6 9 . Teheran E xplosion  in  a Jew ish  school cau s in g  l i g h t  
damage. .•
2 S .8 .6 9 . London A hand grenade  was thrown in to  the  "Ziof* o f f i c e ,  
wounding a  female employee and damaging p r o p e r ty .
Habash " F ro n t" The t e r r o r i s t s  succeeded In e s c a p in g .
SOURCE:IDF SPOKESMANS OFFICE.
Date P la c e D e sc r ip t io n O rg an iza t io n The p e r p e t r a t o r s '  f a t e
.C .3 .6 9 . B ru s te U A t e r r o r i s t  threw a  hand grenade  a t  the  
I s r a e l i  Embassy.
Habash "F ro i t t" The t e r r o r i s t  was a r r e s t e d  and a f t e r  
h i s  I n v e s t ig a t io n  was handed o v e r  t o  
L ibya.
6 .9 .6 9 . Bonn Two t e r r o r i s t s  threw a hand grenade In to  
the I s r a e l i  Embassy.
Habash " f r o n t " The two t e r r o r i s t s  succeeded In  
e s c a p in g .
' 9 .1 1 .6 9 . West B e r l in TIme-Bomb d isco v e red  In a Jew ish  Commun­
i t y  C e n te r .
Habash " f r o n t "
2 7 .1 1 .6 9 . Athens Two t e r r o r i s t s  threw a  hand grenade In to  
the CI-AI o f f i c e -  wounding 16 peop le  — 
among them ten  lo ca l  c l t l s e n s  and four 
I s r a e l i s .
"P o p u la r  S t ru g g le  
F ro n t"
The two t e r o r r l s t s  were e r r e s t c d  by 
Athens po lice*  b u t  were re le a s e d  as  
a  consequence o f  th e  h i j a c k in g  o f  
an Olympic Alrwiys p la n e  to  Jo rd a n ,  
22 J u l v .  '70s
ka. i z .  69 . ■■ ucci 'Bari in ....
the  CI-AI o f f i c e .  I t  was d is m a n t le d .  
Near "America House" a second charge  was 
n e u t r a l i s e d .  A th i r d  charge exploded In  
i n  American O f f i c e r ' s  Club. Bader Helnhof Croup 
(A ssoc ia ted  w i th  the  ■ 
Habash " F r o n t " ) .
•
'2 1 .1 2 .6 9 . Athens Three t e r r o r i s t s  who planned t o  h i j a c k  
a TUA p lane  ( a r r i v i n g  from Tel-Aviv) 
were a r r e s t e d  by the lo c a l  p o l i c e .
Habash " F r o n t" T e r ro r i s t s *  r e le a s e d  fo l low ing  (ilj a c k l ig  
o f  Olympic Airways p la n e  on 2 2 .7 .7 0 .
■■'J
1 0 .2 .7 0 . Munich Three t e r r o r i s t s  sh o t  and th rew  grenades 
a t  the  passen g ers  o f  an CI-AI p la n e .
One I s r a e l i  passenger  k i l l e d  and e ig h t  
o t h e r s  ( f i v e  I s r a e l i s ,  th re e  B r i t i s h )  
I n ju r e d .
E xecutive  Committee 
f o r  th e  L ib e ra t io n  o f  
P a l e s t i n e .
"1 '111One t e r r o r i s t  was I n ju r e d .  A ll  t h r e a p  
were a r r e s t e d  b u t  r e le a s e d  fo l lo w in g  
th e  h i j a c k in g  o f  a  p la n e  t o  Jo rdan  
In  S e p t .  1970.
: 9 .9 .7 0 . West*
Germany
Arsen In an  o ld  age homo. Seven s e n io r  
c i t i z e n s  d ie d  and o th e r s  s u s ta in e d  I n j u r i e s . .*
•
. .
.......... . • - __ . . . . .
Dat« M ac# D e s c r ip t io n O rg a n iz a t io n The p e r p e t r a t o r s '  f a t e
2 1 .2 .7 0 . Zurich S w is s a i r  p la n e  en ro u le  from Zurich  to  Lod 
exploded In m id - a i r  k i l l i n g  a l l  38 passenger#  
and n in e  crewmembers. (from I s r a e l  
13» West Germany 10, U.S. 5 ,  S w itze r lan d  
2, Mexico 2 ,  Canada 2 ,  Thailand  1, B r i t a i n  
1, Belgium 1, Senegal 1. A ll n ine  crew­
members were S w iss ) .
J l b f l l  ' f r o n t " T e r r o r i s t s  escaped  to  th e  MlddleCaC
2 1 .2 .7 0 . F r a n k f u r t E xp losion  In ca rg o  ho ld  o f  A u s t r ia n  A i r l i n e s  
p la n e .  P lan s  damaged b u t  landed s a f e l y .
J I b r l l  " F r o n t" ^ r ^ r o r l s t s  escaped to  the  Middle
2 4 .2 .7 0 . F ra n k fu r t Two r ig g e d  p a r c e l s  s e n t  from F ra n k fu r t  to  
a d d re s se s  ' n  I s r a e l  Were n e u t r a l i z e d .
J I b r l l  " F ro n t"
7 .3 .7 0 . Cuatamal# Hand grenade tossed  In to  the  c o u r ty a rd  
o f  I s r a e l ' s  honorary  c o n su l .
An u n i d e n t i f i e d  
Cuatamalan o rgan­
i z a t i o n  su p p o r t in g  
th e  A rab s .
2 4 .4 .7 0 . is tam bul and 
Izmir
E xplos ion  In the EI-AI o f f i c e  In Istambul 
and Pan-American o f f i c e s  In Izm ir .
P o p u la r  S t ru g g le  
F ro n t
4 .5 .7 0 . A su n c lo 'n Two armed P a l e s t i n i a n s  broke In to  th e  I s r a e l The p e r p e r t r a t o r s  were a r r e s t e d  and
(Paraguay) C o n s u la te 's  o f f i c e  and sh o t  a t  o f f i c e  employees, 
k i l l i n g  an I s r a e l i  s e c r e t a r y  and wounding 
a  lo c a l  s e c r e t a r y .
s t i l l  imprisoned.
2 2 .7 .7 0 . Athena and Olympic Airways p lan e  on ro u te  from Be 1r u t P o p u le r  S t ru g g le H i ja c k e r s  and e i g h t  o t h e r  t e r r o r l s #
B e i r u t t o  Athens h i ja c k e d  by s i x  t e r r o r i s t s  and 
landed In  A thens.
F ro n t r e le a s e d  by Creek g o v ' t ,  and flcOJ 
t o  C a i ro  f o r  h e r o e s '  welcome. ^
i . 9 . 7 0 . Jo rdan Three p la n e s  h i ja c k e d  w i th  400 p a sse n g e rs  
on  b o a rd .  One blown up In Egypt; th e  o t h e r  
two landed In  Z a rk a ,  Jo rd an .
Habash " f r o n t "
0 « te M ace D e sc r ip t io n O rg a n iz a t io n The p e r p e t r a t o r s '  F a te
4 . 9 . 70 . London- Lod A bortive  a t te m p t  to  h i j a c k  an EI-Al 
p la n e .  In g u n f lg h t  In s id e  the  p la n e  one 
t e r r o r i s t  was .k i l l e d  and a female t e r r o r i s t  
( L e i l a  Haled) I n ju re d .  A steward ( I s r a e l i  
c i t i z e n )  and fo u r  p assen g ers  were I n ju r e d .
Habash " F ro n t" In ju re d  fem ale  t e r r o r i s t  r e l e a s e d  
by B r i t a i n  In  exchamga fo r  
h o s ta g e s  subsequen tly  h i ja c k e d  In 
a  BOAC plaA e.
0 .9 .7 0 . Athens A sabotage  a t te m p t  a g a in s t  the  EI-AI o f f i c e s  
- -  th w ar ted .
Two t e r r o r i s t s  a r r e s t e d  b u t  l a t e r  
r e l e a s e d  In  th e  wake o f  a  h i j a c k l i  
o f  a  p la n e  t o  J o rd a n ,  1970.
9 . 9 . 70. f lahreIn-  
London
A nother BOAC p la n e  fo rced  to  land a t  
Zarka, Jo rd an .
6 . 10. 70 . London Rigged l e t t e r s  addressed  t o  EI-AI and I s r a e l  
Embassy d is c o v e re d . •
I S . 10 .70. W es t-B erl in Rigged l e t t e r s  d isc o v e re d  a t  I s r a e l  Masada 
e x h i b i t i o n .
1221 •
1 4 .3 .7 1 . Rotterdam Fuel tanks a t  the  o i l  docks blown up by a  
f iv e  member t e r r o r i s t  squad . Approximately 
SI m i l l io n  damage caused .
F a tah
•
2 6 .S . 71. . Rio OeJaneiro Explosion In J .N .F .  o f f i c e .
2 0 .5 .7 1 . Turkey The I s r a e l i  Consul g en e ra l  murdered. The T urk ish  




I I . 6 . 7 I . Bab cl-Mandab 
(S. Yemen)
The I s r a e l i  tan k er  Coral 10 a t ta c k e d  In  th e  
Bab cl-Mandab s t r a i t s  by fou r  t e r r o r i s t s  cau s in g  
damage to  th e  v e s s e l .
Habash " F r o n t" The t e r r o r i s t s  escaped by b o a t  t o  
South  Yemen c o a s t .
2 0 .7 .7 1 . Rome Sabotage o f "A Il a "  (Jo rdan  A i r l i n e s  Co.) o f f i c e s  
caus ing  damage.
F a tah
2 3 .7 .7 1 . P a r i s A number o f  Molotov c o c k t a i l s  thrown a t  the  
Jo rd a n ia n  embassy.
F a ta h One o f  th e  t e r r o r i s t s  was wounded 
p o l i c e  f i r e  and apprehended .
.... ............... .........................
0«te f*Lacc D e s c r ip t io n O rg a n iz a t io n P e r p e t r a t o r s '  Fa te
2 4 .7 .7 1 . Egypt A ttack  on Jo rdan  A i r l i n e s  « lane  a t  a i r p o r t .  S l i g h t  
damage to  p la n e .
El Fatah
2 8 .7 .7 1 . Aome*Lod A tte irp t to  blow up EI-AI p lane  en  ro u te  from 
Rome to  Lod by r igged  s u i t c a s e  brough t aboard by 
a  Dutch g i r l  unaware o f  I t s  n a tu r e .
J I b r l l  ' f r o n t " G ir l  r e l e a s e d .  The t e r r o r i s t  r e s ­
p o n s ib le  g o t  away.
Auoust A lg e r ia Two t e r r o r i s t s  hi lack a p lane  to  A lg e r ia . El Fatah
‘ J i a  ■'
1.2 .71 londom-lod Attempt to  blow up an EI-AI p la n e  en ro u te  from 
London to  Lod by r igged  s u i t c a s e  brought aboard 
by P eruv ian  g i r l  unaware o f  I t s  n a tu r e .
J I b r l l  " f r o n t " G ir l  r e l e a s e d .
8 .9 .7 1 . Jordan H ijack in g  of Jo rd an ian  p lan e  o f  A l la  Co. by Libyan 
h i j a c k e r .
El Fatah T e r r o r i s t  se iz e d  anil r e le a s e d  a 
few days l a t e r .
1 6 .9 .7 1 . B e iru t A b o r t iv e  a t tm cp t  to  h i j a c k  Jo rd a n ia n  A l ia  p lane  
f l y i n g  t o  B e i ru t .
El Fatah
2 8 .1 1 .7 1 . C airo Jo rd an ian  Prime M in is te r  WaspI e l - T a l  murdt red 
by fou r  t e r r o r i s t s .
"F a ta h "  -  Black 
September.
One t e r r o r i s t  wounded and a r r e s t s  
A ll were re le a s e d  In Jan .  ' 7 Î .
1 5 .1 2 .7 1 . London J o r d a n 's  Ambassador In London wounded by sh o ts  
f i r e d  a t  him by two t e r r o r i s t s .
" F a ta h "  -  Black 
September.
The p e r p e t r a t o r s '  e scaped .
1 6 .1 2 .7 1 . Geneva Explos ion  In the b u i ld in g  o f  th e  Jo rd an ian  Embassy. 
Four peop le  wounded and s l i g h t  damage cau sed .
"The Jo rd a n ia n  
N a tiona l  L ib e r ­
a t i o n  Movement"
K -
M
2 8 .1 2 .7 1 . A u s t r ia Rigged l e t t e r s  o f  Yugoslavian and A u s t r ia n  
p rovenance . A p o l i c e  sap p e r  bounded.
J I b r l l  " F r o n t"
122 1
5 .2 . 7 2 . Holland A s i x  man t e r r o r i s t  squad blew up two gas 
I n s t a l l a t i o n s .
"F a tah "  -  B lack 
September
The p e r p e t r a t o r s  e scap ed .
UMI’mmmmmammmmmm
O jte P lace D e s c r ip t io n O rg a n iz a t io n The p e r p e t r a t o r s '  f a t e
6 .2 .7 2 . West Germany Sabotage of  a Hamburg e l e c t r o n i c s  p l a n t ,  
cau s in g  heavy damage.
“ F a tah "  -  Black 
September
6 .2 .7 2 . Germany Five P a l e s t i n i a n s  and a Jo rd an ian  murdered by 
two armed t e r r o r i s t s .
Block September
1 9 .2 .7 2 . Calro*
Amman
Attempt to  h i j a c k  a Jo rdan ian  p lan e  en ro u te  
from C a iro  to  Amman f o i l e d .
2 2 .2 .7 2 . Europe
(Germany)
German L ufthansa  p lane  h i ja c k e d  by f i v e  t e r r o r i s t s .  
The p lane  and i t s  passen g ers  r e le a s e d  a f t e r  
Lufthansa  paid SS m i l l i o n  ransom.
Habash “ F ro n t"
2 2 .2 .7 2 . Hamburg 
(U. Germany)
Sabotage of an o i l  p i p e l i n e . “ F a tah "  -  Black 
September
11 .3 .72 . London Attempt to  a t t a c k  King H u sse in 's  r e s id e n c e ,  London. Black September
2 9 .«..72. Hanover. 
Germany
Rigned p a rc e ls  l e n t  to  the I s r a e l i  p a v i l l c n  a t  
the  Hanover f a i r .
J I b r l l  “F ro n t"
9 .5 .7 2 . Lod Sabena plane  h i ja c k e d  en ro u te  from B ru sse ls  t o  
Lod under t e r r o r i s t  t h r e a t  to  blow up p la n e .  
Passengers  r e le a s e d  and t e r r o r i s t s  t r a p p e d .
“F a ta h "  -  Black 
September
Two t e r r o r i s t s  k i l l e d ,  two o th e r  
tak en  p r i s o n e r .
4 .8 .7 2 T r i e s t e , I t a l y Sabotage o f  o i l  i n s t a l l a t i o n s  by se v e ra l  t e r r o r i s t  
squads o p e ra t in g  s im u l ta n e o u s ly .  Heavy damage 
caused .
“ F a tah "  -  Black 
September KJw
to
1 6 .8 .7 2 . Roma"Lod Attempt t o  blow up El AI p lan e  In th e  a i r  en 
ro u te  to  Lod by b r in g in g  booby-trapped  re c o rd  
p la y e r  aboard . I t  exploded In  luggage ho ld  
o f  p la n e .
J I b r l l  F ro n t Two E n g lish  g i r l s  who brough t re< 
reco rd  p la y e r  o n to  p lan e  were re 
le a se d  by I t a l i a n  g o v ' t .  The two 
t e r r o r i s t s  r e le a s e d  on b a l l .  Feb 
*73 d isa p p e a re d  from I t a l y .
0<ite P lace Descr ip t  ion O rgan iza t io n The P e r p e r t r a to r s "  Fate
i . 9 . 72 . Munich A squad o f  e ig h t  t e r r o r i s t s  s e iz e d  the 
dorm itory  where I s r a e l i  sportsmen were 
housed. In the  course  o f  th e  in c id e n t  
II  I s r a e l i  a t h l e t e s  were k i l l e d .
" F a ta h "  -  Black 
September
Five t e r r o r i s t s  k i l l e d ,  th r e e  
a r r e s t e d  by German a u t h o r i t i e s  
and r e le a s e d  fo l low ing  th e  L u f th ­
ansa  h i j a c k in g  o f  O ct.  *72.
tO .9 .7 2 . O rtisse ls An employee o f  the  I s r a e l  Embassy was 
a t t a c k e d  and wounded.
" F a ta h "  -  Black 
September
1 8 .9 .72 . Am&terdam Rigged l e t t e r s  s e n t  from Amsterdam to  
I s r a e l  and I s r a e l i  l e g a t io n s  throughout 
the world (P a r is ,C en ev a .M o n trea l .V ien n a ,  
W ashington,Ottowa, Brus s e I s , Klnshasa,B uenos 
AI res(Pnompenh).
" F a ta h "  -  Black 
September
1 9 9 . 7 2 . London The Economic Advisor o f  the  I s r a e l  Embassy 
was k i l l e d  when an envelope ad d ressed  to  
him exploded .
20 . 9 . 72 . Buenos At re s Synagogue sabo taged . •
4 .1 0 .7 2 . H a loys le Wave o f  r igged  l e t t e r s  from M alaysia t o  Jew ish  
a d d re s se s  in  I s r a e l  and throughout th e  
w orld .  One such en v e lo p e ,  rece iv ed  by th e  
"H la s"  Jewish W elfare  Agency. O ther Such 
l e t t e r s  se n t  t o  two Jews In Rhodesia and 
t o  th e  d i r e c t o r  o f  th e  N.V. Chapter o f  th e  
"Hadassah" o r g a n iz a t io n .  Rigged enve lopes 
exploded In a  M.Y. P o s t  O f f i c e ,  wounding •
U.S. p o s ta l  employee.
" F a ta h "  -  Black 
September tow
w
13. 10. 72. P e r i s A bomb d is c o v e re d  In  EI-AI o f f i c e s ■
■ I* ». '
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23 . t o . >2 . " Holland A P lo  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  in  A russe ts  was a r r e s t e d  
In H olland . Rigged envelopes were d isco v e red  
In  h i s  p o s s e s s io n .
PLÔ Vhe t e r r o r i s t s  was r e le a s e d  
s h o r t l y  a f t e r .
29 .> 0 .7 2 . Germany German L ufthansa  p lane  s e iz e d  by two t e r r o r i s t s  
who demanded re le a s e  o f  th e  t h r e e  Munich 
M urderers.
Habash “ f r o n t " Found re fuge  in  Libya and r e ­
le a se d  from t h e r e .
IV .10.72. Rotterdam A bomb was d isco v ered  in  the  e n t ra n c e  o f  a 
b u i ld in g  housing  “ Bank o f  America" and “ Zira" 
Co. . N>W
•u
30 .1 0 .7 2 . H a la y s la /
S ingapore
Rigged envelopes s e n t  from M alaysia  and 
Singapore t o  I s r a e l .
“ F a ta h "  -  S lack  
September
31 . 10. 72. N ig e r ia A r igged  envelope rece iv ed  by th e  I s r a e l  
Embassy.
I t .11. 72 . FrankfurC A r igged  envelope rece ived  by a  Jewish  Z io n i s t  
Youth Croup.
11. 11. 72 . Geneva Five r ig g ed  envelopes rece iv ed  by I s r a e l i  
d e le g a t io n  to  Jev/ish o r g a n iz a t io n s .
•
11. 11. 72. B r i t a i n 14 r igged  envelopes rece iv ed  by Jewish o r g a n iz a t io n s  
and p e r s o n a l i t i e s .  A Jewish  diamond d e a l e r  was 
s e v e re ly  wounded when one such enve lope  exploded .
13. 11. 72 . P a r i* Three armed t e r r o r i s t s  b roke  i n t o  th e  apartm ent 
o f  a  S y r ian  J o u r n a l i s t  and murdered him.
“ F a ta h "  •  Black 
September
The p e r p e t r a t o r » '  f a t eD e sc r ip t io nP laceDate
American In fo rm ation  Center  sabo tagedAnkara
(Turkey)
fo u r  r ig g ed  enve lopes  t e n t  t o  Jew» In t h a t  
c i t y ,  d is c o v e re d .
Toronto2 1 . I I . 72
Four abandoned s u i t c a s e s  c o n ta ln ig  weapons 
d isco v e red  a t  Rome's a i r p o r t .
Rome
Rigged enve lopes  s e n t  t o  p u b l i c  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
In I s r a e l .
J I b r l l  " F ro n t"S ingapore  *
A t e r r o r i s t  was a r r e s t e d  -  In h i s  p o s s e s s io n  were 
weapons and ex p lo s iv e s  d e s t in e d  to  be employed 
a g a in s t  I s r a e l i  Embassies in  S cand inav ia .
20 .12 .72 "B lack  September" flew  t o  C a iro  and l a t eFour t e r r o r i s t s  occupy I s r a e l i  Embassy, s ix  
Embassy employees h e ld  hos tage  and re le a s e d  
by the  t e r r o r i s t s  19 hours l a t e r .
The tei
London
A sguad o f  t e r r o r i s t s  uncovered in  Greece, 
' t h e i r '  i n t e n t  be ing  to  reach I s r a e l  by boa t 
and to  c a r r y  o u t  t e r r o r  and s u i c i d e  m iss io n s  
t h e r e .
Dec. '72 Greece
An au tom obile  c a r ry in g  e x p lo s iv e s  l e f t  a  Fatah  
base  In N ahar le l  Bared (Lebanon) and a r r iv e d  
In Europe. I t s  c a rg o  was to  be employed Ih 
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1 .1 .7 3 . Kuwait/Jordan Rigged enve lopes addressed  t o  J o rd a n ia n  p e r s o n a l i t i e s . " F a ta h "  -  Black 
September.
9 .1 .7 3 . P a r i s Jewish  Agency b u i ld in g  was sabo taged . "F a ta h "  -  Black 
September.
9 .1 .7 3 . Cyprus An a t tem p t  t o  c a r ry  ou t a s u ic id e  m iss io n  In H a i f a ,  by 
four  t e r r o r i s t s  was thw arted .  The t e r r o r i s t s  were 
taken  o f f  th e  s h i p  "Haspla** In Cyprus.




1 9 .1 .7 3 . Vienna An a t tem p t  to  a t t a c k  new Immigrants ' t r a n s i ,  f a c i l i t i e s  
In Vienna (Schoenau C a s t le )  was th w ar ted ,  "h re e  
t e r r o r i s t s  were a r r e s t e d .
"B lack September" Received suspended se n te n c e s  
and e e l  le d  t o  S y r i a ,  March '7 3
•
2 4 .1 .7 3 . Creece-Chl la  
C anada-A ustra l la
Rigged envelopes s e n t  to  the I s r a e l  C o nsu la te s  In 
C h i le ,  and A u s t r a l i a  and Canada, (m ostly  l o c a l s ) .
"B lack September"
2 6 .1 .7 3 . Madrid An I s r a e l i  (Hoshe ben Hanan) -  Baruch Cohen, murdered 
In Madrid by a t e r r o r i s t .
"F a ta h "  -  Black 
September.
2 6 .1 .7 3 . I t a l y Three t e r r o r i s t s  a r r e s t e d  by I t a j l a n  a u t h o r i t i e s  when 
c r o s s in g  th e  I t a l i a n  bo rd e r  w i th  I n t e n t  o f  a t t a t k i n g  
S o v ie t  Jewish  em ig ran ts  l i v in g  In a t r a n s i t  h o s te l  
In Vienna.
" F a ta h "  -  Black 
September.
The t e r r o M s t s  were l a t e r  
e e l  l e d .
D«tc P lace D e sc r ip t io n O rg an iza t io n The P e r p e t r a t o r s '  F a te
Turkey Rigged enve lopes  o f  T u rk ish  provenance s e n t  co I s r a e l . " F a ta h "  -  Black 
September.
3 1 . I . 73. Rome-Ruanda Rigged enve lopes  s e n t  from Rome to  the  I s r a e l  Embassy 
In Ruanda.
" F a ta h "  -  Black 
September.
5 .2 .7 3 . Rome-
Guatemala
Rigged enve lopes  s e n t  from Rome to  the  I s r a e l  Embassy 
In Guatemala.
" F a ta h "  -  Black 
September.
8 .2 .7 3 . Germany-Central Rigged enve lopes  s e n t  from Germany to  I s r a e l  Embassy 
A fr ican  In Bangui, c a p i t a l  o f  th e  C en tra l  A fr ic a n  R epub lic .  
Republic
" F a ta h "  -  Black 
September.
1 .3 .7 3 . Khartum An e ig h t  man t e r r o r i s t  squad occupied th e  Saudi 
A rabian  Embassy. Three w este rn  d ip lom ats  murdered.
" F a ta h "  -  Black 
S ep te  * e r .
E igh t  t e r r o r i s t s  s t i l l  
Sudanese p r i s o n .
In
3 .3 .7 3 . Cyprus The C yp r io t  passen g er  s h ip  "Sunyon" sunk . Habash Front
6 .3 .7 3 . New York An a t te m p t  to  sabo tage  I s r a e l i  o b j e c t i v e s  In New York 
by means o f  th r e e  booby-trapped  c a r s  (one n ea r  th e  El 
AI te rm in a l  a t  Kennedy A i r p o r t ,  and two o t h e r s  n e a r  th e  
th e  New York b ranches  o f  I s r a e l  Discount Bank and 
Bank Leuml l e  I s r a e l )  was thw ar ted . N>
* 2 .3 .7 3 . Cyrpus An I s r a e l i  businessm an was murdered by a  J o rd a n ia n  
s tu d e n t .
" F a ta h "  -  Black 
September.
■ LIL
* 4 .3 .7 3 . f r a n c a French s e c u r i t y  a u t h o r i t i e s  a r r e s t e d  two t e r r o r i s t s  who 
in ten d ed  t o  a t t a c k  th e  I s r a e l  E i^assy  in  P a r i s .
" F a ta h "  -  Black 
ScptciSber.
UMI
0 « t« f l« c « D e s c r ip t io n Organization Th# Perpetrators* Fate
O l Y i : ' B e r l in Explosion In  a weapons p ro d u c t io n  p l a n t . ' f a t a h "  -  Black 
September.
13 .6 .7 3 . I t a l y Two t e r r o r i s t s  wounded In an ex p lo s io n  In t h e i r  c a r  
nea r  the  El AI o f f i c e  In  Rome.
“ F a tah "  -  Black 
September.
They were f r e e d  under b a l l ,  
Dec. '7 3 .
7 .5 .7 3 . P a r i s An a t tem p t  by two armed t e r r o r i s t s  to  s e i z e  a  room 
o v e r lo o k in g  the I s r a e l  Embassy and from t h e r e  t o  f i r e  
on the b u i ld in g ,  was thw arted .
1 .7 .7 3 . Washington L t .  Col. Yoscph Ayalon, I s r a e l  A ir  A t ta c h e ,  ambushed and 
murdered n e a r  h i s  home.
w :
%
2 0 .7 .7 3 . Japan-
Llbya
Jumbo J e t  o f  Japanese A v ia t io n  Co. en ro u te  from P a r i s  
f o r  Tokyo v i a  Amsterdam, h i ja c k e d  and landed In I .Ibya..  
One o f  th e  t e r r o r i s t s  was k i l l e d .  P lane blown up on 
2 4 .7 .7 3 .  In Libya.
Habash F ro n t  -  
“ Red Army"
T e r r o r i s t s  c a p tu re d  In L ibya , 
r e l e a s e d  l a t e r .
5 .8 .7 3 . Athens Hass k i l l i n g  a t  Athens a i r p o r t ,  fo u r  p a ssen g e rs  k i l l e d  
3 US c i t i z e n s ,  1 A u s t r ia n )  and 54 wounded (22 American 
32 Creeks) most o f  th e  TWA passengers  from I s r a e l .  The 
t e r r o r i s t s  who v/crc s e iz e d  s a id  they  had t r a i n e d  In 
Libya and were a s s ig n e d  to  k i l l  t r a v e l e r s  who had l e f t  
I s r a e l .
"Arab N a t i o n a l i s t  
Youth O rg an iza t io n  
f o r  t h e  L ib e ra t io n  
o f  P a l e s t i n e . "
T e r r o r i s t s  r e l e a s e d  f o r  Libya 
In  Feb. '7 4 .
3 0 .8 .7 3 . B e i ru t Two t e r r o r i s t s  a r r e s t e d  a t  B e i ru t  a i r p o r t  eh  ro u te  f o r  
C zechso ivak la .
Sa lqa The t e r r o r i s t s  were r e l e a s e d  
5 .9 .7 3 .
5 .9 .7 3 . Rome A t e r r o r i s t  m i s s i l e  a t t a c k  on an  El AI p la n e  a t  Rome, was 
th w a r te d .  5 t e r r o r i s t s  were a r r e s t e d .  In t h e i r  p o s s e s s io n  
were SA-7 m i s s i l e s .
• “ F a tah "  -  Black 
September.
2 t e r r o r i s t s  were r e le a s e d  on  
b a l l ,  30 O c t . .  3 were r e l e a s e d  
t o  L ib y a ,  1 March '7 4 .
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.9 .7 3 . P a r i s F iv e  t e r r o r i s t s  t h a t  occupied  th e  Saudi A rabian Embassy 
and h e ld  II  peop le  h o s ta g e ,  were f re e d  and flown to  Kuwait.
**FataK^* -  s la c k  
September.
t h e  t e r r p r l s t s  were l a t e r  
t r a n s p o r te d  to  Libya.
.9 .7 3 . West B e r l in The I s r a e l i  P a v i l io n
1 .9 .7 3 . A u s t r a l i a A t e r r o r i s t  a r r e s t e d  In A u s t r a l i a n . Black September. T e r r o r i s t  f r e e d  and re tu rn e d  
to  th e  Middle E a s t .
8 .9 .7 3 . A u s t r i a T e r r o r i s t s  occup ied  a t r a i n  t r a n s p o r t i n g  S o v ie t  Jewish  
em ig ran ts  a t  the  Harchegg b o rder  s t a t i o n  (on the  A u s t r ia n  
s id e )  and h e ld  th r e e  Jews h o s ta g e .  In o rd e r  t o  o b ta in  t h e i r  
r e l e a s e  the  A u s t r la n s  d e c la re d  t h a t  they would c lo s e  the  
Schoenau-C astle  t r a n s i t  f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  Immigrants.
•
18.10.73. West B e r l in 4 T e r r o r i s t s  who brought s u i t c a s e  w i th  4 Kg. ex p io  Ives were 
a r r e s t e d .  Planndd t o  a t t a c k  El AI p la n e  and h o t e l s  Had 
Lebanese p a s s p o r t s .
" F a ta h "  -B lack 
September.
Released 10 J u ly  1974.
i S . l l . 7 3 .
»nd
B e i ru t Three armed t e r r o r i s t s  boarded KIM Jumbo In f i e i r r t  and 
ga ined  c o n t ro l  ov e r  I t  a f t e r  t a k e - o f f  fo r  llew-Delhl and 
Tokyo. P lane no t p e rm it te d  to  land a t  s e v e ra l  a i r f i e l d s ,  
f i n a l l y  landed a t  Dubai. T e r r o r i s t s  gave them selves  up 
were a r r e s t e d .




17 .1 1 .7 3 . Geneva*
I s r a e l
f i v e  r ig g e d  enve lopes  ad d re ssed  t o ‘I s r a e l i  government o f f i c e s  
and to  an C l l a t  h o t e l , were d is c o v e re d .  Three a d d i t i o n a l  
enve lopes  d isc o v e re d  In I s r a e l .
2 9 .1 1 .7 3 . H olland  -  
I s r a e l
S I m r ig g e d  enve lopes  s e n t  from H o lland ,  d is c o v e re d  In  I s r a e l .
D«te f  lac« D e s c r ip t io n O rg an iza t io n The P e rp e t ra to r^ *  F a te
England -  
l s r« « l
Nine r igged  enve lopes s e n t  from England t o  I s r a e l  d is c o v e re d .
>7-12.73. Rome S la u g h te r  o f  p a ssen g e rs  a t  Fiumlclno a i r p o r t .  Five t e r r o r i s t s  
a t t a c k e d  Pan American p la n e ,  k i l l i n g  3> p e rso n s  and wounding 
40. At same tim e , t e r r o r i s t s  se iz e d  a Lufthansa  p la n e .  Flew to  
Kuwait and gave them selves up, one o f  h o s ta g e s  ( I t a l i a n )  
c i t i z e n )  was k i l l e d .
“Arab N a t i o n a l i s t  
Youth fo r  th e  
L ib e ra t io n  o f  
P a l e s t i n e " .
T e r r o r i s t s  handed o v e r  t o  Egypt 
and l a t e r  r e le a s e d  fo llow ing  
h i j a c k in g  o f  p lan e  In Nov. *74.
19. 12. 73. P e r l# A J o i n t  c e l l  o f  the  Habash Front and A lg e r ia n  and Turk ish  
t e r r o r i s t  o rg a n iz a t io n s  was uncovered In a  v l l l i .  n ea r  P a r i s .  
Approximately 13 t e r r o r i s t s  were a r r e s t e d  (10 of them Turk ish  
c i t i z e n s  be longing  to  the Popular  L ib e ra t io n  F r t n t ) .  They 
In tended to  kidnap th e  son o f  an I s r a e l i  d lp lu o u t  and to  a t t a c k  




25 . 12. 73 . B r l t e in Four t e r r o r i s t s  s a id  t o  have co n sp ired  to  c a r r y  o u t  a t t a c k s  
a r r e s t e d  In B r i t a i n .
“ F a tah"  -  Black 
September.
The t e r r o r i s t s  were r e le a s e d  
and tu rn e d  o v e r  t o  S y r ia  sho r tV
30. 12. 73 . London Harold S c iv ,  a London Jewish  p e r s o n a l i t y ,  wounded In an 
a s s a s ln a t lo n  a t te m p t .
Habash “ F ro n t" The t e r r o r i s t  e scap ed .
31 . 12. 73 . Cenewe S ix  booby-trapped  p a r c e l s  d isco v e red  In th e  r a i lw a y  s t a t i o n .  
These were n e u t r a l i z e d .
1974 '
20 . 1. 74 . London A Libyan c i t i z e n  a r r e s t e d  In London. I t  was c la im ed  t h a t  h e  was 
t o  c a r ry o u t  an a t t a c k  on th e  El AI o f f i c e s .
He was s e n te n c e d  t o  two y e a r s  
Imprisonment, b u t  e x i l e d .
2 4 .1 .7 4 . London An e x p lo s iv e  charge  h u r le d  In to  th e  London b ranch  o f  Bank Hapoallm. Habash F ro n t
Date P lace D e s c r ip t io n O rg an iza t io n The P e r p e t r a t o r s '  Fa te
31. 1. 74. S ingapore Four t e r r o r i s t s  (two P a l e s t i n i a n s  and two Japanese)  
sabo taged  the  S h e l l  Co. fu e l  depot and then  occupied 
a bo a t  anchored on th e  i s l a n d .
HabasK Front They were f re e d  fou r  days l a t e r  
In  the  wake o f  the  occu p a t io n  
o f  th e  Japanese Embassy in  
Kuwait and f lew  to  South Yemen.
2 . 2 . 74 . Karachi
(P a k is ta n )
Three t e r r o r i s t s  occup ied  a Creek sh ip  and demanded 
the  r e l e a s e  o f  the  two t e r r o r i s t s  who had c a r r i e d  o u t  th e  
Athens m assacre .  (Aug. *73).
"Arab N a t iona l  Youth 
f o r  th e  l i b e r a t i o n  
o f  P a l e s t i n e " .
The t e r r o r i s t s  f lew to  Libya 
and were r e l e a s e d .
6 .2 .7 4 . Kuwait F ive t e r r o r i s t s  occupied  the  Japanese  Embassy In Kuwait 
and demanded th a t  th e  four  t e r r o r i s t s  who c a r r i e d  ou t  th e  
S ingapore o p e r a t io n  be p e rm it te d  to  leave the  co u n try .
Habash -  Japanese Red 
Army
The t e r r o r i s t s  who commit led  t r e  
a c t  were flown In a Japanese 
p lan e  from Singapore to  South 
Yemen to g e th e r  w i th  t h e i r  four 
comrads. There they rece iv ed  
asylum.
3 .3 .7 4 . B e i ru t  -  
Amsterdam
Two t e r r o r i s t s  ga in ed  c o n t ro l  over  B r i t i s h  a i r c r a f t  
a f t e r  t a k e - o f f  from B e i ru t  and flew I t  t o  Amslsrdam. 
T e r r o r i s t s  blew up th e  p lan e  a f t e r  p a ssen g e rs  allowed 
to  a l I g h t .
T e r r o r i s t s  r e le a s e d  In Holland 
a f t e r  h i j a c k in g  o f  B r i t i s h  p lan e  
In Nov. '7 4 .
14. 3 . 74. B e i ru t S ix  t e r r o r i s t s  a r r e s t e d  a t  a i r p o r t  In a t tem p t  to  smuggle 
arms In to  KIM p lan e  t h a t  they  p lanned  to  h i j a c k .
"Arab N a t io n a l i s t  
Youth O rgan iza tion  
f o r  th e  L ib e ra t io n  
o f  P a l e s t i n e " .
T e r r o r i s t s /  r e l e a s e d  f o r  lack  




29 . 5 . 74 . West B e r l in Explosion  n e a r  th e  Japanese  A i r l i n e  Co. cau s in g  s l i g h t
damage.
Habash F ro n t .
2 5 .7 .7 4 . P a r i s A Japanese  c i t i z e n  a r r e s t e d .  In h i s  p o s s e s s io n  were fo rged  
p a s s p o r t s .
Japanese  "Red Army" 
Habash f r o n t
Released S e p t .  '7 4  In th e  wake 
o f  t h e  a t t a c k s  on th e  French 
Embassy, Hague.
OAta P Iac* Description OrgenlzAtlon Th# P«rp#tr#tort* Fat#
3.D .7L P a r i s Three booby-trapped c a r s  exploded In P a r i s  s l i g h t l y  In ju r in g  
two p e o p le .  One c a r  exploded n ea r  the  Jew ish  W elfare  O f f ic e  
In  the  c e n t e r  o f  P a r i s .  The second one n e a r  th e  o f f i c e s  o f  th e  
newspaper "L 'Au.'ore". The t h i r d  nea r  the  e d i t o r i a l  board o f  
the  r i g h t  wing newspaper " H l n u l t " .
liakash F ront
26 . 8 . 74. F ra n k fu r t  -  
Mannheim
Explosion n ea r  the  I s r a e l  T o u r is t  O f f ic e ,  F ra n k fu r t .  At the  
same time a f a c to ry  In Mannheim a s s o c ia te d  w i th  I s r a e l i  . 
i n d u s t r i e s  was sabotaged .
Habash F ro n t  .
8 . 9 . 74 . Greece TUA p lane  en  ro u te  from Lod to  New York v ia  Athens exploded 
In m id a ir  n e a r  the  Creek C oast.  All 68 p assen g e rs  k i l l e d .
Arab N A tlo n a l ls t  
Youth O rg a n iz a t io n  
f o r  th e  L ib e r a t io n  
o f  P a l e s t i n e .
10
to
13. 9 . 74 . Hague Three t e r r o r i s t s  occupied  the  French Embassy ani' he ld  the  
Ambassador and uighc emoloyces h o s ta g e .  They demanded the  
r e l e a s e  o f  the  Japanese t e r r o r i s t  Imprisoned In F rance . The 
f r e n c h  government su r re n d e re d  to  t h e i r  demands.
The Japanese  "Red- 
Army".
The t e r r o r i s t s  were r e le a s e d  
and taken  to  I r a q .
1 .1 0 .7 4 . Rabat 15 t e r r o r i s t s  who were to  a s s a s ln a t e  King Hussein a r r e s t e d  
in  Morocco.
" F a ta h "  -  Black 
September
They were r e le a s e d  and s e n t  to  
Egypt.
22 . 11. 74 . Dubai -  
Tunis
Four t e r r o r i s t s  s e iz e d  B r i t i s h  p lan e  In t r a n s i t  In Dubai en 
r o u te  fo r  London from Far E a s t .  F in a l ly  landed p lane  In T u n is ia  
T u n i s i a .  One h os tage  (U. German p h y s ic ia n )  k i l l e d .
S p l i n t e r  group o f  
El Fa tah  In I r a q .
T e r r o r i s t s  gave them selves up 
handed o v e r  t o  th e  PLO.
12Zi
13. 1. 75. P a r i s Two t e r r o r i s t s  sh o t  ro c k e ts  a t  El Al p lane  a t  Orly a i r p o r t .
They m issed t a r g e t  b u t  h i t  Yugoslav j e t  p lan e  parked n e a r  th e  
I s r a e l i  p la n e .  Three pe rsons  wounded (1 Y ugoslav ,2 F r e n c h ) c l t 1%ens)
Habash F ron t
Oate PImc# D e sc r ip t io n O rg an iza t io n The Fcrpejtra tors*  Fat*
1 9 .1 .7S. P a r i s Attempted a t t a c k  by two t e r r o r i s t s  on El Al a i r c r a f t  a t  
Orly a i r p o r t  f o i l e d .  A f te r  p o l i c e  f i r e d  on th e m , , th e  
t e r r o r i s t s  opened smal1-arms f i r e  and threw hand g renades 
a t  p u b l ic  In the A i r p o r t .  20 p e rso n s  were I n ju re d .  T e r r o r i s t s  
se iz e d  s i x  h o s ta g e s .
Muhammed Budla 
Commando o r  
Habash Front
T e r r o r i s t s  gave them selves up 
t o  I r a q i  a u t h o r i t i e s .
10 .2 .7 S . Geneva Explosion In b u i ld in g  o f  West German C onsu la te .
4 .8 .7 5 . M alaysia Members o f  the  Japanese "Red Army" occupied  the  American 
C onsula te  and Swedish le g a t io n  In the  M alaysian c a p i t a l  
h o ld in g  more than 50 h o s ta g e s .  Japan su r ren d e red  to  the  
t e r r o r i s t ' s  demand and f re e d  7 t e r r o r i s t s  Imprisoned in  Japan .
Japanese  
"Red Army"
1 9 .8 .7 5 . Uest B e r l in Rigged enve lopes  se n t  to  head o f  th e  Jewish community In 
B e r l i n .  The p a rc e l  exploded In a German p o l i c e  c a r  w ith o u t  
cau s in g  damage.
5 .9 .7 5 . Hoi land Four t e r r o r i s t s  b e a r in g  S y rian  p a s s p o r t s  a r r e s t e d  In Amsterdam. 
T he ir  aim was to  tak e  shou t 12 r a i l r o a d  p assen g ers  ho s tag e  
so  as  t o  e v e n tu a l ly  c u t  o f f  Dutch su p p o r t  o f  Jewish  Immigrant* 
t o  I s r a e l .
" S a lq a " The t e r r o r i s t s  were sen ten ced  to  
a  y e a r ' s  Imprisonment.
1 5 .9 .7 5 . Madrid Four t e r r o r i s t s  brokk I n to  th e  Egyptian  Embassy In Spain  and 
s e iz e d  s i x  Egyptian  d ip lom ats  th r e a te n in g  to  k i l l  them u n le s s  
th e  E gyp tian  d e le g a t io n  w ithdrew from th e  Geneva t a l k s  and 
condemned th e  In te r im  accord  w i th  I s r a e l*
" F a ta h " to•n.
u>
• ' # V
Q*te P laça D e sc r ip t io n O rgan lze t lo n r The P e r p e t r a t o r s '  F e te
2 I . I 2 .7 S . Vienna SIm t e r r o r i s t s  occupied  tk e  OPEC b u i ld in g  In c e n t r a l  
Vienna. At th e  time a  convention  o f  th e  o i l  m in i s t e r s  
be long ing  to  th e  o rg a n iz a t io n  was be ing  h e ld .  The . 
t e r r o r i s t s  h e ld  th e  O il M in is te r s  and t h e i r  a i d s .  The 
fo l low ing  day th e  t e r r o r i s t s  and t h e i r  h o s tag es  (approx . 
20) l e f t  fo r  A lg e r ia ,  fo u r  were k i l l e d  (two A u s t r l a n s .  two 
Libyan and one I r a q i )  and a Kuqaltl c i t i z e n  was wounded.
2 9 .1 2 .7 5 . New Vork A r ig g ed  p a rce l  exploded In the  TUA b u i ld in g  a t  Laguardia  
A i r p o r t .  |4  people  were k i l l e d  and 75 wounded.
to
i â Z i
K. ■
•tx
1 2 .1 .76 . New York Three bombs were d isco v e red  n ea r  th e  l i b r a r y  of th e  UN Head- 
q u a t e r s .  One n f  bombs scheduled t o  go nff rnOitents 
b e fo re  the opening o f  th e  S e c u r i ty  Council deba te  on the 
Middle E a s t .  The bombs were d ism an tled .
• ■
J a n .  *76 According 
t o  r e p o r t s  
In Nairobi
Five t e r r o r i s t s  (amongst them a young German man and 
women) were c a p tu re d  abroad when they  a t tem p ted  to  a t t a c k  
an El Al p lane  w i th  m i s s i l e s ,  w i th  more than  100 passengers  
on b oard .
Habash Fron t 
w i th  Hadad C 
Germans.
Brought to  I s r a e l  and 
Im prisoned.
8 .2 .7 6 . U es t  B e r l in A bomb exploded a t  ( I s r a e l ' s )  "O ff ic e  f o r  I s r a e l i  Economic 
A f f a i r s " :
Habash F ron t
* 7 .4 .7 6 . Canada Two t e r r o r s t s  a r r e s t e d  by Canadian p o l i c e .  In t h e i r  p o s se s s io n  
were arms d e s t in e d  to .b e  used d u r in g  th e  Olympic Carnes.
IUt« Place Description Organizktlon Th« P*rp«tr«torft* Fat#
Athcns'Uganda Four t e r r o r i s t s  s e iz e d  an A ir  France  p la n e .  Th: a i r c r a f t  
which wcs en r o u te  from lod  to  Rome wos h i ja c k e d  a f t e r  
having  s topped  a t  A thens. The p la n e  landed a t  Libya and 
l a t e r  a t  Entebbe, Uganda. 2li6 passen g ers  and 12 crewmen 
were on b o a .d .  On 30 Ju n e ,  46 passen g ers  were f r e e d .  On 
J u ly  1 s t .  an a d d i t i o n a l  100 were r e le a s e d .  78 I s r a e l i s ,  
dual n a t i o n a l s ,  and th e  p l a n e 's  crew remained. On the  n ig h t  
o f  J u ly  3-4 an IDF Commando ( c o n s i s t in g  o f  ground add a i r  
f o r c e s )  l i b e r a t e d  the  passengers  In a b r i l l i a n t ,  d a r in g  
o p e r a t io n .  One IDF o f f i c e r  was k i l l e d ,  th r e e  I s r a e l i  
c i t i z e n s  were k i l l e d  and f i v e  o th e rs  wounded, and fo u r  I s r a e l i  
s o l d i e r s  were wounded. S evera l  days a f t e r  th e  o p e r a t io n  
Mrs. BIbch, a p assenger  o f  th e  p lan e  was murdered a f t e r  
be ing  abducted  from a Ugandlan h o s p i t a l  by Idl Amin's a g e n t s .
1 0 .7 .7 6 . P a r i s  . An e x p lo s io n  occu red  In th e  Bnel B r l th  o f f i c e . .
2 0 .7 .7 6 Rom# E xplosion  n ea r  th e  S y r ia n  a l r l l n e s ' o f f i c e s  In Rome. P r in te d  
m a t te r  s t a t i n g  p a l e s t i n i e n  t e r r o r i s t s  were r e s p o n s ib le  was
found In th e  v i c i n i t y  o f  the  b l a s t .
1 2 .8 .7 6 . Istambul A ttack  upon an El Al p lane  by th r e e  t e r r o r i s t s .  The p lane  was 
p re p a r in g  to  ta k e  o f f  f o r  a  f l i g h t  from Istambul to  Tel-Aviv 
Two I s r a e l i  n a t i o n a l s  were k l l l k d ,  one American Jew, one 
Ja p a n e se  n a t io n a l  were k i l l e d .  18 I s r a e l i  n a t i o n a l s ,  one Swiss 
and two Americans were wounded. During t h e i r  I n t c r o g a t lo n  th e  
t e r r o r i s t s  t o l d  t h a t  they  r e c e iv e d  p a s s p o r t s  and were t r a i n e d  
In  Libya and t h a t  th ey  l e f t  Libya f o r  Rome.and from t h e r e  to -  
is ta m b u l .  A T urk ish  policeman was wounded.
Habash f r o n t Two t e r r o r i s t s  were c a p t u r e d ^  
by T u rk ish  a u t h o r i t i e s  and 
brought t o  I s r a e l .  The t h i r d  
t e r r o r i s t  was k i l l e d .
0ac« Place D e s c r ip t io n O rg an iza t io n The P e rp e t r a to r s *  Fa te • u
6 .1 1 .7 6 Isiambtil P l a s t i c  bomb e x p lo s io n  in  the  El Al b u i ld in g  which caused 
s l i g h t  dammage.
17 .11 .76 Amman Four t e r r o r i s t s  a t ta c k e d  the. i n t e r c o n t in e n t a l  H o te l .
They h e ld  the  b u i ld in g  and h o s ta g e s .  In a c o u n te r ­
a t t a c k  th e  Jo rdan ian  army re c a p tu red  the  b u i ld in g ,  
l i b e r a t i n g  the  h o s ta g e s .  A Jo rdan ian  o f f i c e r  and s o l d i e r  
were k i l l e d  and one s o l d i e r  wounded. In th e  a t t a c k  two 
h o te l  workers were k i l l e d  and two guests»  from Holland and 
America, were wounded.
"B lack Ju n e" Three t e r r o r i s t s  were k i l l e d .  One 
s e r i o u s l y  wounded, and n g c a p tu ra d ,
toah
CTV
6 .5 .7 7 B e i ru t A Norvégien s tu d e n t  was a r r e s t e d  a t  B e i r u t ' s  a i r p o r t  
when he was about to  board  a p lane  bound fo r  F ra n k fu r t .
He was t o  have e v e n tu a l ly  to  have p la n te d  a  bomb in  I s r a e l .
"Democratic
F ro n t"
^ . 9 . 7 7 " Bengta H i ja c k e rs  forced  a Japanese  a i r l i n e r  in  ro u te  t o  Turkey Japanesa  Red The h i j a c k e r s  a long  w i th  t h e i r
5 .1 0 .7 7 Deth from P a r i s  t o  land a t  Bengla Oesh. The h i j a c k e r s  demanded 
th e  r e l e a s e  o f  6 imprisoned comradS and a  ransom o f  6 m i l l i o n  
d o l l a r s .  They f le w  to  Kuweit. Damascus, and AlgerlA where 
they  su r re n d e re d  them selves t o  a u t h o r i t i e s  a f t e r  t h e i r  demands 
had been  m et.
Army • comrads were a p p a re n t ly  
camps In A lg e H a .
. -
Date Place Description Organization The Perpetrators' Fate
4 . 9 . 76 . Mice A KLH p lane  from Madrid to  Amsterdam v ia  Nice was H ijack ed .
On the p la n e  were 84 passengers  and 7 crew members.
(France) p lan e  l a t e r  flew in to  I s r a e l i  s k ie s  demanding t h a t  t e r r o r i s t s
In I s r a e l  be f r e e d .  A f te r  I s r a e l  re fu se d  to  answer the  
t e r r o r i s t s  demands the  p lane  r e tu rn e d  to  Cyprus. Through the 
I n t e r v e n t io n  o f  a PLO r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  
the  Libyan l e g a t io n  in  Cyprus the  a f f a i r  was ended.
J I b r l l  "F ro n t"  
(Abu Abas)
The th r e e  t e r r o r i s t s  were taken  
t o  th e  Libyan Embassy In  Cyprus 
and from then  to  L ibya.
2 4 -2 5 .9 .7 6 Rome -  Arsen In a jo in t ly -o w n ed  I t a l i a n  I s r a e l i  i r r i g a t i o n  co n ce rn .
-  Molotov c o c k ta i l  In "IIIAS" Rome o f f i c e .
-  Molotov c o c k ta i l  In a  Lebanese M aronite  m onesta ry . The 
molotov c o c k ta i l  d id  not exp lode .
"Assan KanfanI"
a n t l z l o n l s t
commando.
2 4 .9 .7 6 Lod-Bofflbay A p la n  t o  c a r ry  o u t  a t t a c k s  a t  I s r a e l ' s  Ben Cur on a i r p o r t ,  
on I s ra e l -b o u n d  f l i g h t s  and w i th in  I s r a e l  p ro p e r ,  was f o i l e d  
as  a r e s u l t  o f  th e  a r r e s t  o f  a  Dutch g i r l  Lodwira J a n s e n ,  who 
acco rd in g  to  h e r  own adm ission  had been t r a i n e d  In Aden.
A Second Dutch c i t i z e n  Marios Nieuwenborg was a r r e s t e d  a t  
Bombay A i r p o r t .
• (O
lU
4 .1 0 .7 6 West B e r l in Explos ion  In an I s r a e l i  r e s t a u r a n t .
Date P lace D e sc r ip t io n O rg a n isa t io n
13.10 .77-  
18 .10 .77  '
I
Majorca A L ufthansa  a i r l i n e r  c a r ry in g  87 p assangers  and crew
was h i ja c k e d  en rou te  from Majorca t o  F r a n k f u r t . The 
p lan e  was flown v ia  Rome to  L arnaca, Cyprus and from 
there, to  Oubay, Aden, and Som alia . The h i j a c k e r s  who 
demanded a ransom and the  r e le a s e  o f  imprisoned comrads 
in  Ankara and Germany, k i l l e d  the  p l a n e 's  c a p t a in .  On 
the n ig h t  o f  17-18 the ho s tag es  were r e le a s e d  by an o p e ra t io n  
s tag ed  by German commandos In Somalia .
Wadi Hadad In Three male t e r r o r i s t s  k i l l e d
c o n ju c t lo n  w i th  and a female t e r r o r i s t  wounded,
a German T e r r o r i s t  
o r g a n iz a t io n .
toA00
2 0 .1 1 .7 7  Cannes An e x p lo s iv e  charge d isco v e red  in a h a l l  wh?re a French*
(France) I s r a e l i  meeting was ta k in g  p la c e .
1 .2 .7 8 Hoi land Symptoms o f  po ison ing  d isc o v e re d  In 5 c h i ld r e n  who had Arab R evo lu tion •
e a te n  I s r a e l i  o ranges .  Warning l e t t e r s  were s e n t  t o  v a r io u s Army. P a l e s t i n e
n a t io n s  by P a l e s t i n i a n  so u rc e s . command (a p p a re n t ly 1
f i c t i t i o u s  name
• which had been
mentioned a t  th e
time o f  an a s s a s s i n a t i o n
a t te m p t  on S y r ia n
F ore ign  m in i s t e r
Khadam, O ct.  '7 7 . )
m / m m
0»tc Place Description Organitatlon The Pr
30.3.7s West Berlin Time bomb planted near an EI-AI office was dismatled by 
a demolitions expert.
20.5.78 Orly airport, 
Paris
Three terrorists who apparently arrived from Tunis attacked 
passengers waiting at the El AI terminal. A French policeman 
and a civilian were killed. Two others were wounded.




An explosion near Agrexco's Frankfurt office caused extensive 




20.8.78 London A bus carrying 20 El AI crew members was attacked by terrorists. 
A stewardess was killed and three crew members were wounded.
Six British citizens were likewise wounded.
1 '
One terrorist was killed 




1. An explosive charge went off near an Israeli restaurant.







18.10.78 Ber 1 in 2 bombs were planted near buildings belonging to Jews. 
One exploded causing considerable damage. •
;
